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Abstract 
 
This study begins with the clinical observation that psychopathic patients distort and 
disrupt the organisation containing and caring for them on one hand, and that 
organisational leaders manage to galvanise followers into realising his vision on the 
other; the two seeming to be phenomenologically similar; the former is 
organisationally effective antisocially, and the latter, pro-socially; one destructive 
and one creative.  
 
The study explores the implications of this observation through the sociological, 
psychological and leadership literatures, having focussed on the question of how 
managers are effective within organisations and to what extent is the personality or 
psychopathy of a manager a critical variable. Examining Hitler as a crucial case 
study, who as a leader combined effectiveness, charisma and a personality cult  
with a violent and psychopathic regime, the study uses a hermeneutic 
phenomenology methodology. Having looked at the case through the triangulated 
lenses of personality, historical context (structure) and managerial case history 
(agent), the study concludes that charisma rather than psychopathy may the critical 
success factor, and it proposes and describes a concept of "managerial agency" as 
a capability that combines charismatic with transactional and more coercive 
leadership.  
 
It argues that the sociological dualism of structure and agency ontologically are the 
same, such that social structures are collectively held (structurated) ideas. In an 
organisational (managerial) context they are divided by a relationship between the 
owner of the structure and the agent. The managerial agent, charismatically uses 
inspiration of and care for the individual subordinate, to modify (structurate) their 
psychology and attitudes, establishing energetic adherence to the manager’s task, 
which influence can be strengthened with more hierarchical transactional factors.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This research asks a particular set of questions about how leaders and managers 
are effective within organisations1. Driven by a “clinical hunch” that leaders and 
psychopathic patients have personality traits in common, the question is to what 
extent the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable in 
determining their effectiveness.  
 
Having explored clinical, sociological and leadership literatures, Hitler, was selected 
as a “crucial case”, in which effective agency, psychopathy and charisma are all 
widely-noted properties. His combination of the components of leadership 
(charisma, determination and a clear vision), with those of management, 
(transactional elements and the use of systems) lead to the construct “managerial 
agency”. Core in this concept is the charismatic, emotional manipulation of 
colleagues to change their internal psychological structures, combined with 
maximising the potential of positional power.  
 
 
1.1 Psychopathic agency by patients.  
 
The research question was developed during a career of clinical practice with 
personality disordered patients, in the context of simultaneously occupying 
leadership and management roles.  
 
Personality disorder as a concept tries to capture the notion that people can be 
“crazy” but not formally insane, that their problems and behaviours (usually forms of 
violence and self harm) are an extreme of normal, and therefore better described as 
compulsively and destructively eccentric; their “deeply ingrained maladaptive 
patterns of behaviour”2are cited as part of the clinical definition.   
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The observation as a clinician is that some personality disordered patients can 
enact a form of ground up leadership; achieving organisational impact and potency 
by disrupting and undermining the structures attempting to contain or treat them, 
usually prisons and psychiatric hospitals. The observation as a manager was that 
these patients have a similar set of interpersonal skills as effective leaders and 
managers.  
 
Some examples demonstrate not only the patients’ pathology and risk, but also their 
agency or organisational potency in effectively disrupting and/or damaging the 
organisation containing them.  
 
A patient in a secure personality disorder treatment unit escapes, and while 
at large and as part of his negotiation to return, constructs a complaint 
about the unit that is highly publicised, leads to exchanges in parliament, a 
full judicial enquiry, the closure of the unit, and nearly the hospital.3  
 
A patient seduces and impregnates a female member of staff in a well 
known secure hospital, selling the story to a tabloid newspaper, which 
publishes it with pictures of her heavily pregnant taken without her 
knowledge.  
 
A psychiatric hospital ward has three riots within a short space of time that 
stop when a particular patient is removed, although the ward that he is sent 
to subsequently has a more serious riot. 
 
A young and good looking male patient is refused psychological treatment, 
subsequently lacerating his face in a shopping mall, leading to criticism in 
the local press, and the provision of the therapy that he was requesting. Out 
of largesse, the female CEO meets him with the medical director to explain 
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their care plan. Subsequently, he fabricates a complaint about the female 
CEO alleging sexual harassment, taking this to the local papers leading to 
the resignation of the CEO. 
 
An inpatient requests that staff witness a change of name deed, the patient 
changing his surname. The story is covered in the national press as a 
marriage ceremony to a celebrity that he has stalked for years, thus linking 
the name of the celebrity to the stalker. 
 
The personality disorder type or trait involving violence is antisocial/dissocial 
personality,4 and its more extreme and focussed variant is psychopathy.5 The 
“malice aforethought” involved in the seduction and impregnation of a female 
member of staff in order to make some money from a tabloid newspaper (as in the 
second example) contains within it several of the key factors attributed to popular 
conceptions of psychopathy, namely violence (psychological in this case), 
callousness, lack of empathy, and charm to enact the seduction.  
 
In addition to these psychopathic symptoms, however, there seemed to be another 
factor more closely allied to leadership. These organisationally effective, destructive 
patients were demonstrating an ability to plan, to act strategically and to engage 
others in enacting their plan. The plan included the identification of the gaps and 
weaknesses in the security of the systems that contained them, and the gaps and 
weaknesses in the staff that were working with them. It was from a consideration of 
these similarities that the “clinical hunch” emerged regarding the similarity of leaders 
and such psychopathic patients.  
 
1.2 Psychopathic agency by managers?  
 
A number of popular books have linked psychopathy with management and 
leadership.6 At training courses and conferences about psychopathy someone will 
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usually comment that the psychopathic person or characteristic just described sums 
up their manager, a well known politician, or one of the seminar leaders or 
conference presenters. In such settings, the resonance of these comments may 
derive from most people having had the experience of becoming aware that they are 
being manipulated, or more overtly bullied, by a manager or leader. The examples 
below are some of the researcher’s experience of such phenomena.  
 
In a secure hospital setting, complaints were made and concern expressed 
that a senior manager was bringing items in for a psychopathic patient; it 
was concluded that the manager had been duped and compromised. A plan 
was drawn up in which the patient would be moved from the unit at the 
same time as the manager was moved to a different function. Preparations 
were made without the managers’ knowledge to prevent the manager 
making the patient aware; to manage the risk the patient might present, and 
to enable effective and decisive management of the compromised manager. 
 
Negotiating the development of government regulation of psychotherapy, 
the Department of Health proposed this be under the new “Health 
Professions Council”. Seeing this as unsuited to the regulation of “talking 
heads” psychotherapies, as opposed to physical therapies such as 
Occupational Therapy, Osteopathy, and Podiatry, the psychotherapists and 
psychologists together formed a powerful lobby group chaired by Lord 
Alderdice (a psychiatrist and psychotherapist), proposing an alternative 
psychotherapy bill in the Lords.  Behind the back of this group, the 
Department of Health approached the British Psychological Society, who 
had been seeking state regulation for years, offering them a fast track into 
the Health Professions Council and state registration, thus splitting the 
larger “talking heads” group and neutering their resistance.  
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In a secure hospital setting, the lead clinician had been a Doctor. A senior 
psychologist was brought in by the new CEO to carry out a consultation and 
“review”, under which terms his input was accepted by the clinical 
therapeutic staff. In the event, the review did not materialise, but instead the 
psychologist replaced the consultant psychiatrist in terms of managerial role 
and funding of his post. The concept of a “review” was, in retrospect, a 
managerial ruse to facilitate entry and acceptance.  
 
In each of these examples, in retrospect the managerial decisions were appropriate 
and correct in the circumstances. In spite of having been a dupe in all three 
instances, the researcher accepts that the ends justified the means of pragmatic 
managerial enactment.  The paradox, therefore, is that apparently at times the only 
way to get the right thing done is via duplicitous and manipulative managerial 
methods. Opprobrium for Machiavellianism may be a disavowal of managers’ 
everyday real strategy in dealing with people. Managers can’t always tell people the 
truth; have to close down their empathetic resonance with subordinates, and have to 
“groom” and charm people consciously to manipulate them. Each of these are 
psychopathic traits that are being used in the broader interests of the managerial 
strategy, and their legitimacy and moral justifiability are determined by the moral 
valance of that strategy or intended outcome. 
 
The “clinical hunch” that emerged was as follows: on the one hand the psychopathic 
patient undermines the organisation containing them, eroding its culture and 
structure by manipulating peers and staff. On the other, a good manager or leader 
leads and develops the organisation, altering its culture and structure by 
manipulating executive board peers and subordinate staff. Patients and managers 
are using the same set of manipulative levers antisocially, and pro-socially 
respectively.   
 
 
 14 
 
1.3 Managerial agency 
 
The notion of managerial effectiveness leans into the researcher’s preoccupations 
that are being triangulated in the study. These are; 
 
1. Within an organisation, how do people get things done? This element 
derives from the execution of the researcher’s own management and 
leadership roles, and seems to rest heavily on the extent to which a 
manager or leader can galvanise the support of their subordinates to enact 
their vision. In this way, the phenomenon being explored elides the 
concepts of leadership and management, which are more commonly 
separated into distinct functions. 7 
2. How is it that people at the bottom of a hierarchy can change 
organisations? This element derives from clinical work with PD patients 
whose symptoms include distorting and destroying the organisation by 
which they are contained, and a wish to understand the mechanism by 
which this agency operates.  
3. What relevance does the personality of the leader have to the 
movement or organisation that bears their name? To what extent is 
Emerson right that “there is properly no history, only biography”?8  
 
These preoccupations are the basis for the first limb of the research question, “how 
managers are effective within organisations”, A model of “managerial agency” is 
proposed as a response that combines leadership and sociological concepts.  
 
The second limb of the research question, namely, “to what extent is the personality 
and psychopathy of the manager is a critical variable,” derives from the researcher’s 
heuristic perspective as a psychoanalytically trained psychiatrist specialising in 
personality. Although this second half of the research question is less squarely met 
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with an outcome from the research, it is proposed that the critical personal variable 
for managerial effectiveness is charisma rather than psychopathy per se.  
 
In looking at “how managers are effective within organisations and to what extent is 
the personality or psychopathy of a manager a critical variable”, there are several 
areas specifically bracketed out.   
 
1. This is not about organisational strategy or “what to do”.9 Achieving 
organisational success is in large part the result of selecting the right 
strategy in the external environment. To the extent that making the right 
strategic decisions expedites the leader’s agency internally, it is bracketed 
out within this project.  
2. This is not about “change management”,10 an internal campaign utilising 
various techniques and strategies contingent on the nature of the change to 
percolate a new idea or way of doing things through an organisational unit; 
evaluating resistors, neutrals and supporters. This again can be seen as 
strategy, although internal rather than external. 
 
In summary, the question driving the research derives from the observation that 
there are people who are able to effectively manipulate and massage organisations 
and the individuals who make them up. Revolutionaries and some psychopathic 
patients are able to do this from the bottom of the organisation or structure, and 
effective leaders are able to do this from the top. In the first example above, the 
patient, Daggett, who had escaped from Ashworth high security hospital, triggered a 
full judicial enquiry and debate in the House of Commons followed by £3bn 
investment in treating psychopathy differently between 2000 and 2008.11 Daggett 
had agency, but was not managerial. Managerial agency as a concept proposes 
that individuals, by force of their personalities, can enrol followers to accept and 
enact their vision. This ability is further amplified by combining with their structural 
position of power to amplify their potency and agency further.  
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1.4 Outlining the research: Executive summary 
 
In exploring the stated research question of “how managers are effective within 
organisations and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a 
critical variable”, a style of research is adopted (chapter 5) which is intended to allow 
for rich and nuanced understandings and theoretical propositions.  
 
Within this paradigm, the managerial and leadership literature is reviewed (chapter 
2), with a particular emphasis on the phenomenon of charismatic leadership. As this 
chapter is focused on the leaders in the context of the second limb of the research 
question, “to what extent the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical 
variable”, there is a brief account of the personality and psychopathy literature.  
 
Next, the sociological literature is explored (chapter 3) particularly examining 
accounts and models of structure and agency, Archer’s morphogenic theory; and 
the power literature as relevant to a manager’s enactment of their authority. This 
exploration provides a platform to propose a theory of structure and agency as an 
interpersonal relationship by incorporating psychoanalytic “object relations” theory. 
Finally, within the theoretical exposition, because there is little or no scholarly 
literature about psychopathic leadership directly,12 the issue is explored by looking 
at “bad leadership” (chapter 4) through the literature available, and more generally 
in terms of ethics.  
 
In the theoretical discussion, proposed contributions arrived at include an “object 
relations” theory of structure and agency (3.3); an evolutionary theory of “bad 
charisma” (4.2.2) and redefinition of criminal organisations (4.5). 
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Having explained and argued for the legitimacy of the hermeneutic 
phenomenological research paradigm as appropriate to a project exploring social 
and psychological issues, and looking for complex and textured hypotheses, 
(chapter 5), a crucial case study research method (chapter 6) is described and 
justified in terms of Hitler having combined the elements in the research, having 
lead a psychopathic and violent movement, having been an effective leader, having 
had a personality cult, and being said to be charismatic.  
 
The research data are then presented in four chapters so developing an account 
and understanding of Hitler as the crucial case. These look in turn at the man 
biographically and psychiatrically (chapter 7); at the structural context culturally and 
historically (chapter 8), and at his career as a leadership/management case history 
(chapter 9). The structuring of the case history reflects a structure/agency; 
context/case dialectic that runs through the research, then leadership and cultural 
themes from the case history are explored (chapter 10).  
 
In the case history, specifically, it is concluded that the evidence does not support a 
view that Hitler was characteristically/clinically psychopathic but there are stronger 
indications that he probably had Asperger’s syndrome. It is also concluded that the 
NSDAP and the German state from 1930 were a criminal organisation (10.1/10.2). 
 
In the final chapter (Chapter 11), having outlined various contributory conclusions 
previously arrived at, a model of “managerial agency” is proposed. This concept 
combines the proposed leadership model of interpersonal account of agency (3.3) 
and charisma, with the transactional and hierarchical managerial elements that 
emerged in the case history.  Finally, some limitations of the study are noted, as are 
proposals for further research. 
 
The overall conclusions of the project are that in response to the first limb of the 
research question, “how managers enact agency within organisations” the concept 
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of “managerial agency” is proposed. This holds that a “managerial agent” has an 
ability to mutate and change the internal “structurated” attitudes of followers, 
accessing and manipulating these through the mechanisms described in the 
charismatic leadership literature. The manager/leader adapts their goals to align 
with and appeal individually to followers’ aspirations and values. Having evolved and 
developed a cultural hegemony, the positional, structural and coercive power 
achieved amplifies and extends the leader’s agency.  
 
Looking at the second limb of the research question, “to what extent the personality 
or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable in determining their effectiveness”, 
it is broadly concluded that charisma is a crucial factor, but that psychopathy is not. 
The influential psychopathic patients described in chapter 1 were more likely to have 
been effective by virtue of their charismatic manipulative skills rather than their 
psychopathy.  
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2. Personality, leadership and charisma 
 
 
The research question of “how managers are effective within organisations, and to 
what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable” is 
motivated and shaped by the researcher’s personal heuristic of understanding 
organisations and cultural movements in terms of the personalities that lead them.  
 
Through the researcher’s professional practice of psychoanalytically informed 
psychiatric practice with personality disordered patients, a sensitivity has developed 
to the fit between people, the situations that they end up in, and to the organisations 
or groups that that they may lead managerially. The tendency is to understand 
events, organisations and cultural phenomena in terms of the personalities of the 
protagonists in the same way as in professional practice.  
 
The difficulty is that this perspective of personalising understandings of current affairs 
and artistic and intellectual creativity can be decried as a tabloid oversimplification. 
The 1984 miners’ strike as a crisis was about Scargill, a Jaguar driving Marxist, and 
Thatcher, determined to pay back the humiliation meted out to the Heath 
government: a clash of personalities. 
 
Other explanations, perhaps in terms of the evolution of a post-industrial society; the 
legitimacy of the state investing in peoples’ jobs; the battles over union power and the 
UK industrial malaise; the emergence and legitimacy of the monetarist “big idea” as 
an alternative to Keyensianism are potentially obscured by a simplistic 
anthropomorphisation of the contest.   
 
Notwithstanding this critique, the definition of historical epochs in English history in 
terms of the monarchs remains; the Elizabethan or Victorian periods are phenomena 
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understood in part in terms of the personality of that particular monarch. In relation to 
this research, more relevant are the social and political movements that bear the 
name of their originator; Scargillism or Thatcherism in the example above, where 
there is a clear link between the ideas and leadership of the individual and the 
movement that takes their name.  
 
The subsequent chapter explores the research question from the sociological 
perspective of structure and agency. This chapter is exploring what the leadership 
and personality literature has to say about the nature of the agent.  
 
 
2.1 Leaders  
 
One argument in favour of the idea that the actual person at the helm of an 
organisation; the actual person leading a structural change is important, is the 
existence of the executive search industry. The idea that for a particular task, there 
will be people who will be more and less good at achieving it, so finding and attracting 
the right person becomes a task absorbing large amounts of energy and thinking. 
The high level of executive salaries is constantly justified on the basis of there being 
competition for the particular people that are needed.  
 
The ability of a leader or person with positional authority to get people to do things is 
dependant on their ability to motivate them and persuade them to carry out the 
leader’s requests; this in turn is dependant on their ability to alter cultural content and 
attitudes within the environment, and within the individual persons that comprise it. 
Notwithstanding the developing critical stance,13 the driving force of the vast and 
exponentially multiplying leadership literature seems to have been an effort to find a 
holy grail of more effective leadership. The performance of an organisation or group 
is elastic. For the same sunk costs of wages and equipment, vastly different 
outcomes can be obtained depending on how hard people work and how enthusiastic 
 21 
 
they are, and this arguably depends on the quality of the leadership being provided. 
Good leadership therefore may be a very valuable commodity.  
 
 
2.1.1 Leadership   
The leadership literature is vast, ranging from hagiographies to lists of tasks to unlock 
the mysteries. Scoullier14 distinguishes between literature describing models of 
leadership as, 
 
 “Philosophies” of leadership, for example the notion of servant leadership, 
and  
 “Styles” of leadership, value and philosophy neutral descriptions of the 
behaviour of leaders in practice.  
 
Carlyle’s biography of Fredrick the Great was an example of pre 20th century 
leadership study.15 Great (almost exclusively) men might be studied as a means of 
understanding their power. Built upon this, the “trait theories” of leadership in the 
1930s and 1940s, looked at the personality traits of the leaders of American industry, 
predictably finding them to be “tall white men”, and rather discrediting the trait theory 
of leadership in the process.16 Other research proposes that a person’s history or 
personality can determine their likelihood of becoming a leader, for example being 
first born17, to having narcissistic traits18 
 
Hofstede’s work, finding different styles of leadership in different divisions of IBM in a 
number of different countries,19 argued leadership was contingent, in this instance, on 
prevailing culture. The styles of management literature proposed that the style was 
contingent on the nature of the work; that one would vary between focussing on the 
task (for example in more manual industries) and focussing on the people (for 
example in a more professional setting).20 Different organisational cultures were 
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characterised; high focus on people and low on task was a “country club” style; low 
focus on people and high focus on task was a “produce or perish” style and so on.  
 
There followed a host of different ways of characterising the variables, for example 
Hersey and Blanchard distinguishing between the leader having to “tell” or “sell” the 
task depending on follower willingness;21 or Feidler’s model distinguishing between 
leaders adopting a more task or relationship orientated approach based upon 
organisational “favourableness”.22 According to Schein, the key to being able to 
mobilise the individuals that make up an organisational unit is by manipulation or 
management of the culture.23  
 
These models derived some empirical support, and in general it seemed that leader 
behaviours were more correlated with performance or effectiveness than leader 
traits.24 However, the atomisation of behavioural descriptive approaches seem too 
concrete to incorporate the very considerable differences in behaviour that leaders 
exhibited.25  
 
As a result, there seems to have been a bifurcation of the literature, with on one hand 
a more explicit empirical examination of leadership behaviour,26 or on the other 
exploring what Lord Slim termed leadership “of the spirit”.27  
 
Another bifurcation has been the development of a distinction between transactional 
type leadership28 where the leader articulates their structural power with rewards or 
censure; and transformational leadership29 involving the building of a collective vision 
and the intellectual stimulation of followed by the leader, in the context of concern for 
followers, the latter being closer to Lord Slim’s account. The emphasis within this 
current research project is on the psychological and interpersonal dimension of 
leadership, on transformational rather than transactional accounts. Leadership as 
combining concepts of “spirit”; cultural and personal transformation and the 
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interpersonal dimensions of agency point towards charismatic theorisation of 
leadership, which will be explored next.   
 
 
2.1.2 Charisma 
There are a number of difficulties with the charisma concept, redolent of the irrational, 
religious and charlatan. The word “charisma” means “God’s grace”.30 Notwithstanding 
these, in the current exploration of how managers are effective within organisations 
and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager a critical variable 
the concept of charisma has come to occupy a central position.  
 
In the classical Weberian account, the attraction of the charismat derives firstly from 
the anxiety of being in a crisis situation and becoming dependant on someone 
coming forward with a solution, irrespective of whether this is a good or bad one.31 
The charismatic leader therefore exploits people’s emotional vulnerability in a 
situation of anxiety provoking crisis. This is a key to the concept. Charismatic 
leadership is about the manipulation of followers’ emotions, about the circumventing 
of their rationality such that they put aside their own interests to some degree in 
favour of the interests of the leader, or the organisational task.  
 
The charismatically-led follower works harder and becomes more productive for no 
material benefit or gain for themselves other than pleasing the leader, and feeling like 
an effective and legitimate part of a social group. Belief in a charismatic leader (which 
is ubiquitous) is an example of an irrational loss of personal emotional control. This is 
why when faith is lost, they have to be vilified, as if they had turned bad.  
  
The charisma literature consists largely of impressionistic definitions, perspectives 
and anecdotes that are difficult to integrate and synthesise. Because the concept has 
emerged as a central element in the research, five different approaches to the 
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concept are now summarised in some although the different perspectives are partly 
overlapping and contradictory.  
 
2.1.2.1 Weber. The classical and most accessible approach to theorising charisma is 
that of Weber, for whom charisma was one of the four forms of political “domination” 
(also translated as “authority”), alongside traditional, patriarchal and legal 
domination.32 Weber’s charismatic leader is more likely to be legitimised in a context 
of social upheaval and uncertainty, in which followers latch onto the three facets of 
the concept; firstly the leader’s clear sense of vision, what to do; secondly the 
leader’s perceived exceptional qualities; and thirdly what Weber describes as a “felt 
duty” to action the leader's vision.  
 
Weber’s “felt duty” with can be linked with House’s characterisation of charismat’s 
ability to inspire better performance via confidence in their ability coupled with high 
expectations;33 Conger and Kanugo describe empowerment via an increase in the 
self efficacy belief of followers.34 
 
The other important aspect of the Weberian account of charisma is that it is inherently 
unstable. In spite of followers ignoring some faults and mistakes in order to preserve 
the idealisation of their leader, real failure deconstructs their belief in his exceptional 
qualities and so their attachment. Secondly, the context of situational crisis that 
bolsters the charismatic leaders' power will not be permanent, so that there is a 
tendency for charismatic organisations to evolve into Weberian bureaucracies 
through the process of “routinisation”.35  
 
2.1.2.2 Bass and Alvolio’s “4 Is”. A second access point into the concept of 
charismatic leadership is via the “4 Is” model of Bass and Alvolio that underpins their 
leadership questionnaire, the MLQ (Multi factor Leadership Questionnaire).36 The “I”s 
referred to identify four characteristic aspects of charismatic leadership;  
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 Idealised influence – corresponding to Weber’s attribution of exceptional 
abilities, the charismat is believed to be above the commonality. 
 Inspirational motivation – this combines the Weberian attribution of vision 
and clarity of direction with an ability to be able both to effectively 
communicate it and make it believably attainable. 
 Intellectual stimulation – similar to Weber’s “felt duty”, it involves the 
follower personally buying into the vision, the strategy to achieve it, and the 
belief that it represents a path to a better future. The follower with a 
charismatic leader is personally intellectually stimulated and motivated by the 
task.  
 Individualised consideration. This has been linked “EQ”, emotional 
intelligence, the ability of some leaders to have an empathetic resonance 
with followers,37 but it extends beyond this to both tuning into followers 
feeling states, and also having a personal connection with individual 
followers. Related to charismatic leadership it has two facets,  
o It enables the leader to describe the vision in terms that will chime 
with the aspirations for the future of followers, and with their 
dissatisfactions with the current situation, so that they will buy into 
the strategy.  
o In individual interactions, it develops a personalised sense of 
connection between the follower and leader that promotes follower 
(faithfulness). 
 
2.1.2.3 Steyrer’s Mechanisms. A third approach to understanding charismatic 
leadership is to follow Steyrer’s “conceptual system of concepts”38(sic), which 
theorise the mechanisms by which charismatic leadership operates. He identifies four 
groups of theories; 
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 Leader-centred theories; to the leader attributions mentioned above he 
adds a Kohutian psychoanalytic concept of a grandiose sense of self that 
requires idealisation by followers.39  
 Follower centred theories that include Mendel’s “social contagion effect”;40 
within a context of crisis, people need a leader to follow, and attribute them 
with charismatic characteristics, and the other side of Kohutian Narcissism, 
that the leader takes on an idealised protective parent image that the 
follower can be part of.  
 Context centred theories, where the emphasis is on the crisis in the 
environment. 
 Interdependency theories, where the two elements of narcissism come 
together, the leader’s need to have followers, and the follower’s need to 
have a leader.  
 
2.1.2.4 Typologies. The fourth approach is to look at the series of distinctions that 
have emerged in the literature that clarify the concept of charismatic leadership and 
in doing so, have contributed to the evolution of the concept.  
 
 Transactional and transformational leadership: the distinction between 
the two.  
o Transactional leaders “… influence the behaviour of their followers by 
exchanging one thing for another”;41 equated with the more standard 
management practice.  
o The transformational leader “… motivates followers to do more than 
they originally intended to do”42, transforming the follower’s attitude 
and performance.   
 Charismatic and transformational leadership, similarities and 
distinctions. At times, it seems that the terms “transformational” and 
”charismatic” leadership are used synonymously to describe a style of 
leadership that employs a social dimension, or which utilises the emotions 
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of workers. At other times, the distinction between transformational and 
charismatic leadership is seen as one of degree, with charismatic leaders 
being an order of magnitude more intense in their use of emotion. For 
example Connelly’s43 account, wherein communicating his vision, the 
transformational leader inspires interest, excitement, optimism and hope in 
followers; the charismatic leader inspires all of these and awe in addition. In 
establishing their initial influence, the transformational leader creates a 
feeling of relief, contentment and happiness in followers; the charismatic 
leader creates these feelings, and in addition, feelings of responsibility, 
compassion and caring.  
 Socialised and personalised charisma, the distinction between the two. 
The distinction between socialised and personalised charisma is one 
answer to the concerns raised above about the possibility of being 
manipulated and duped.44  
o The socialised charismatic leader uses his skill at manipulating the 
emotions of followers for the greater good and “higher order 
values”45 and in the interests of the group. His followers feel 
empowered and more potent to carry out the task, and grow and 
benefit from the experience.  
o The personalised charismatic utilises his manipulative skill for his 
own aggrandisement, develops followers into a submissive and 
dependency, and works for personal and hidden goals, “bad 
charisma”.46 
 
2.1.2.5 Experiential. The final approach is not literature based, but rather, 
experiential. Everyone has had the experience of working with inspirational leaders 
demonstrating Conger and Kanugo “empowerment” dynamic”47 and aspects of the 4 
“I”s model of Bass and Alvolio;48 and can therefore construct a narrative about what it 
was about their behaviour and attitudes that inspired, and whether, post hoc, they felt 
used or duped. To quote Roberts and Bradley (1988);  
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We have neither a theory to predict outcomes, nor any critical 
understanding to ensure “good” and prevent “bad” charisma… Do we 
really want to deliberately risk unleashing its darker side?49 
 
If the leadership literature strives to describe the basic “stuff” that makes leaders 
effective, then there is an argument that the charismatic aspect of leadership is that 
“stuff”. The problem is, then, that it rests on an anti-rational, emotional, and quasi-
spiritual process that partially dissolves the worker’s individual perspective. This can 
be good for the delivery of the leader’s or the organisation’s task, but has the risk of 
dissolving the moral standards and frame, such that it can be a force for good or ill.  
 
 
2.2 Personalities 
 
The clinical hunch underlying the research question, namely how are managers are 
effective within organisations and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of 
a manager a critical variable, is that those with no positional power, personality 
disordered people, may disrupt and distort organisations purely by force of 
personality, and the question asks whether managers who are effective within 
organisations has some link with this observation.  
 
The individual personality, social context and constitution of individual leaders plays a 
part, for example, leaders are more commonly first born children,50 and there may be 
people who are “compulsive leaders,” that can only feel comfortable in a context of 
being followed, and that this compulsion becomes a self fulfilling prophesy.51Having 
looked at the leadership literature, the personality variables of the manager will be 
explored.  
 
According to Marshall in the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology,  
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The [personality] concept has its origins in the of the Latin word 
persona (meaning mask), and refers to the set of more or less stable 
characteristics, as assessed and judged by others, that distinguish one 
individual from another… [that] hold stable across time and place and 
underlie behaviour…52  
 
Theoretical approaches to personality can be distinguished into three broad groups; 
developmental ideographic approaches that understand personality, to include Freud, 
the psychoanalysts and associated descriptive accounts such as Erikson;53 
classificatory systems that try to identify different personality types using 
psychological tests, and biological approaches. 
 
 
2.2.1 Personality and biology.  
The origins of the biological study of personality include the “somatotypes”, linking 
body shape with personality characteristics54 and Gall’s phrenology.55 The biological 
study of personality now comprises the two disciplines of genetics, with personality 
traits demonstrating different degrees of hereditability,56 and neuroanatomy and 
physiology.  
 
Particularly hereditable are antisocial aspects of personality with aggressiveness 
being about 40% genetic,57 fitting in with the common sense view of hereditability of 
personality characteristics in families. With brain imaging, there is increasing 
understanding about the role of particular brain structures, particularly the limbic 
system, in the management and experience of the emotions, aggression and 
behaviour, although in terms of detailed understanding of the psyche, these remain at 
a high level of abstraction, like the celebrated account of Phineas Gage, an 18th 
century railway worker who survived an industrial accident where a pin lodged in his 
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eye piercing his brain’s occipito-frontal cortex, turning a conscientious worker into a 
drinking unreliable sensualist.58 
 
 
2.2.2 Personality theory – type and trait 
The signs of the Zodiac are an example of a personality typology. More sensible are 
trait theories, such as Eysenk’s proposal of three dimensions of personality along 
which people varied, introversion/extraversion; psychoticism (proneness to bizarre 
beliefs and behaviour) and neuroticism (general nervousness).59 Within such a 
dimensional model, a good leader would be likely to be extroverted, stable (rather 
than psychotic) and non-neurotic.  
 
The current lead personality trait theory is the so-called “Big Five,”60 a model 
supported by a considerable research base demonstrating some intercultural and 
developmental reliability.61 
 
High score 
characteristic 
Trait scale Low scores 
characteristic 
Worrying, nervous, 
insecure 
NEUROTICISM Calm, relaxed, secure 
Sociable, active, sociable EXTRAVERSION Reserved, sober, aloof 
Curious, creative, original OPENNESS Conventional, down-to-
earth, inartistic 
Soft hearted, good 
natured, trusting 
AGREEABLENESS Cynical, rude, suspicious 
Organised, reliable, 
hardworking 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS Aimless, unreliable, lazy 
 
Table 1. Big Five summary (From Costa et al 1992) 
 
Given the empirical grounding for this theory, it lends considerable support for some 
form of trait theory of leadership, as it would be difficult to imagine being able to 
provide leadership or effective management if one's personality was high in 
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neuroticism, low for extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness. 
Having said this, personality trait accounts of leadership are too concrete to provide 
meaning for phenomena such as Lord Slim’s leadership “of the spirit”.62 
 
 
2.2.3 Personality theory; psychoanalytic. 
Psychoanalytic and more generally psychodynamic theories of personality have the 
potential to provide deeper and more complex and nuanced accounts of personality 
characteristics of leadership, for example leaders having narcissistic needs63 and 
followers having dependency needs leading to their attachment.64  
 
Broadly the Freudian enterprise proposes, 
 
 Adult personality is moulded by events in childhood, by the success by 
which various psycho-developmental milestones are negotiated, and by 
other contingent traumata.65  
 Various structural metaphors of personality, including the concept of the 
unconscious, the super-ego/ego/id; oral/anal/phallic developmental 
fixations; the instincts, narcissism and so on.66 
 
Common in subsequent elaborations of psychoanalytic accounts of character67 or 
personality is the theme of the struggle between the agency or will of the person and 
the givens of their environment (social expectations and mores) between the 
instincts and the superego. This “dynamic” account of personality provides a 
platform for interpretative accounts of the decisions of individuals, for example the 
Ted Hughes’ proposal that George Bush’s enthusiasm for war in Iraq was 
contributed to by the failure of his father’s war in the same region.68 
 
Freud’s rather scientistic project was based upon natural science metaphysics and an 
original belief that the psychic structures he was proposing would knit together with 
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the evolving science of neurology.69 It was based upon a rational doctor-patient 
relationship, with an expert power differential; and crucially, an alliance between 
patient and doctor. It was assumed that the psychoanalyst would be able to ally with 
the patient, and together they would explore the patient’s psyche.  
 
This classical Freudian tradition spread with the psychoanalytic diaspora in the 
1930s, becoming dominant in the US with the Ego Psychology school.70 The “British 
Tradition” however, was somewhat different, based on the work of Klein,71 who saw 
the psychoanalytic process much more as a dynamic relationship, characterised by 
the mistrust and paranoia that brought the patient to the therapy in the first place. The 
patient is not going to be an ally in their psychoanalysis; but rather, the patient will 
distrust the analyst, and shield material about which they are ashamed. 
 
The Kleinian critique of the Classical Freudian approach was that the patient was 
unlikely to be an ally in the exploration of self; they were more likely to dupe and to 
hide out of shame or fear, or the enjoyment of triumph over the analyst. 
Psychoanalysis could only proceed in spite of the patient, rather than with them as 
co-researcher.  
 
The British psychoanalytic tradition, therefore, assumes that to a greater or lesser 
extent the patient is always “playing” the analyst, that the therapeutic process 
primarily involves the perception of these plays (often very difficult), their elucidation 
and presentation to the patient, and then a discourse on what they hide.  
 
From this perspective, disobeying Kant’s categorical imperative by “playing” people 
rather than relating and dealing honestly with them is much more widespread than 
just being practiced by its more extreme psychopathic protagonists. The manifest 
interpersonal motive on the surface is espoused; but that the latent, motive under the 
surface is disavowed, and this operation is assumed by the researcher’s British 
psychoanalytic tradition to be a largely unconscious daily practice, not just for the 
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personality disorder clinician, or manipulative manager, but is part of everyday social 
engagement.  
 
From this perspective, the managers and patients that interest the researcher have 
become virtuoso at this every day social duplicity, and use it for their antisocial or 
organisational objectives.  
 
 
2.2.4 Personality disorder and psychopathy 
Sociologically, the concept of psychiatry has spawned considerable social criticism,72 
with the likelihood of more for its even less empirically validated psychiatric diagnosis 
of “personality disorder”. Patients who display bizarre and disturbed behaviour, but 
who are not formally psychiatrically ill with schizophrenia, manic depression or 
dementia were characterised as “neurotics; neurasthenics; the character disordered.”  
 
A common definition is, 
 
Deeply ingrained, maladaptive patterns of behaviour present since 
adolescence and causing the self and/or others to suffer.73 
 
Interest in this group expanded early in the last century, particularly within the 
psychoanalytic movement. Psychodynamic psychiatric treatment involves the 
understanding of the patient's symptoms and difficulties within a context of their 
history, the structure of their personality, and their characteristic ways of reacting to 
and dealing with everyday traumata. Gradually over time, and through an iterative 
process backwards and forwards between the individual’s history and an emerging 
understanding of the nature of their personality, the interconnectedness of the three 
factors, symptom, history and personality can be identified.  
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The question is not about “nature vs. nurture”, in terms of a chicken and egg 
argument. An individual’s personality is not a particular way because of a trauma in 
childhood, but there is a link, rather like a Greek tragedy, where the seeds of the 
denouement are sown in the first act, such that the plot twists are chance fate and 
choice at the same time. The therapeutic outcome of the work is the development 
with the patient of a narrative that to some extent enables them to choose the 
screenplay: To be able to manage their personality rather than be entirely driven by it.   
 
In the empirical study of personality, there has been some more success in the 
clarification and measurement of specific individual personality types and traits. One 
example of this approach is the well known distinction between “Type A and Type B 
personalities” in terms of the risk of heart disease.74 This has also been the approach 
to the development of the concept of psychopathy.  
 
The term “psychopathy” has several meanings as follows; 
 
 Legal – within the UK Mental Health Act 1983-2007, psychiatric problems 
were divided into learning disability; mental illness (schizophrenia/manic 
depression) and “Psychopathic disorder”. The latter corresponded to those 
with personality disorder.75  
 Popular - from the tabloids, which can range from any criminal or violent 
person to someone sharp and selfish.  
 Technical – scoring above 30 on the PCLR psychopathy checklist, see 
below. 
 Clinical – more severe antisocial personality. 
 
The problem of criminality led to a formulation by Cleckley in the 1930s.76 The 
operationalisation of Cleckley’s clinical descriptions in to the “Psychopathy Check 
List”77 produced a very powerful risk assessment tool, with much empirical support 
that directly relates the risk of further violent crime to the score achieved.78 Using 
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self report and collateral information (police records and intelligence, conviction and 
other histories etc.) A score of over 25 or 30 out of 40 identifies clinical psychopathy 
in a UK population.79 
 
Within the psychopathy checklist, two separate factors emerge that correspond to the 
different aspects of criminality described, factor 1 involving broadly social 
psychopathic variables, socially charming, but manipulative violent, cunning and 
ruthless; and factor 2 having the more disorganised contents with poor impulse 
control, uncontrolled substance abuse and so on, the “bar room brawler”.  
 
The significance of the concept is that many have noticed the parallel between the 
charming, ruthless, manipulative popular notion of a psychopath and that of the 
successful CEO.80 Hare’s “Snakes in Suits”81 describes how self interested and 
selfish individuals can ruthlessly and effectively manipulate an organisation for their 
own interests, and the havoc that this can cause to the business. 
 
Increasingly, and supported by empirical data, the key attitudinal dyad of being 
callous and unemotional is being cited as the core pathology for clinical 
psychopathy.82 Violence is simply one variable that some callous and unemotional 
psychopathic people have,83 that brings them in conflict with society, and therefore 
frequently to prison. One’s manager, leader or political representative may well be a 
clinical psychopath, just probably not a violent one.   
 
 
2.3 Personality, leadership and charisma: Conclusion 
 
Neither discipline of leadership, personality or psychopathy alone provide a 
sufficiently rich account to illuminate the “clinical hunch” crystallised in the research 
question of how managers are effective within organisations, and the relevance or 
otherwise of the personality or psychopathy of the manager.  
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There is a schism between the managerial and sociological literatures; the 
managerial focus on the influence of the person and behaviour of the Chief 
Executive, whereas the sociological literature is more focussed on the structural, the 
power of structure and habitual cultural mores. Consequently, the sociological 
themes of structure, agency and power will be explored next.  
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2. Agency and power 
 
 
In exploring the question of how managers are effective within organizations, 
models of social structures within sociology might be anticipated to illuminate 
organisational theory. Questions of social agency and power likewise might 
contribute to understanding leadership.  
 
Having touched upon the issues of personality and psychopathy, this section takes 
the research question about managerial agency into the domain of social theorizing, 
looking at the question of structure and agency on the one hand, and power on the 
other, proposing an interpersonal account of agency.  
 
 
3.1 Structure and agency  
 
If the history of social theorising began with the Greeks the overwhelming approach 
was theistic. Agency was evacuated into deities, with mythological accounts of the 
gods themselves in conflict with the fates and each other. With the enlightenment 
develops more of a notion of human as opposed to divine agency, fuelled by 
industrialisation and a mechanical augmentation of human activity, and then by the 
development of capitalism and the expansion of private property.  
 
”Individualism” developed, combining three emergent social theoretical strands; 
notions of the “Rights of Man”;84 Adam Smith’s theorisation of individual activity in 
the market place,85 and utilitarian ethics,86 which atomise ethical decision making 
from divine statute to individual people and situations.  
 
This developing tension was explored by Durkheim,87 who described “anomie” as a 
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condition where traditional social structures and mores have dissolved, leaving an 
individual without referents. Contrasting this view was Marx’s account of social 
structure as rigidly determined by capitalism.88 Modern theorising of the 
structure/agency relationship begins with Weber’s classification of different types of 
social action at a micro-level.89  
 
3.1.1 Unalloyed structure or agency  
Archer is critical of extreme versions of rational choice theory as representing the 
extreme end of an atomised, individualistic, subjective agentic account of society, 
and an extreme version of linguistic structuralism to represent its opposite.90 Her 
main argument seems to be that these accounts leave something of being human 
out of the equation.91 An Adam Smith market place society would be a pure 
meritocracy, where people’s earning potential would be related to the value of their 
skills and abilities; there is no account of underlying structural constraints or 
facilitators such as old boy or Masonic networks, prejudice, and so on. Elegant 
though the theory of the pure market is, it lacks face validity because it doesn’t 
describe life as it is.  
 
Characteristically, the one-dimensional accounts at the extremes are both elegant 
and internally coherent; they can refute challenges and reinterpret counter 
arguments in their own terms. Their elegance and coherence derive from their 
eschewal of the central problematic of how the two, structure and agency; will and 
reality, how these two actually engage. In her challenge to the linguistic 
structuralists, Archer comments that if the extreme structural linguists were to be 
believed, one could turn base metal into gold by saying so.  
 
A further characteristic of one-dimensional accounts is that the opposite pole is in 
someway disavowed or displaced elsewhere, into some other part of the system. 
Marxism displaces agency onto the owners of the means of production, who reduce 
wages and increase prices to squeeze profits out of an increasingly unstable 
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system.92 Religious people, by projecting their own limited agentic potency into a 
deity, can feel reassured as said figure takes on omnipotent proportions. Such 
models of enforced passivity allow people to disavow the fact that they have choices 
and agency that they choose not to use.  
 
 
3.1.2 Structure and the “category mistake”  
As part of his structuration theory, Giddens describes structure and agency as being 
two sides of the same coin; that the two are constitutive of the same phenomena, 
but perceived from different angles, such that the two cannot be seen at the same 
time together. This idea was elaborated by Hay suggesting that the two being metal 
constituents of an alloy of which the coin is made, such that they together form an 
irreducible “compound” that cannot be separated.93  
 
Giddens’ structuration theory employs a neat elision of structure and agency where 
agency requires structure to be able to have the conditions to act potently, and that 
by utilising the structure, it confirms it and strengthens it. Like a language, to be 
understood and act, one needs to use English, as by doing so the structure that is 
the English language is strengthened and confirmed. To suggest that social 
structures are “things” like blocks of granite is a category mistake. Attempts to 
understand social structures in the same way that one understands physical objects 
are futile for this reason. For Giddens94, social structures only exist in their praxis 
and use by people.  
 
However, if the “category mistake” notion underpins Giddens’ coin or Hay’s alloy (as 
it seems to), then the analogy of structure and agency to the coin’s faces or alloy is 
wrong. Rather, agency is to structure what a coin is to money, not as a coin is to its 
constituent chemical compound, or to another facet of its physical structure.  
 
Money only has meaning for so long as it is being used and actively valued by 
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individual agents. Money is made up of individual coins in the same way that (in 
Giddens’ model) structure comprises individual agents.  Money is almost a verb, a 
doing word, where the “doing” is active valuing and usage of money in transactions, 
in the same way as structures in fact are structurations by their active usage and 
praxis.  
 
Absent from this ontological point is how agency and structure might actually 
engage with each other. To be facetious, what happens to the coin if it doesn’t want 
to be just money, but it wants to be a flower instead. Or, closer to Giddens’ analogy, 
one side of the coin wants to be a dollar, and the other wants to be a pound.  
 
People, individuals, do want to do unpredictable things. How does structuration 
theory accommodate the process of their struggle? Sometimes these capricious 
ideas take off: the idea of evolution; the internet; the “final solution”. An account of 
structure and agency needs to be able to account for these deviations and major 
turns in societal development that can begin from the ideas of individuals without 
structurally collapsing these ideas into pre-existing nascent cognitions structured by 
the external environment on the one hand, or dissolving into a cult-
personality/agency worship on the other. 
 
 
3.1.3 “Situating” agency 
Giddens’ contribution can be argued to be threefold, where he uses his technique of 
“bracketing” structure and agency respectively to explore the issues contained. 
These three separate accounts of structure and agency take three separate 
positions on the spectrum rather than that they integrate into one grand theory.  
 
Giddens’ agent focussed account involves individuals utilising structures to carry out 
actions.95 His contention is that people live within social structures, use them 
towards their ends, and that they need them to be able to function. In many ways, 
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this is a common sense perspective about the nature of society, and 
uncontroversial. Giddens’ account of an agent’s praxis involves the habitual carrying 
out of sequences of actions that confirm and underpin structures96. The structure of 
the banking industry is confirmed, not by the daily decisions about whether to leave 
one's money in a bank or not, but by the fact that one always has without thinking 
about it.  
 
Giddens’ account raises the question of the importance of internal structures, within 
the agent's mind, as determinants of behaviour. Pre-existing accepted social mores 
and practices themselves influence the agents’ actions. However, pre-existing 
prejudices and unquestioned assumptions and habits may do more than influence; 
according to Giddens, they determine both the agents’ actions and the solidity and 
dependability of the social structures that as agents provide the frameworks for 
action.  
 
The question for Giddens is what is there left for the agent to do, once they have 
confirmed in their daily structured routine. There seems to be little room for an agent 
to be able to do anything innovative, different, or agentic at all.  
 
Giddens’ account of agency framed within a structuration process paints a similar 
picture to that proposed by Bevir and Rhodes’ concept of “situated agency”. Bevir’s 
interpretivist approach97 describes what is meant by being situated in terms of a 
“web” of beliefs, culture and practice; a web that is structurally engendered. As in 
structuration, the agent’s situation both facilitates and constrains his actions, but 
Rhodes draws a clear and helpful distinction between agency and autonomy, where 
the former is situated within a particular social and ideational context, and the latter 
is not. Rhodes is clear that agency within a social context is a phenomenon, but that 
an agent so situated cannot be completely autonomous.  
 
This account makes intuitive sense;  Rhodes points out that this is true of many 
 42 
 
interpretivist accounts, but that they should not be underestimated as a result.98 
Unlike Giddens, Rhodes makes no claim to have solved the structure/agency riddle, 
arguing instead that an interpretivist model can provide a set of hypotheses about 
the nature of the knowledge web of the agent that contextualised and may explain 
his action. Rhodes account can be criticised as being relativist and lacking the 
clarity of grand theory of other writers, and at times the question can arise, as in 
Giddens, of what there is left for the agent to do once their autonomy has been 
curtailed by their situatedness.  
 
There is no account in either of these models of the struggle between agent and 
structure. It is as if everyone is happy with their appointed lot in living within their 
situation, or in supporting the structuration process of which they are a part. There is 
an aspect of the liveliness, criticism and rebelliousness of life and being that seems 
neutered in Rhodes’ or Giddens’ agent; the logic of their arguments takes them 
inexorably towards a more structural account. However, Rhodes reassures the 
reader on occasion that the agent does have a degree of freedom as this is part of 
the theory, and Giddens tells the reader that they do have agency as illustrated by 
the fact that individuals can move their bodies unpredictably and as they wish.  
 
 
3.1.4 Morphogenesis and culture 
A critical realist perspective involves the notion of layers of reality, illustrated in 
Archer’s trilogy of books, two exploring structure and agency respectively, and a 
third exploring culture.99 The role of culture within Archer’s morphogenic theory is a 
staging post between the actions of an individual, who through a collective, 
incrementally acts upon the culture, which changes, and structural change may 
follow.  
 
Archer classifies the foregoing accounts into those that focus on agency,100 that she 
describes as an “upward conflation” including variations of rational choice and social 
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action theory; those that she describes as a “central conflation”, such as 
structuration theory, and those that she describes as a “downward conflation”, 
particularly the iterations of structuralism, although the researcher will argue that her 
own “morphogenic theory”101 can be included in this group.  
 
The power of the explanatory value of the three terms, agency, culture and structure 
lies in part in terms of their differential epistemological derivations that are 
summarised in table 2.  
 
 Ontology Epistemology Comment 
Agency Individual 
idea 
Phenomenological; 
hermeneutic 
An understanding of agency 
derives from an empathetic process 
derived from personal experience 
of agency 
 
Culture 
Partially 
shared 
idea 
Hermeneutic, 
positivist 
Culture is disavowed or 
unrecognised everyday practice 
that can be inductively established 
Structure Collectively 
shared 
idea 
Positivist; 
falsificationist 
Structure is explicit practice and 
organisation  
 
Table 2. Ontology and epistemology for structure, agency and culture 
 
Morphogenesis proposes a staged model of agency changing structure, where an 
individual might start a change in the cultural flux that might lead to a collective of 
individuals of like mind that in turn leads to a change in the structure.102 Important 
for this model is the dimension of time, agents can change structures over a 
temporal span in a developmental way. The stages of morphogenesis involve an 
agent interacting socially with a group that takes on and adopts the agent’s 
perspective, and the group work together, potent to change the structure. 
 
Morphogenic theory, while seeming convincing and “common sense”; seems not to 
have an explicit theory of agency. How, and in what way, does the agent “convert” 
the group to their way of thinking? Why does the group take on the agent’s 
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perspective, and not somebody else’s? Following this unexplained conversion of the 
rest of the group to the agent’s view, what holds the group to task; who defines the 
task i.e. how to achieve the new direction identified? Is it the agent or some form of 
group dynamic?  
 
Archer’s explanation for the mechanisms underlying the process relies heavily on 
the concept of culture. In parallel with the process described above, culture is 
changing in a gradual way following the same sequence as structure changing. This 
is an interesting and important aspect of the theory, chiming, as it does with the 
management literature that acknowledges the difficulty of describing and identifying 
culture, but which sees cultural change as crucial to organisational change.103 
However, at the level of abstraction of structure and agency within social theory, it is 
inordinately difficult to define what is meant by culture in such a way as to 
distinguish it from structure for two reasons. Firstly, from a neo-Marxist perspective, 
if culture is defined as local tradition, attitudes and shared values, conscious or 
unconscious, these are structure, placed there to maintain the alienation of the 
working classes, and so on.  Culture is simply hidden structure. While structuration 
theory does not make explicit use of the term, culture might be close to the habits 
and daily praxis of the millions that are structurating the structures in their everyday 
lives. These habits and social mores are simply describing the personal experience 
of structure, rather than its shared manifestation. Culture is the personal feeling of 
snobbery at a person’s accent or table manners; class is the social structure that is 
its collective manifestation.  
 
What is required is a sense of what an agent does to start a morphogenic 
movement off. Indeed, what is the nature of the agent? Is it an individual, a 
particular person? Is it an idea, in a sort of neo Hegelian way that an idea springs up 
and simply by the force and power of the idea, the morphogenic process pushed 
forwards on a tide of ascent and recognition? Or is the agent the incubator of 
unseen social currents and eddies, such that individuals emerge to espouse an idea 
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whose time has come? 
 
Once a morphogenic movement is started, Archer’s account is adequate; but rather 
like the antiquated “first mover” arguments for the existence of God, it seems to beg 
the question about the nature of agency rather than giving an account of it.  
 
 
3.1.5 Micro-sociological agents 
The forgoing accounts have been “structure heavy”, in spite of their avowal of 
agency, the logic of their arguments crowds agency out.  There are other social 
theory literatures that do accurately and powerfully describe aspects of agentic 
behaviour. In the spectrum diagram above are included the “Dramaturgical” 
accounts, principally Goffman104, but also the insights from the symbolic 
interactionist tradition105, for example Weber’s classification of different types of 
social action106.  
 
Powerful and relevant, though these accounts are, they attempt to describe and 
explain human behaviour in different specific and micro situations, rather than 
providing an account of potent agency. Becoming sensitised to the non verbal 
cueing and engagement of everyday conversation is interesting, and an awareness 
of deeper layers of communication being developed at a symbolic level within a 
discourse is fascinating; as is spotting the various different dramaturgical roles 
people adopt strategically in everyday life. These descriptions of how an individual 
person interacts with and personally mutates the social structures that surrounds 
them; descriptions of their everyday social psychology are relevant in understanding 
day-to-day social activity and communication. They do not (and do not claim to) 
offer a grand theory how the agent tries to change the structure within which he is 
placed. In short, they seem silent about both structures, and about the interaction of 
structure and agency.  
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3.1.6 Hay and the “strategic agent”  
Hay107 proposes that the agent identifies the action that they wish to make, 
evaluates the environment and positions of other agents, (supportive or resistant) 
and plots out a strategy to achieve the action. During the process of acting, the 
agent is aware both that their action may change the environment and that there will 
be activities of supporters and detractors, so that the strategy needs to constantly 
change to take account of this. The agent’s strategy takes account of the 
environment and significant others, and then the re-development of strategy takes 
into account feedback from the environment.  
 
It is surprising how little management literature is appealed to in these accounts of 
structure and agency within social theory. If the researcher’s critique of Rhodes, 
Giddens and Archer is accurate, namely that their accounts are in fact crypto-
structuralist, then this may be a reason. While Hay does not quote the management 
literature, he seems to come to a similar conclusion, namely that the crucial activity 
of the agent is the establishment of a clear sense of an action that they wish to take, 
and second, the development of a strategy to bring this about following a close 
environmental analysis. Thirdly, a continual process of review of the strategy in the 
light of environmental change steers changes in strategy.  
 
Two things seem to be missing from this account, firstly, that the process of 
competing strategies seems to be rather too civilised; if the agent’s plan is thwarted, 
in an unemotional way he will simply re-calculate and start again? Secondly, Hay 
spends insufficient time defining and describing the nature of either an agent or a 
structure. One can infer that an agent is perceptive of the structural environment 
and to the attitudes of others, and that they have sufficient intellectual ability to 
devise a good strategic plan, but in this account it is not clear whether the agent is 
the person or the strategy itself. In other words, are organisations and societies 
changed by people, or is the agent simply a vessel for an idea whose time has 
 47 
 
come?  
 
3.1.7 A structure/agency spectrum.  
The different “solutions” to the structure/agency question can be placed along a 
spectrum from those with more structuralist leanings at one pole, to those with more 
agency-based understandings at the other. Occupying the two extremes are 
linguistic structuralism or neo-marxism at the extreme structuralist pole, with 
phenomenological accounts and rational choice theory on the other. Scattered 
between the two poles are other accounts noted above, and in the middle are the 
balanced structuration model of Giddens, or the alloy/two faces of a coin of Hay. A 
diagrammatic summary of the various theoretical accounts and their relative 
positions on a spectrum is produced in table 3 below.  
 
An alternative temporal model of structure and agency situated within the spectrum 
of past present and future is articulated by Emirbayer and Mische108. For them, 
agency is a compound structure of a past “iterative element”, the historical 
contextual, habitual contribution; a “projective element” where future trajectories can 
be anticipated, as articulated by the rational choice theorists; and a “practical-
evaluative element”, that might be described as reactive and strategic, contingent on 
the emerging situation. Together this “chordal triad of agency” consists of  
 
 …engagement  by actors …through the interplay of habit, imagination 
and judgment transforms those structures in response to …changing 
historical situations109 
 
The aim in this section is to survey the different approaches to and accounts of 
structure and agency in order to apply it to the question of manager’s effectiveness 
in organizations. Such an application requires a synthesis such as that provided by 
Archer’s morphogenesis; by the notion of a spectrum of theories; or by Emirbayer’s 
spectrum of past, present and future. This discussion will be returned to below to 
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develop an interpersonal model of structure and agency, which it will be argued is 
more closely relevant to the realities of managerial practice.  
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Table 3 The Structure/agency theoretical spectrum. 
 
 
3.2 Power 
 
One variable that potentiates agency is the power of the agent, hence the 
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exploration of the concept. In the management literature Pfeffer gives an account of 
managers being phobic of the concept of power and its political, organisational 
expression122 and argues that this is surprising as power is a clear and evident 
construct of central importance to an executive getting things done.  
 
Weber distinguished between power and domination, where power is defined as the 
individual’s “ability to carry out their will in a given situation despite resistance”, but 
this concept is not developed further by him, and instead, as with the accounts 
above, the more structural account of domination is explored at length in terms of 
the ways that authority is legitimised.123 
 
Approaching the sociological literature on power conflationary and reductionistic 
issues emerge. The conflationary problem seems to be the difficulty in distinguishing 
the sociological power literature from the rest of sociology. Theories of power are 
implicit in accounts of social order from the macro global level to the micro level of 
individual social repertoire. This can reproduce a secular form of pantheism by, for 
example Marx’s materialism, or the “pantheoreticism” of a Foucaldian understanding 
of “discipline”, with obedience culturally programmed; invisible by its ubiquity124 and 
inseparable from the very language describing the phenomenon.  
 
On the other hand, the study of power can be reduced back to an ontological 
dispute between structure and agency. Clegg’s cites Hobbes’ structuralist 
legitimisation of political power as “… a myth of order based on sovereignty”125 on 
the one hand, with the more agency orientated Machiavellian account of 
strategies126 on the other.  
 
3.2.1 Power – A on B.   
For Hobbes, power is about the structures of the state that ensure conformity of the 
people; a relatively omnipotent legitimised authority, to avoid the chaos and 
suffering ensuing from the 16th century English Civil War. The monarch, or later, 
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parliament; but importantly something/anything agreed to be sovereign. In the 
context of the industrial revolution, Marx places sovereignty in the hands of the 
owners of the means of production. Within a context of developed capitalist 
democracies, perhaps the sovereign may become a “power elite”.127 
 
Mann identifies “four sources and organisations of power”,128 namely, 
 Ideological, via manipulation/control of meaning, and norms. 
 Economic, manipulation/control of the satisfaction of needs and circuits of 
production. 
 Military, coercive 
 Political, via the institutionalised regulation of social relations.  
 
The study of the mechanisms of legitimised political power of the state lead to the so 
called “three dimensions” of political power, beginning with Dahl’s clarification that 
power is essentially the ability of A to get B to do something. Dahl’s position was to 
critique the elitist account of politics, following the process of the city authorities in 
New Haven.129 He traced power pluralistically distributed within the society, 
coalesced into interest and pressure groups that influenced policy and decisions. 
The path of power was therefore a summation of the different vectors pulling and 
pushing the executive in different directions. 
 
Bachrach and Baratz argued that that power could also be, “exercised by confining 
the scope of decision making to relatively safe issues”;130 keeping contentions 
issues off the agenda, Lukes added a third,131 namely that B does what A wants 
unaware that A is exercising power over them. That is to say that A prevents B 
realising that what A was making them do is in A’s interests. This final concept of 
the third dimension of power has as its foundation the notion of, “false 
consciousness”; where one dominant class or group has the power to manipulate 
the very ideas and perceptions of their subordinates. 
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3.2.2 Power as a collective 
Clegg points out that Hobbes’ “social contract” to abide by the rules set out by the 
sovereign contains within it a collectivist account of power, in that the social contract 
is entered into freely by the population, to extend their lives and opportunities from 
its “nasty, brutish and short” alternative.132 
 
For Hobbes, this free choice of the people to accept a sovereign has a Lamarkian 
quality,133 such that the agreement to obey the identified sovereign cannot 
subsequently be recalled, and subsequent generations are bound by the 
agreement. But the genesis of the power of the sovereign is based upon the 
consent of the people, at least originally.  
 
Other writers have been more explicit in this formulation, most notably, Parsons’ 
account of power as being like money, in that it is actually created by people, and 
that it changes hands between people, ideas, or structures; like money.134  
 
Parsons’ starting point is to say that power is a “key concept in the great western 
tradition of thought…” but to criticise it for being “conceptually diffuse”, for not giving 
an account of the distinction between coercive and consensual power, and for being 
assumed to be “zero-sum”, that the power of A diminishes the power of B. He 
defines the “core complex of meaning” of power as the capacity of persons or 
collectives “to get things done” effectively, in particular when their goals are 
obstructed by some kind of human resistance or opposition”, and later as “means of 
acquiring control of the factors of effectiveness”, where “factors of effectiveness” 
part of his model that parallel aspects of economic theory, and are defined in table 
4.135 
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 Economic theory Parsonian theory of power 
Inputs Factors of 
production 
Factors of effectiveness 
 Land Commitment to collective action 
 Labour Collective need (interest group pressure) 
 Capital Control over some part of economic 
productivity 
 Organisation Legitimacy of authority of collective 
decisions 
Outputs Goods, services Influence 
 Consumption “wants” Collective demand satisfaction 
Process Resource combination 
increasing value 
Resource combination increasing 
effectiveness 
Circulating 
medium 
Money Power 
 
Table 4  A Summary of Parsons’ economic theory of power.  
 
Haugaard traces Parson’s theory back to a review of Mills “Power Elite” book.136 
Parsons had influentially criticised it as an “eccentric”137 justification and 
rationalisation of conservative societal structures of the United States. His power 
theory comprises part of his biological metaphor of “structural-functionalism” of the 
organism adapting to its environment, and a significant critique is that this explains 
away conflictual social phenomena in a Panglossian “best of all possible worlds” 
manner as if the inevitable outcome of a social natural selection.  
 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, central and legitimate in Parson’s account is the 
truism that power is found in the collective. Without the consent and compliance of 
the masses, Mill’s power elites or Hobbs’ sovereign have no power.  
 
This theme is extended in Arendt’s work: She defines power as, 
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… The human ability to act … Power… belongs to a group and 
remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. 138  
 
Barnes’ consensual theory of power echoes this; for him, 
 
… Social power is the capacity for action in a society… the agent’s 
power to act through the bodies of others.139  
 
There are difficulties in these collective theories of power, particularly for Barnes, 
how to conceptualise coercive power; Arendt responds to this by qualifying her 
definition of “power” as a positive creative energy born out of the collective, and 
distinct from violence, equated with coercive power.  
 
 
3.2.3 Personal power  
Within the management literature, the specific issue of personal power all seems to 
refer back to French and Raven’s 1959 paper140 that identifies five sources of social 
power;  
 
 Reward power  
 Coercive power, 
 Legitimate power  
 Referent power 
 Expert knowledge power 
 
The broad hypothesis is that an individual with more of each and any of these 
attributes will have more power. The first three of these attributes are based upon 
an assumption of a social structure, an organisation within which the individual has 
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a position or role, by virtue of this position they can confer an advantage or the 
opposite on subordinates.  
 
Type of personal power source Supporting concepts/literatures 
Reward power – ability to confer 
financial, promotional or other 
reward. 
Positive reinforcement – learning theory141 
 Material benefits 
 Status benefits 
Coercive power – the ability to 
inflict negative stimuli on the 
subordinate 
Negative reinforcement – learning theory142  
 Criticism 
 Demotion/exclusion/material dis-
benefit 
Economy of violence143 
Legitimate power – the belief that 
the individual has the right to exert 
influence. 
Weberian legitimate domination144 
 Rational/legal 
 Traditional 
 Charismatic  
Position power – authority/seniority within 
structured organisation145 
Referent power – the power holder 
as a role model, so that the 
subordinate is personally motivated 
to obey. 
Charisma/transformational theory (see 
above). 
Expert knowledge power – having 
knowledge needed by the 
subordinate 
Consultant ability to guide and supervise 
subordinates’ work 
Wisdom; expert; intelligence – early trait 
theory 
 
Table 5  Sources of personal power 
 
Organisations comprise an operationalisation of the collectivist power theories 
described above, that power and the ability to carry out actions is based upon a 
process of structuring individuals into collectives organised around a particular task, 
the division of labour with reduction in transaction costs. Within a structured 
collective, an organisation, individuals will vary in the degree to which they can 
utilise and control other individuals that comprise it.  
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3.2.4 Power as internal: Ideology, discipline and habitus.  
The nature of accepted and invisible paradigms in society seems to have been the 
subject of the post structuralists, and the same basic theme crops up in different 
guises in a number of different accounts.  
 
Weber’s concept of Herschaft has no exact English translation, but combines the 
notions of “domination” and “authority” with the idea that it has organisational power 
that is usually obeyed; “authority” based upon an understanding of the allied notion 
of legitimacy146. Crucial is the fact that the herschaft authority is obeyed on the basis 
of internal beliefs and attitudes, rather than because of threat or coercion. The 
follower obeys on the basis of what was subsequently identified as internal 
discipline by Foucault, habitus or structuration by Bordieu and Giddens respectively. 
 
A starting point is Foucault’s account of the function of the Panopticon prison in 
Discipline and Punish.147 He notes that there has been a vast reduction in the 
severity of physical punishment, but that this has been balanced by a “punishment 
that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations”.148  
 
In the panoptic on prison, the miscreant is continually observed by representatives 
of “normal” society that judge harshly his misdemeanours, and the attitudes and 
“episteme” that underlie them:  
 
The penitentiary technique bears not on the relation between author 
and crime, but on the criminal’s affinity with his crime.149 
 
The effect of this “treatment” is the deconstruction of the delinquent’s set of attitudes 
and values, and the recreation of those accepted by society. Release back into 
normal society is contingent on this transformation taking place.  
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The significance of this process is that it illuminates the pervasiveness of particular 
ways of thinking and attitudes that determine and control everyday life: internal 
discipline. This is,  
 
Real subjection… so it is not necessary to… constrain the convict to 
good behaviour… the worker to work, the schoolboy to application... 
150 
 
This theme of “real [internalised] subjection” underlies other post structuralist 
accounts. Gidden’s “practical consciousness knowledge” takes us, unthinking, about 
our daily activities, and in turn “structurates” society151. Bourdieu’s “habitus” is, 
 
… A tacit knowledge of how to ‘go on’...a form of disposition…both an 
internalisation of reality, and in the moment of practice, an 
externalisation of self…”152 153 
 
The individuals that comprise the collectives on whom power depends are 
themselves subjugated by internal ideas, symbols and practices namely discipline, 
practical consciousness and habitus.  
 
 
3.3 An object relations theory of structure and agency 
 
Having explored leadership, agency and power, the aim of this section is to 
integrate these concepts by proposing firstly that the structure and agency is an 
interpersonal dynamic (using Dahl’s nomenclature) between A and B, and secondly, 
that A articulates their agency by creating the structure within which B is 
constrained. This theory is based upon firstly on the claim that structure and agency 
are ontologically identical, and secondly on psychoanalytic “object relations” theory.   
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3.3.1 The ontology of “structure”. 
Giddens154 and Bhaskar155 have argued for the need to address the ontological 
dimension of the structure-agency question, and there is a risk of collapse into a 
hopeless relativism, as Hay suggests,  
 
...there are as many different solutions to the structure-agency 
problem(atique) as there are authors holding different ontological 
assumptions 156. 
 
Human social development involves being encultured into a set of social mores, and 
it is extraordinarily difficult to break through the barriers that these social structures 
construct around us. The personal anxiety and phobia generated by disobeying 
social mores and customs falsely gives the impression of solidity and permanence 
to these habits; the ability of individuals to transgress social boundaries, for 
example, criminals thieving (traducing the social structure of property ownership), or 
people committing incest (overcoming fundamental taboos) demonstrate that social 
structures can be overcome by a subordinate idea; a sense of entitlement or 
overwhelming need for a thief; hedonism or idiosyncratic family culture contributing 
to incest.  
 
Notwithstanding their power, the structures described in sociology are ideas. 
Physical structures have an existence in the external world; an existence in physical 
space, they are “extended” in the Cartesian definition. Social structures do not. 
Social structures have no existence outside people’s minds. Some ideas, such as 
the ownership of property, or the legitimacy of the legal system, are very powerful, 
because lots of people accept them. Social structures such as class; the state; 
human rights; the family; these are all ideas, ideas that lots of people accept, but 
simply ideas.  
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The difference between an idea and a social structure is determined by the number 
of people who accept it. The ideas of the nation state or of class are social 
structures because the ideas are widely accepted. The idea of stoning blasphemers 
to death, or the idea of the need for FGM is not widely held in the UK, and therefore 
these are not social structures in the UK.  
 
By using the word “structure” to denote something like class, there is an implication 
that the idea has the strength and solidity of a block of granite, which it does not. Its 
fluidity is illustrated by the different manifestations of societal stratification in 
different cultures, for example based upon wealth in the US, “caste” in India and a 
complex mix of historical, educational and financial factors in the UK. The demise of 
some very established social structures such as public executions or slavery in 
western societies demonstrates that social structures are essentially ephemeral, 
unlike a physical structure, the block of granite 
 
3.3.2 Object relations theory.  
“Object relations” theory is a psychoanalytic approach to understanding and 
describing human relations associated with the British Kleinian tradition, and 
particularly theorists such as Fairburn, Klein and Winnicott.157 It seeks to explain the 
vicissitudes of human relationships in terms of those previously encountered during 
development. The individual might relate to their partner, colleagues, children and 
so on, as they formerly did to their parents, siblings etc. Each of these people are 
termed “objects”; as being the object of a psychological drive (loving, hating etc.); 
the term illustrating their interchangeability.  
 
An object relations theory of structure and agency proposes that one person’s 
agency becomes another person’s structure; that structure and agency are at the 
core a human relationship. Two agents are “related” if they have interests in 
common. Varieties of relatedness include the very intimate and involved relationship 
of a marriage partnership, the sort of relationship between the taxpayer and state, 
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the relationships between employer and employee, or farmers in rich and poor 
countries.  For a relatedness to exist, some form of shared interest in an area 
relevant to the structure/agency issue in question is required; an issue about which 
they struggle; an ongoing dialectic. The agent is defined by winning, subordinating 
the other to their imposed idea, which becomes the structure.   
 
Structure and agency are ontologically identical, with neither to be privileged, 
although perceived from different perspectives within a relationship. The agency of 
actor A becomes the structure of actor  B; or the agency of actor B becomes the 
structure for actor A. The relative success of each in structuring their peer’s world 
determines whether A or B is the agent and whether A or B is constrained by 
structure. Agency is an outcome of overwhelming the subordinate actor. Being 
constrained by structure is an outcome of being overwhelmed by the superordinate 
actor.    
 
3.3.3 Agents and their structures 
An agent can be singular or plural, can be an individual, a group, an organisation or 
institution, a nation state. For example, it is common practice in the field of 
globalisation for individual nation states act as agents,158 or in the analysis of the 
actions of institutions in political theory.159 Similarly, it is extendable to the inclusion 
of semiotics as in actor network theory160, in that an idea can subjugate human 
actors.   
 
Neither can an agent be reduced to being a single responsible mind or idea. 
Rorty161, following Hume162, powerfully deconstructs the notion of a single 
autonomous psychological sense of self; Subsequent psychoanalytic writers have 
characterised the individual using very similar terms as social theorists characterise 
society; as confused, with fragmentary value sets, variable and contradictory aims 
and preferences, and with the presence of an internal conversation or dialectic 
about what action to take.  
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The risk of the theory dissolving into a tautology is prevented firstly by the presence 
of a subject/object directional dimension to the two actors. This need for an 
empathetic resonance in examining such structure agency situations is illustrated by 
the anthromophisation. The law is a policeman; the court is a judge; the nation state 
is the premier or president. This structure is experienced not just as “the rules”, but 
as someone else’s rules.  
 
Take the road traffic law as an example: the UK legislature is the agent-subject that 
lays out a structure to constrain the driver-agent-object. As the speeding driver on a 
lonely deserted road, the tables are turned, and the agent-subject becomes the 
driver imposing their structure on parliament-agent-object; until, that is, they drive 
into a speed trap around the next bend, the polarity is reversed again.  
 
The second polarity preventing collapse into a tautology is the issue of power. In 
short, structure is the dominant agency, the more powerful agency. Most people 
obey the traffic laws because of the power of the criminal justice system. In relation 
to the structure agency question, the issue about power is simply about its relative 
distribution, rather than (as in political science) the overt or covert ways it is 
manifest.   
 
 
3.4 Agency and power: Conclusion 
 
In addressing the question of how managers in organisations are effective, the 
broad thesis starts to be defined theoretically. If social structures are ideas, then the 
agency in changing them is the process of inculcation of ideas. The task for A if they 
want to impose something upon B, is for A to mould B’s internal 
discipline/habitus/herschaft/structuration so that the action sought is self-evident and 
taken-for-granted - every day praxis - for B.  
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Translated into an organisational context, the leader/manager perceives the internal 
psychological structures that comprise internal 
discipline/habitus/herschaft/structuration of the follower. The leadership task 
becomes the creation and then the orchestration of these internal structures of 
followers to conform with the vision of the leader, and internally motivate the follower 
to enact the this vision.  
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4. Bad leadership 
 
 
In exploring the issue of how managers are effective within organisations, the issues 
related to the leader as an individual have been explored by looking at the 
leadership literature and personality as a variable. Next, the sociological literatures 
have been explored, redefining “effectiveness” as “agency”, and developing a 
hypothesis of leadership manipulating follower’s internal habitus/structures. .  
 
This section explores questions relating to bad and unethical leadership, to focus on 
the second part of the research question, namely the extent to which psychopathy in 
management and leadership is a critical variable. The approach taken has been to 
look at four areas, 
 
 The question of “bad leadership” directly; 
 “Corrupted leadership” through the topics of “bad charisma” and 
Machiavellianism; 
 Models of psychopathic leadership through organised crime and the 
callousness of organisational theory; 
 Exploration of the mainstream approach to such questions, namely “ethical 
leadership”. 
 
 
4.1 Bad Leadership 
 
It is striking that much organisational failure is attributed in practice to bad 
leadership, and yet the large leadership literature is relatively silent on the issue.  
 
 
 63 
 
4.1.1 Kellerman’s typology  
In her book “Bad Leadership”, Kellerman163 has classified the types of bad 
leadership using case examples as summarised in table 7. She suggests that this 
scotomisation of bad leadership as a topic within the leadership literature can be 
understood in a number of ways. Firstly, there are genuine difficulties post hoc. of 
identifying the contribution of leadership to an adverse episode. Secondly, she 
suggests that even if it were possible to attribute failure clearly to leadership, one 
would be averse to doing so. There is a need to preserve the illusion of leadership 
infallibility in a context of the ubiquity of living different aspects of reliance on 
leadership. Finally, in terms of corporate governance and commercial 
considerations, there would be organisational resistance to both clearly 
acknowledging organisational failure and then attributing leadership fault.  
 
She argues that as a result, we know much less about a rather common and 
extremely important issue than we should. She argues that the “bad side” needs to 
be reclaimed, so that meaning can be made of it, and it can be learned from.  
 
Kellerman’s method is to classify examples of leadership failure into seven different 
types, describing each, but particularly using case examples, summarised in table 6.  
 
A number of criticisms can be raised against Kellerman’s model. Firstly, these 
examples can be taken as an illustration of Enoch Powell’s apocryphal comment 
that all political lives end in failure; indeed Kellerman herself comments on this 
factor. Secondly, in general, there are a number of weaknesses in using case 
examples to illustrate good, bad, ethical or unethical leadership. The difficulties are 
that the case examples are: 
 
 Partial; either focussing on usually one particular success or failing or even 
one pattern of success or failure within a vast career output of any given 
leader, and/or not describing the context of the reported success of failure; 
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were they in the right place at the right time (for success) or the wrong place 
at the wrong time (for failure).  
Ways of 
“leading 
badly” 
Characteristics Examples 
Incompetent 
leadership 
 Lack will or skill (or both) to 
sustain effective action 
 Do not create positive change 
with an impotent leadership 
challenge 
Juan Antonio 
Samaranch – Olympic 
corruption 
Rigid 
leadership 
 Stiff and unyielding 
 Unable/unwilling to adapt to 
new ideas/information or 
changing times 
 Not “deflected by the facts”164 
Thabo Mbeki – AIDS 
and South Africa 
Intemperate 
leadership 
 Lacks self control 
 Followers unable/unwilling to 
intervene 
Boris Yeltsin – alcohol 
Callous 
leadership 
 Uncaring and unkind 
 Ignores/discounts needs/wants 
of organisation members 
Martha Stewart – 
“nastiness” 
Corrupt 
leadership 
 Lie, cheat or steal 
 Self interest ahead of public 
interest (more than norm) 
 Motivated by power or greed 
A Alfred Taubman – 
Sotheby’s/Christie’s 
cartel 
Insular 
leadership 
 Minimisation/disregard of the 
health of “the other” – i.e. Those 
outside realms of direct 
responsibility 
Bill Clinton – Rwanda 
Evil 
leadership 
 Commit atrocities 
 Use pain as instrument of 
power 
 Harm done is severe, and 
physical, psychological or both 
Foday Sankoh – Sierra 
Leone civil war 
atrocities 
 
Table 6. Kellerman’s (2004) typology of “Bad Leadership”  
 
 Short termist and culturally determined; leaders celebrated at one time are 
later criticised (e.g. Robert Maxwell, Asil Nadir); and then sometimes in 
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subsequent generations more appreciated (e.g. the recent revisionism 
regarding Richard II165) 
 
 Normative; depending on the author’s frequently un-stated prejudices 
about “good leadership”.  
 
A third criticism of this approach can be made that some pathological aspects of 
personality are necessary for effective leadership, for example Kellerman’s 
describes rigid, intemperate and callous leadership. There would be an argument, 
that a temperate leader might be unable to summon the passion to take a group or 
organisation along with them; that the tenacity required to deliver a vision requires a 
degree of rigidity, and that difficult decisions require a degree of callousness. It 
seems inappropriate, therefore, to identify leaders as bad because they display 
these characteristics, which can be argued to be contributory to their success. 
Instead, the question one of degree; whether the characteristic in question is 
unbalanced.  
 
The same can be said of her other variables. Regarding corruption, there is a “real 
politic” argument that a degree of questionable deal making is inevitable with 
leadership and power. Similarly, insularity of focus can be lauded as “sticking to the 
knitting”166, and a leader overly concerned with extra-group peripheral issues can be 
criticised.  
 
Kellerman’s account itself can be reframed as capturing some of the characteristics 
required of leadership, perhaps up to and including the need to commit “atrocities” 
during downsizing in order to preserve the viability of the organisation. Kellerman 
may capture some characteristics required of leadership, but then colour them with 
negative terminology. Table 7 (below) reframes Kellerman’s “bad leadership” types 
into putative managerial strengths to illustrate the issue.  
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This criticism of Kellerman’s account potentially leads to a form of relativism. Bad 
leadership is not about being incompetent, rigid, intemperate, and so on, but about 
being inappropriately incompetent, rigid, or intemperate. Furthermore, if the 
discussion about good and bad leadership moves from a typology of qualities that 
define bad leadership on to a discourse about balance of leadership traits that in 
excess can lead to failure, the definition of “good leadership” starts to look 
Aristotelian. Firstly, in terms of the Greek notion of a healthy character (or 
leadership) comprising an appropriate balance of the humours, and secondly, a 
general sense of integrity of life and way of living implying a balance of passion and 
temperance; rigidity and flexibility; and so on.167  
 
Ways of “leading badly” Positive reframing 
Incompetent leadership Leadership willing to take on and struggle  
to achieve the impossible 
Rigid leadership Tenacious/principled/consistent leadership 
Intemperate leadership Passionate leadership 
Callous leadership Leadership willing to make difficult decisions 
Corrupt leadership Leadership able to operate flexibly within different 
cultural environments and value sets 
Insular leadership Leadership “sticking to the knitting” 
Evil leadership Leadership not afraid to be ruthless if necessary 
 
Table 7. A positive reframing Kellerman’s typology of “Bad Leadership”. 
 
 
4.1.2 Lipman-Bluman’s “Toxic Leadership” 
Lipman-Bluman’s concept and definition of what constitutes a “toxic leader”168 is 
somewhat confused, including case examples illustrating bullying and psychological 
manipulativeness, but also incompetence and failure.  
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The power of the toxic leader concept instead derives from the analysis of their 
origins, namely through the needs and actions of followers. In her account, toxic 
leaders are not born, but made by their followers. Leaders, she argues, are created 
to meet followers’, 
 
 Need for reassuring authority figures (to fill parent’s shoes); 
 The willingness to surrender freedom to achieve security and certainty; 
 Need to feel chosen/special; 
 Need for membership; 
 Fear of being ostracised/isolated; 
 Fear of personal powerlessness to challenge a bad leader. 
 
Reasonable leaders can be turned bad by the pressures that followers bring to bear, 
for example: 
 
 Flattery that prevents the leader having a true picture of the environment 
and followers' views. 
 Followers’ need to identify with an uplifting vision, such that leaders are 
more often chosen on the basis of their vision, rather than competence, 
turning the leader “toxic” in terms of incompetence.  
 Once in place, “Maslow hierarchy control myths” create an illusion the 
leader is essential to meet physiological needs, safety needs, belonging 
needs, making them unimpeachable.  
 
Although the “toxic leadership” model ends with an exhortation to “nurture reluctant 
leaders,” her central thesis is that leaders are there to protect followers from 
existential, social and infantile fears. She concludes that the whole equation of 
leadership and followership is irrational and potentially damaging for both sides, and 
obscures the perception of the real world.  
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The relevance for the current research is that her theory describes the process of 
followers surrendering their own potency and agency to the leader because of their 
needs that she describes; making them vulnerable to leaders whose personalities 
may have narcissistic or psychopathic elements.  
 
 
4.2 Corrupted leadership  
 
If the previous section directly explored bad leadership, this section looks at 
leadership that becomes bad, that becomes corrupted. Three models of leadership 
are explored , firstly the real concern of the potential to corrupt charismatic 
leadership, where the traditional typological accounts are challenged with a 
proposed evolutionary theory; looking at the writings of Machiavelli, and then looking 
at organised crime where, rather than the leadership being corrupted, leadership 
practice is utilised within a corrupt or criminal organisation.  
 
4.2.1 “Good” and “Bad” charisma. 
The core of charismatic leadership is the leader’s ability to neutralise the rationality 
and even values of followers, reconfiguring them towards the leaders’ or 
organisation's aims. David Koresh and Jim Jones as charismatic leaders 
demonstrate both the power and negative potential of the model.   
 
There are two theories that try to rehabilitate the concept from what Roberts called 
its “darker side”169; by distinguishing between socialised and personalised charisma, 
and distinguishing between “authentic” and “pseudo-” transformational leadership.  
 
The “authentic/pseudo” distinction is articulated in a paper by Bass and 
Steidlmeier,170 where they cite literature proposing that the ethical dimensions of 
leadership rest on “three pillars”:  
 The moral character of the leader,  
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 The ethical values embedded in the leader’s vision,  
 The morality of the “… choice and action…” pursued.171  
Table 8 (below) summarises the differences between the two types of according to 
Bass. 
 
Table 8. Transformational/pseudotransformational leadership 172 
 Genuine 
transformational 
 
Pseudo-transformational 
 
Modal values Honesty Instrumental mendacity 
 Loyalty Nepotism 
 Fairness Favouritism, victimisation 
Ends values Justice Submission 
 Equality Racial superiority 
 Human rights “Social Darwinism” 
Inner change 
dynamics 
Intellectual 
stimulation 
Imaginary enemies, fictitious obstacles 
 
 Freely embraced 
change of heart 
Bribes; abuse of authority 
 
Leader’s 
attitude 
Need for power 
channelled in socially 
constructive manner 
Power used for self aggrandisement; privately 
contemptuous of followers 
 
Idealised 
influence 
Acclamation by 
followers 
Self aggrandisement; “impression management”; 
consciously projected image of strength and 
decisiveness 
Inspirational 
motivation 
Realisable 
aspirational shared 
goal as vision 
 
Unrealistic fantasy; magical vision; “We – they” 
differences 
Intellectual 
stimulation 
Genuine open ended 
intellectual 
stimulation 
Imaginary enemies; fictitious obstacles; “logic 
containing false assumptions to slay the dragons of 
uncertainty”; Emotional argumentation instead of 
rational discourse 
Individualised 
consideration 
Development of 
followers into leaders 
Maintenance of follower’s dependency; 
Maintenance of distance between followers and 
leader; Fermentation of favouritism and competition 
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A second conceptualisation of the distinction between good and bad charisma is 
articulated by Howell173 in terms of the degree of socialisation (summarised in table 
9 below) of the leader’s aims and motivations, and whether they are focused 
primarily on the group’s or the leader’s own progress and development.  
 
Whereas the Steidlemeier model looks at the behaviours and strategies of the 
leader to establish the distinction, Howell focuses on the leader’s underlying attitude 
and motivation, whether it is collective or selfish and individualistic. 
 
 Socialised Personalised 
Focus of power 
motive174 
Inculcation of higher order 
values 
Exert dominance and 
submission over others 
 
 Serving the common good Serving the leaders interests 
 
Goals and values Development of collective 
goals 
Imposition of leaders goals 
 
 Tolerance and 
understanding 
Cultivation of leaders values 
 
 Serving the common good Serving the leader’s interests 
 
Methods Follower autonomy and 
empowerment 
Follower dependence on the 
leader fostered 
 
 Leader psychological 
availability 
Leader psychological distance 
 
 
Table 9. Socialised and personalised charismatic leadership 
 
There are three arguments against these distinctions. Firstly, there is the problem of 
extremes. The two binary models of Howells and Steidlemeier do articulate 
something true about different types of charismatic leader, but they describe two 
 71 
 
ends of a spectrum. Leaders such as Mother Theresa might be described as being 
down the “good” column of the two tables, and criminal gang leaders or end stage 
totalitarian dictators down the “bad” column, but even within these groups, the 
division starts to fall apart as demonstrated by the iteration of lionisation and 
vilification of leaders within the popular press. The practical problem is identifying 
“god” and “bad” charismatic or transformational leaders in real time, as distinct from 
in hindsight.  
 
A second criticism employs the phenomenon of the “halo effect”, namely the 
tendency, when questioned, to attribute good attributes to people thought to be 
good, and bad ones to those thought to be bad.175 There is evidence that people 
attribute charismatic qualities broadly to leaders that they have respected.176. 
 
Thirdly, distinctions between “good” and “bad” charisma may be a way of reassuring 
ourselves and rationalise the fear of being emotionally manipulated and duped. One 
of the powerful proposals of the post-structural movement is the idea that scholarly 
articles claiming truth value in fact follow literary and rhetorical conventions, for 
example the setting up of a binary grouping, one good one bad.177 “Good” and “bad” 
charisma, via whatever categorisation, Steidlemeiers’ genuine/pseudo; Howell’s 
socialised/personalised, or Alvolio’s “transformational vs. pure”,178 (where “pure” is 
similar to “personalised”, fostering dependency): These divisions potentially 
rationalise away the fear of a charismatic element of leadership, and may cover a 
rather weak argument that one can inherently distinguish between types of 
charismatic leadership. Charismatic leadership is powerful and can be dangerous. It 
may be an illusion to think that it is easy to distinguish between the two.   
 
4.2.2 An evolutionary model of “bad charisma” 
In contrast to identifying different types of charisma, some beneficent and benign, 
and some malignant, as in the approach above, the account below proposes a 
developmental/evolutionary model, wherein the different types form a continuum. 
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The advantage of this over a typology is that it raises the awareness that “good” 
charisma can turn into “bad” charisma in certain situations. Secondly, it highlights 
that there is a natural tendency for the charismatic element of the leadership to 
expand over time in the sense that “power corrupts”. 
 
Firstly, the model utilises the suggestion that different types of managerial style; 
transactional, transformational and charismatic have increasing amounts of 
charismatic type leadership behaviour respectively (see 2.1.2.4 above). Secondly, it 
proposes that, because it is successful and effective, operant conditioning179 will 
shape the managers behaviour to favour and expand the more charismatic 
elements of their managerial practice.  
 
At the first stage of evolution, the transactional leader develops and expands the 
transformational elements of behaviour in their leadership practice. This is driven by 
operant conditioning180; the manager may be unaware of it, but their 
transformational behaviour is positively re-enforced because of the positive 
feedback and task success engendered. Pre-existing transformational type 
behaviour such as caring about subordinates, intellectually engaging them about the 
task or vision; speaking of a better future; all increase in frequency through operant 
conditioning because the manager is rewarded by followers in the form of improved 
performance.  
 
The second stage of evolution is between transformational and charismatic 
leadership. For some, the terms are used synonymously; for others, charismatic 
leadership is transformational leadership plus some additional factors that intensify 
the charismatic/transformational effect181. In this developmental model, a 
transformational leader becomes charismatic at the point that they realise the 
effectiveness of their use of charismatic/transformational behaviours, and begin to 
use them deliberately.  
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The leader realises that particular aspects of their behaviour are more effective than 
others; that 4 “I” behaviour is more effective than conventional transactional 
maagement type rewards and punishments, and that moreover, 4 “I” behaviour is 
entirely within their aegis to provide, and are resource neutral, unlike financial 
bonuses.  
 
While the leader may not be aware of the theoretical context of their behaviours, 
they develop some sense that “leadership” is a distinct activity from “management”; 
that “leadership” is an emotional and personal activity, about teambuilding, care and 
consideration of followers, about gaining buy into a direction and organisational 
strategy, about cultivating the interest of followers, and their ownership of the 
organisation or the leader’s aims. The leader begins to recognise what are in effect 
a series of highly potent emotional levers, and starts to use them.   
 
The third stage involves the development of “bad” from “good” charismatic 
leadership. To start with, all transformational and then charismatic leadership needs 
to be “good enough” to be able to improve organisational performance. In the 
language of “socialised and personalised” charisma, it has to start off as sufficiently 
“socialised” for the authority base to develop; for the person to receive promotion; 
for the individual to develop the Weberian distinction and exceptionality required as 
a charismatic prerequisite. The development of “bad” charisma from “good” is driven 
by adverse contingencies, either related to the business environment context, or to 
the personality of the charismatic leader.  
 
Charismatic political leaders, whose time has passed, but who do not wish to 
relinquish power provide the clearest examples of bad charisma. There are purges 
of individuals perceived as unsupportive; truths that underline the facts about the 
need for change are suppressed; image management becomes an increasingly 
important and central activity with the use of naked power to quell dissent.  
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Fig 1. Developmental model of charismatic leadership 
 
The second contingent driver of charisma from good to bad involves the personality 
of the individual leader themselves, for example De Vries’ managerial case history 
of the “imposter”182. This man quickly rose through the ranks of industry as an 
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impressive performer and reliable and modest team player, to become CEO. At this 
point, his attitude completely changed to becoming autocratic, unreasonable, self 
serving and vain. He saw no conflict with this change; the issue was simply that 
there was no one that he had to please any more, so that he could please himself. 
There is a variation in the moral and ethical attitudes and values of individuals, such 
that power corrupts some more than others. As the power of charismatic managerial 
practice is realised by the individual, their own moral and ethical attitudes are 
amplified, be they pro- or anti-social; be they directed towards the common or 
selfish individual good.  
 
Where the leader is significantly challenged to the point of threat; the same powerful 
levers that had previously provided purchase and traction are brought to bear, not 
with the aim of furthering the task, but rather focussed on ensuring the survival of 
the manager.  
 
The importance of this developmental model lies in the proposal that there is a 
natural development between good and bad charismatic leadership. There are not 
two types of charismatic leader, all good charismatics can develop into bad 
charismatics with a particular set of circumstances.  
 
4.2.3  Machiavelli’s extreme pragmatism.  
Machiavellianism is often used as a byword for psychopathic management. For 
most leadership, the moral dilemma is whether or not to act ethically dubiously in 
the pursuit of the greater good, where “good” of the ends can be easily and 
unequivocally argued.  
 
An ambitious man himself, Machiavelli, after some political success in the unstable 
political environment of late 15th and early 16th century Florence was imprisoned by 
the Medicis and withdrew from public life, to write.183 His aim was to articulate how a 
“prince” could stay in power. Central in his arguments is the following 
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 War/fighting/change is the natural state: 
 
… Human affairs [are] in a state of perpetual movement, either 
ascending or declining”;  “… men are more ready for evil than 
for good… first [they] seek to secure themselves against 
attack, then they attack others…”184; “it is impossible for a 
republic… to remain long in the quiet enjoyment of her 
freedom… for even she does not molest others, others will 
molest her…”185 [so that] “… the foundation of states is good 
military organisation… Without such military organisation, 
there can neither be good laws, nor anything else good.”186.  
 
 Morality must appear to be enacted, rather than needing to be. 
 
… The chief duty of every prince is to keep himself from being 
hated and despised…187 
 
Machiavelli distinguishes between private and public morality; Private 
morality is private, drawn from whatever idealistic source, but which may not 
be shared by the population and therefore cannot be used as a foundation 
of power.  
 
Public morality must always be seen to be high. The leader must 
duplicitously create a public (avowed) persona of generosity, compassion 
and integrity while explicitly acting thriftily, ruthlessly and cruelly if necessary 
and while being cunning and conniving. The moral justification of at times 
unpalatable actions derives from the greater good of preserving a stable 
state. 188  
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 Virtue as tough-mindedness. “Virtue” for Machiavelli, the central requisite 
of a leader, and has been variously translated as “strength, skill or 
prowess”189, or even male sexual potency in his erotic verse190. It might best 
be understood as “discipline” where the leader requires to be self disciplined 
not to fall victim to the temptations to “effeminacy” from lack of willingness to 
do the morally uncomfortable. Brutal punishment makes an example of 
several lawbreakers to encourage the masses to obey the laws; maintaining 
an army at readiness, and not shirking from battle if required, and so on.  
 
 Using an “economy of violence”. Presaging Weber’s theorisation that the 
state has a monopoly of violence191, Machiavelli argues that violence or 
cruelty should be used for the greater good as a means of reducing other 
violence. Wolin argues that the requirement for violence is finite and 
measurable, hence his characterising it as economic.192 This may justify 
Machiavelli’s advice to the Prince to treat several criminals very cruelly, to 
make an example of them in the interests of the lawfulness of the majority. 
 
 Being feared rather than liked. Machiavelli’s question of whether it is 
better to be feared or loved is answered in terms of the former, as all 
leaders will have to do things that make them unpopular.   
 
 Chance plays a significant part.  
 
And if anyone might oppose [Fortune’s purpose] she either 
kills him, or she deprives him of any faculty of doing any good; 
…193 
 
Fortune, when she wishes to effect some great result, she 
select[s] for her instrument a man of such spirit and ability that 
he will recognise the opportunity which is afforded him…in the 
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same way, when she wishes to effect ruin and destruction, she 
places men at the head who contribute and hasten such ruin194 
 
Ledeen uses the example of Yasser Arafat to illustrate the successful manipulation 
of public perceived morality,  
 
Arafat had to kill potential challengers to maintain control of the PLO, 
yet it was also important for him to appear as a “moderate”… he 
therefore had his intelligence services secretly create the Abu Nidal 
terrorist organisation… to assassinate his enemies within the 
Palestinian movement… the existence of such a violent and 
murderous group enabled… Arafat [to] maintain a lofty pose and 
speak of peace. The deception succeeded fully. Even the Israelis were 
unaware until… the head of the Romanian secret service defected… 
Arafat spoke of peace in English to foreign diplomats and promised to 
his own people in Arabic that Israel would eventually be destroyed.195  
 
In a Machiavellian analysis, the leader is required to succeed. If the only morally 
acceptable outcome is the achievement of the objective, the duty is to do whatever it 
takes to achieve the objective. It is not that one is justified/excused the 
unacceptable action; rather one is morally required to carry it out to maintain power, 
to maintain peace. .   
 
 
4.2.4 Mafia management.  
In his “Mafia Manager” book, “V” (the author) illuminates a number of aspects of 
leadership in organised crime.  
 
 The place of the Capo  
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… Everyone, early in his or her career needs the sponsorship 
of a capo… before you can command, you must learn to 
obey… when a subordinate, behave like a subordinate… no 
task he gives you is so mean or so bloody (metaphorically 
speaking) [sic.] that you would hesitate to undertake it. 
[However]… later in your career, if by bad happenstance the 
mentor of your early years… stands in the way of your own 
advancement, what do you do? Whack him, no question. He’s 
had his career, right? ...All capos… stand on the shoulders of 
giants… and on the bones of giants. When you climb the 
pyramid, you climb a bone-heap. But he who would have the 
fruit, must climb, eh?196 
 
 The pleasure and activity of leadership.  
 
… The pleasure of commanding is sweeter than sexual 
intercourse… you have to keep telling your staff how good 
they are… stress their worth and the value to you of what they 
do… blow smoke. Every day, blow smoke”197 
 
 The focus on task and absence of ethics 
 
… Our Thing is about making money. Making it in any way it’s 
possible to make it… a complete lack of scruples confers 
substantial advantages.198 
  
 The use of violence-  
 
… A kind word and a gun are much more effective than a kind 
word alone199 
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In Kellerman’s typology of bad leadership, organised criminal leadership would be 
“Evil Leadership”200 in that it uses actual bodily violence, for Arendt’s; it would 
constitute illegitimate violence based subjection.201 
 
 
4.3 Ethics and leadership 
 
Focusing on the second part of the research question, namely the extent to which 
psychopathy in management and leadership is a critical variable, bad and 
“corrupted” leadership have been explored. The leadership ethics literature is a 
response to concerns that are raised both about the potential power of leaders over 
vulnerable followers, and to concerns about the power of institutions.  
 
This section looks firstly at ethical considerations in general, then at the leadership 
ethics literature, exploring the dilemma raised by “V” that unethical practice can be 
more effective in business terms. A further issue explored is the argument that 
organisations are structurally (and legally) obliged to be psychopathic, leading to a 
proposal for the redefinition of criminal organisations to distinguish such normal but 
potentially psychopathic organisations from genuinely criminal ones.  
 
4.3.1 The Good  
A basic polarity running through efforts to understand leadership and organisations 
as good or bad has to be traditional ethical conceptions of the distinction between 
good and bad. Given that many of the definitions of bad or evil come down to “the 
absence of the good”202; this seems a reasonable definition of “bad”. A historical 
summary is to be found in table 10( below). 
 
In their paper trying to untangle the problem of the possibility of malign charismatic 
leadership, Bass uses distillations from “Socratic and Confucian typologies”.203  
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Ethical 
theory 
Content – The 
Good… 
Critique Obverse –  
The Bad… 
Organisation Individual/leadership 
Judeo-
Christian204 
Absolutist – 
e.g.10 
commandments. 
Evolution from 
“lex talionis”, to 
“love thy 
neighbour”,  
Evacuation of 
morality from 
individuals 
into deity.  
Disobeying 
deity, or deity’s 
rules.  
External 
legislative 
coercion; 
being seen to 
follow religious 
values.  
Accepting and acting 
within external moral 
code 
Rational/ 
Kantian 205 
Categorical 
imperative – 
people are ends 
not means 
Neutral about 
task  
Treating people 
as means 
“…our 
customers/staff 
are our biggest 
asset…” 
Person focussed 
leadership style 
(Tannenbaum and 
Schmidt 206) 
Empirical/ 
Utilitarian207 
Right action 
bring 
mathematically 
maximised 
happiness 
Impossible 
measurement  
Non maximised 
happiness 
Marketplace 
as the fairest 
distribution of 
resource; 
stakeholder 
impact 
analyses 
Leadership is a technical 
process of benefit 
analysis 
Relativist208 Moral statements 
express personal 
feelings 
Wide 
acceptance 
of many 
moral themes 
across 
different 
cultures 
Nothing 
inherently good 
and nothing 
bad 
Moral rhetoric 
differs when 
addressing 
shareholders 
and customers 
Post modern skills; moral 
flexibility, rhetoric and 
“spin” 
Applied209 Promotion of 
specific issues – 
fertility, abortion, 
environmental 
issues, animal 
rights 
Atomised and  
politicised,  
Lack of 
consideration of 
specific issue 
Sensitivity and 
response to 
politicised 
single issues  
Leadership as fanatic 
Economic/ 
Business 
Increasing 
wealth/success 
Partial – for a 
defined 
group at the 
expense of 
another 
defined 
group 
Decreasing 
wealth/business 
failure 
“the social 
responsibility 
of business is 
to increase its 
profits”210 
Organisational 
success/personal wealth 
 
Table 10. Conceptions of the good (continued over)211 
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Ethical 
theory 
Content – 
The Good… 
Critique Obverse –  
The Bad… 
Organisation Individual/leadership 
Socratic/ 
Greek212 
Defining “a 
good life” – 
or a “well 
lived life”… 
Partial/discriminatory  
morality; “Well lived 
life” of a man; not a 
woman or slave or 
occupant of 
neighbour city state;  
Not living a 
“good life” 
A good 
responsible 
company – is good 
for business – like 
an individual’s 
“good life” 
Personal Integrity 
leads to positive moral 
leadership 
Confucian213 Proper 
conduct; 
respect of 
authority, 
family 
fidelity, 
respect of 
others 
Idealistic Improper 
conduct 
Proper 
organisational 
conduct 
Integrity of character – 
with integrity defined 
in terms of behaviour 
 
Table 10. Conceptions of the good (continued) 
 
While I have argued elsewhere that their project to clearly distinguish good and bad 
charisma is flawed, their overall technique of exploration of the issue seems 
legitimate, namely that judgement or comment about the ethical valence of 
leadership/management requires recourse to extremely broad perspectives about 
the nature of the good. 
 
With the vastness of the literature, there is a plethora of different broad brush-stroke 
classifications by different writers. In table 10, three broad distinctions have been 
drawn, firstly relating to the externality or internality of the moral imperative. For 
many, the moral imperative comes from without, either in the form of a vengeful god, 
or the demands of a single issue or market success. 
 
Secondly, Greek and Eastern approaches more focus on the nature of the character 
of the individual or organisation, with the implication that being good is not only a 
personal struggle, but also a personal task of definition. 
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A third important dimension is the distinction between the focus on outcomes and 
the focus on means: teleological vs. deontological approaches. Rational theories 
(e.g. Hume and Kant) argue for rational categorical imperatives determining what is 
good (e.g. the Kantian, people as “ends” not “means”) and more empirically 
grounded theories such as Utilitarianism evaluate the amount of good the outcome. 
This is summarised by Ciulla214, who notes recent organisational ethical debate 
being about teleological accountability for low wages in developing countries, 
environmental impact of activities and so on, factors previously ignored.  
 
 
4.3.2 Ethical leadership 
In exploring the conventional approach to concerns about bad leadership, namely 
developing leadership ethics, following a general survey of “the good” and 
understanding “the bad” as its absence, this section will explore some specific 
literature on applied leadership ethics that has emerged. .  
 
4.3.2.1 The “smell, sleep and newspaper” tests? Paine complains that  
 
Ethical analyses [are] rarely a defined part of business decision 
making… [beyond the]… smell tests, sleep tests and newspaper tests: 
Does it smell OK? Will it keep me awake at night? How would it look 
on the front page of the newspaper?215  
 
While she accepts that such “instinct or gut feeling” assessments have their place, 
they cannot be thought to be sufficient. What this approach does do, is focus on the 
individual leader, and therefore clarify the leader’s accountability for the ethicality of 
the actions of the organisation.  
  
Ciulla216 critically appraises the treatment of ethical issues in leadership studies 
heretofore, with a dearth of discussion of the issues in Bass’… 
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Encyclopaedic… Handbook of Leadership… the text is 914 pages and 
contains a 162 page bibliography… if you look ethics up in the index, 
five pages are listed”217  
 
She cites as an example Rost’s book “Leadership in the 20th Century” which is 
extensively researched and has a chapter on ethics, but dismisses traditional 
philosophy and discourse as “useless”, suggesting that a “new language of civic 
virtue” will emerge; Ciulla comments, “he fails to notice that the language of civic 
virtue is quite old”.218  
 
She concludes that in leadership studies, scholars, because they feel intuitively they 
have an ethical sensibility, fail to distinguish their own practical knowledge from 
theoretical knowledge such that they 
 
… End up either reinventing fairly standard philosophic distinctions 
and ethical theories, or [do] without them and [proceed] higgledy-
piggledy with their discussion219.  
 
Calas et al propose that much leadership study is to find the Rosetta Stone of 
leadership,220 but Cuilla proposes this process of fragmentation of the leadership 
task prevents an ethical exploration, which requires a broader perspective. 
 
4.3.2.2 Ethics vs. effectiveness.  Ciulla argues that defining good leadership is 
predicated upon one’s perspective about the different tasks of leadership. This 
dilemma is illustrated by Tannenbaum and Schmitt’s dualism of focus on task vs. 
focus on persons; is good leadership defined by getting the job done, or by the 
wellbeing of followers? That good leadership is person rather than task focussed is 
supported by the “rationalist” Kantian categorical imperative, and Yukl confirms that 
the followers of person-focussed leaders are consistently found to be happier.221 
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Alternatively, if good leadership is defined by delivery of the task, then a 
Machiavellian approach is justifiable.  
 
The more loaded question is whether there is an inverse proportionality between 
ethical management and effectiveness, defining “ethical” in Kantian terms. The 
conflict between the two can be illustrated generally in a number of different ways; 
the need to maximise profit forcing wages and worker benefits downwards; taking 
environmental responsibility as an ethical starting point, profitability will be inversely 
proportional to the efforts made to protect the environment. There are also more 
specific examples include the ruthlessness of managers in dismissing poorly 
performing staff where growth is an explicit objective.222  
 
Paine addresses the issue more pragmatically, suggesting that there is a degree of 
competition between ethical practice and economic success, proposing a “zone of 
acceptability” between the two and for which leaders must aim. “Centre driven” 
decision-making needs to both withstand market testing of the adopted strategy, as 
well as ethical challenge. Leaders “… will need to marry NPV (net present value) 
with MPV (moral point of view) analyses.”223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Paine’s “zone of acceptability”.  
Ethically 
sound Economically 
sound 
The zone of acceptability 
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4.3.2.3  Diverse moral compasses A collection of papers by Paine et al224 
comprises different approaches to the question of what constitutes moral/ethical or 
good leadership. One way of conceptualising these diverse approaches is the notion 
of a “moral compass for decision making”;225 that leaders need to have some ethical 
frame with which to evaluate the legitimacy of their decisions aside from the more 
obvious one of the financially profitable bottom line. Examples of these are listed.  
 
 The relational approach – that “responsible leadership is about building 
and sustaining trustful relations to all relevant stakeholders… by making 
them partners on a leadership journey…”226  
 
 The spiritual approach – using examples of successful organisations with 
religious leaders at their head, the authors conclude that “the evolution from 
a rational based… to a spiritual based perspective…" leadership involves 
an “increasingly inclusive sense of responsibility – a spiritual openness that 
ultimately embraces humanity and the planet.”227 
 
 The “Caux Round Table principles” – an international committee of 
eminent leaders from politics and business whose experience has been 
distilled into guidance and recommendation for responsible leadership. 
Young summarises their conclusions as follows 
o “There is a need for principles… 
o What gets managed gets accomplished… 
o Interests must be addressed… 
o Culture counts… 
o The fish rots from the head”228  
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 Cultural and/or environmental approach, also can define the moral 
“north” 229  
 
 The Aristotelian approach of good leaders being people leading a “good 
life” with integrity and balance as described by Greek philosophers. Sison 
summarises,  
 
The excellence of action is called prudence… Prudence in 
leadership not only requires knowledge of the proper end, but 
also the right choice of means to that particular end… 
leadership comes close to the metaphysical model for a 
perfect, immanent act, where the end is external to the activity 
itself230 
 
In an influential book, Selznick identifies leaders becoming opportunistic in tackling 
challenges leading to organisational drift as a moral challenge; that rather the leader 
should  
 
“choose key values and … create a social structure that embodies 
them”.231  
 
While each different set of moral compass points will have its advocates, their very 
diversity illustrates both the unintegrated nature of the accounts, their lack of shared 
foundation and their potential to “talk past” each other.  
 
 
 
4.4 Organisations: Pro-social, criminal and psychopathic.  
Having explored the question of the extent to which the psychopathy of a leader is a 
critical variable by looking at types of bad leadership, corrupted leadership and 
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leadership ethics, this section explores the extent to which organisations themselves 
might be termed psychopathic. It explores differences between criminal and pro-
social business organisations; looks at a theory that organisations are themselves 
structured to be “psychopathic”, then constructs a proposed distinction and 
redefinition of criminal organisations.  
 
 Pro-social legitimate 
business 
organisation 
Criminal organisation  
e.g. Mafia 
Violence Nonviolence Centrality of violence  
Openness Transparency  Centrality of secrets and criminal code of 
silence 
State 
structures 
Work with legitimate 
(state) authority 
Work against  
 Police/drug law enforcement 
 Tax and customs  
Democratic 
process 
Work within 
democratic process 
Pervert democratic process 
 Political corruption 
 “We are the government”232 
Judicial 
process 
Work within judicial 
process 
Pervert judicial process 
 Perverse use of existing legislation 
 Tampering with court processes 
Group task Legitimate business 
providing financial 
gain 
Criminal activity providing financial gain 
Personnel Free entry/exit No free exit 
Equal rights Espouses equal 
rights, recognition of 
wide group of 
stakeholders 
Abnegation of the rights of  
 General citizens (non family/tribe or 
opposing family/tribe) 
 Individual group members (within the 
same family/tribe if an individual gets 
in the way of an individual or the 
groups ends or means) 
 
Table 11 Legitimate and criminal organisations; distinctions 
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Criminal/mafia organisations can be argued to be different to legitimate business, 
along various parameters as noted in table 11 (below).  
 
Notwithstanding these distinctions on a number of parameters, the distinction 
between criminal and non-criminal organisations can be challenged as follows 
 
 Both have making money as the ultimate aim in a capitalist context 
 Both develop strong group membership cultures that can foster self 
protective unethical practice 
 Both can dissemble or dupe authorities in terms of tax minimisation and 
probity 
 Both seek to influence the political process and policymaking 
 
4.4.1 Organisations as psychopathic 
Balkan takes the argument that the difference between criminal and pro-social 
business organisations is difficult to define a stage further, arguing that all business 
organisations are psychopathic by virtue of their structure.233  
  
Starting from organisational theory, organisations are groupings together of 
activities to reduce transaction costs.234 Such structures quickly lead to the 
separation of those charged with running the organisation from the owners and 
shareholders. 
 
That managers may service their own interests rather than that of the firm is the 
“principal agent problem”. As a consequence, such pursuit of the managers’ agenda 
has been thoroughly restricted by legal obligations on organisational managers to 
maximise profits and minimise losses for and to the owners. According to Balkan, 
the manager “doing the right thing” morally becomes a contractually and legally 
forbidden activity if it does not maximise profit.235  
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Fox contends that as a result, people operate a “destructive dualism” between their 
behaviour and morals outside and inside work, leading to an “occupational 
schizophrenia”236 Within work, they are required above all other duties to maximise 
the profit of the company, irrespective of the damage this may do to persons, the 
environment and so on.  
 
Sensitivities regarding such moral scruples are versions of the “principal agent 
problem” putting their own predilections above those of the owners of the company. 
As Dershowitz commented, 
 
I would never do many of the things in my personal life that I have to 
do as a lawyer.237 
 
A counter argument can be made that treating people and employees ethically well 
is “good for business,” since profit may be enhanced by caring for workers or 
enhancing the reputation of the company. But there remains a significant problem 
with the theory of ethics relating to organisations, as distinct from individuals. 
 
 
4.4.2 Redefining “criminal organisations” 
Although there is research by law enforcement into specific criminal organisations 
with the aim of obtaining prosecutions, there seems to be very much less or none 
into these organisations as organisations; models of leadership; organisational 
culture and so on.   
 
Organised crime has been defined as  
 
… Criminal activity carried on by groups of persons, however loosely 
or tightly organised, for the enrichment of those participating, and at 
the expense of the community and its members. It is frequently 
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accomplished through ruthless disregard of any law, including 
offences against the person…238, 
 
For the purposes of the current research, the question is of how to distinguish 
between criminal (antisocial) and normal business (pro-social) organisations. The 
relevance of this distinction is not only related to the current discussion of the role of 
psychopathy in managerial effectiveness, and the extent to which the leader or 
organisation is psychopathic/antisocial, but also in relation to the analysis of the 
nature of the NSDAP organisation run by Hitler as the crucial case in the chapters 
below.  
 
The distinction can be further explored by the creation of a four square matrix from 
the Machiavellian “ethic” of means and ends, as in figure 3 below. This matrix yields 
four distinct ethical organisational styles; Machiavellian, criminal, Kantian and 
“ethical”. These distinct ethical organisational types identified might be defined as 
follows: 
 
 Machiavellian characterised by an extreme pragmatism, with the moral 
valence of the actions taken managerially are judged by the moral 
legitimacy and significance of the objective. (Similar to Blake and Mouton’s 
managerial grid concern for the task)239 
 
 Criminal where both bad or evil ends and means are utilised and striven 
for. 
 
 Kantian with a moral emphasis on the Kantian categorical imperative of 
treating people as ends rather than means, such that the managerial 
objective in no way can justify less than ideal treatment of subordinates; 
(concern for persons in the managerial grid). 
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 Ethical, where there is “goodness of task” in terms of the ends, (for 
example the UK charitable requirement to be working for the “public 
good”); and within which there is an expectation of a high level of ethical 
practice or “means”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Machiavellian 4 square matrix; Goodness of ends and means 
 
This typology can be further explored by referring back to Paine’s distinction 
between the economic and ethical acceptability of organisational 
actions/strategy/tactics; that unethical practice may be more efficacious (4.3.2.2). 
This notion can also be subtended into a matrix, placing “economic 
acceptability/efficacy” on the y axis, and “ethical acceptability” on the x axis (figure 4 
below).  
 
 
Increasing 
“goodness” 
of task/ends 
Increasing “goodness” of means 
 
 
         Criminal  
  
 
 
 
 
Machiavellian  
 
   
          Kantian  
 
 
 
 
Ethical  
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In the Paine matrix of ethical vs. economic acceptability, the distinction between 
Machiavellian/Criminal and Kantian/Ethical cultures is lost. For the Kantian, the 
moral valence of the outcome is defined by the treatment of those defined as 
“people”, with this being more important than organisational efficacy, or economic 
acceptability in Paine’s terms.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Paine 4 square matrix; economic acceptability (organisational 
efficacy) vs. ethical acceptability.  
 
Machiavellian and criminal organisations are indistinguishable within the efficacy vs. 
ethics table, the task seeming all important, possibly explaining part of the general 
ethical unease and popular opprobrium with a Machiavellian approach.  
 
Criminal and Machiavellian ethical organisational types can be distinguished on the 
“Machiavellian” means/ends matrix, but not on the Paine efficacy/acceptability 
matrix. Machiavellianism has good “ends”, unlike criminality.  
 
 
Economic 
acceptability / 
efficacy 
Ethical acceptability 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Machiavellian / 
Criminal  
 
 
 
 
Kantian / 
Ethical 
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This distinction goes some way to responding to Balkan’s posed challenge that 
organisations are inherently psychopathic, by emphasising that the choice of 
organisational ends and aims are a legitimate ethical variable240, which return the 
focus onto the issue of the leader.  
  
 
4.5 Bad leadership: Conclusions 
 
To explore the second limb of the research question, about whether the degree of 
psychopathy in the manager or leader is a critical variable, the question of bad 
leadership has been explored. A distinction has been drawn between bad in the 
sense of psychopathic leadership (Mafia and Kellerman’s “evil” category) and 
leadership where the aims and intentions are good, for example Machiavelli’s 
recommendations for maintaining social order. The issue is confused by a built in 
callousness in organisational theory, but it has been proposed that one can 
distinguish between the “psychopathy” attributed to organisations by legal 
requirement noted by Balkan and the callousness attributed to more explicitly 
criminal organisations through consideration of a means/ends matrix.  
 
A tentative conclusion is that while there is a negative correlation described by 
Paine between ethical and effective practice, and while organisations themselves 
can be described as psychopathic, within the literature, psychopathy has not been 
identified as a success factor for leadership. The conclusion of the previous chapter 
has been that charisma is the crucial variable in the efficacy of leadership. These 
tentative conclusions and “bad management” theories are utilised in the exploration 
of the case study below. Before giving the case account, Chapters 5 and 6 set out 
the methodological and epistemological basis of the enquiry. 
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5. The hermeneutic phenomenology research paradigm 
 
 
This chapter develops the research paradigm on which the method rests. The 
question of how managers enact agency within organisations, and to what extent 
the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable in determining their 
effectiveness, is one located within the psychological phenomenological and the 
socially constructed world. Consequently the research is set within a qualitative non-
positivist epistemology using a hermeneutic phenomenology research paradigm.  
 
The chapter is split into two sections, the first epistemological, and the second 
starting from an ontology. The first section both critiques positivism as having an 
hegemony of empirical research, and more fundamentally, develops the theme of 
epistemological scepticism to its more recent post modern manifestation. The 
second commences with dualist ontology, constructing an alternative episteme 
based on the coherence of psychological experiences and shared social 
phenomena, and describes the hermeneutic phenomenology adopted as the 
research paradigm. 
 
 
5.1 Epistemic scepticism and the postmodern condition.  
 
This section will firstly set up the positivist paradigm, which has an assumed 
hegemony on scientific research, and then critique it from various perspectives, 
including traditional philosophical scepticism then a critique of science as a social 
phenomenon. A more radical critique from the perspective of language and rhetoric 
will be followed by deconstructionism. Together, these perspectives will develop the 
argument for epistemological scepticism that underlies postmodernism.   
 96 
 
 
 
5.1.1 Positivism and certainty 
The development of western civilisation can be attributed to the industrial revolution, 
in turn driven by the application of the positivistic natural sciences into developing 
technologies. Regarding the foundation of these sciences, Crotty summarises that 
the 
 
… positivist perspective encapsulates the spirit of the Enlightenment, 
the self proclaimed Age of Reason… positivism offers assurance of 
unambiguous and accurate knowledge of the world241 
 
The importance of certainty as a grounding in the emerging sciences was a central 
preoccupation for the philosophy of science, as was the importance of accuracy in 
recording the perceptions on which science rests. Descartes resolved,  
 
never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be 
such; that is to say ...  to exclude all ground of doubt.242 
 
And concluded that observations of the natural world are, 
 
True, in as far as… the object is clear and distinctly apprehended.243 
 
In this context of assumed certainty, the inductive processes for the natural sciences 
that had been set out by Bacon could proceed by 
 
Investigating and discovering truth... Construct [ing] its axioms from 
the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, till 
it finally arrives at the most general axioms…244 
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Ayer popularised the verificationism and scientific positivism of Comte and Mill,245 
 
M Comte… maintains that no hypothesis is legitimate unless it is 
susceptible of verification, and that none ought to be accepted as true 
unless it can be shown not only that it accords with the facts… 246 
 
Ayer and the positivists' position was somewhat softened by Popper’s modification 
to falsificationism, with his critique of non falsifiable pseudo-scientific systems such 
as psychoanalysis and astrology “with its stupendous mass of empirical evidence 
based on observation--on horoscopes and on biographies…”247 He summarises, 
 
A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-
scientific…  Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or 
to refute it. Testability is falsifiability… 248 
 
Crotty concludes that, 
 
Like the Enlightenment that gave it birth, positivism offers assurance 
of unambiguous and accurate knowledge of the world249 
 
The natural sciences underlie the researcher’s medical training and therefore his 
natural outlook. Because the current project specifically eschews a positivist 
approach, this account of positivism has been summarised in order to critique it 
below.  
 
 
5.1.2 Scepticism and Doubt   
Notwithstanding the confidence and success of the natural sciences built on 
positivism, there are challenges that can be made to its epistemology by challenging 
knowledge, the externl world, and cause and effect. The first of these is from 
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philosophical scepticism about the possibility of certain knowledge.  
 
Scepticism has a long history; Pyrrho (about 360-270 BC) was said to have argued 
for accepting that nothing could be certain.250 Subsequently Sextus Empiricus in AD 
200 summarised, 
 
Scepticism is the ability to find the opposites... Because the opposed 
things or reasonings have equal force, we are led first to suspension 
of judgment, and then to serenity251 
 
The sequence is that a thesis proposed is challenged such that the foundations on 
which it is built are shown to be circular or an infinite regress. Pyrrho argued against 
the possibility of certain knowledge on the grounds that; 
 
 Different people, and people and animals perceive things differently, and 
different situations (position/amount of light) change the appearances of 
things 
 Things change (e.g. ground black goat horn powder is white) 
 The “veil of perception” argument, that we perceive perceptions, not the 
“things in themselves” (to use the Kantian term) 
 Things happen frequently or rarely 
 The wide difference in cultural and ethical beliefs between peoples252 
 
Plato is credited with the creation of the standard definition of knowledge, namely 
that it is “justified true belief”; the “J.T.B” theory of knowledge. In the account of 
Socrates’ dialogue with Theatetus, 
 
I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, because there 
may be a false opinion; but I will venture to assert, that knowledge is 
true opinion253 
 99 
 
 
JTB theory has been drawn as a Venn diagram, where there are two overlapping 
circles, one being belief, and the other being truth, and within the overlap; the small 
shared area, is knowledge that is both true and believed. While this is clear, counter 
examples have been described254 that have lead to an iterative process of 
increasingly complex and tortuous qualifications of JTB,255 suggesting that this 
approach to truth is not immune to challenge. 
 
A second challenge is that the philosophy of science is unable to prove the 
existence of a material world based on its perception because one cannot be certain 
of any of what Russell terms “sense data”.256 In Socrates' dialogue with Theatetus, 
Socrates anticipates Descartes,  
 
SOCRATES:… How can you determine whether at this moment 
 we are sleeping, and all our thoughts are a dream; or whether 
 we are awake, and talking to one another in the waking state? 
THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know 
how to prove the one any more than the other, 
for in both cases the facts precisely 
correspond… the resemblance of the two states 
is quite astonishing. 
SOCRATES: You see, then, that a doubt about 
the reality of sense is easily raised… 257 
 
Descartes’ method of “doubt,” 258 rejecting that about which he could not be 
completely certain, undermined the traditional belief in information from sense data. 
How can one prove one is not dreaming/hallucinating? 
 
We know by experience that the senses 
sometimes err... And to one who has thus 
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resolved upon a general doubt, there appear no 
marks by which he can with certainty distinguish 
sleep from the waking state.259 
 
This was taken further by Bishop Berkley with his proposal that there was no 
physical world, but rather God is orchestrating people’s sense data.260 For Berkley, 
“esse est percipi”, to be is to be percieved.261 Everything in the external world is in 
some way perceived or has been processed by the sense organs of a thinking 
being; for Berkley it added nothing to the description of reality to suggest material 
substances in addition to these perceptions. For physical objects,  
 
nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or 
thinking things which perceive them..262 
 
These perspectives have their modern iterations in the “five minute hypothesis”, or 
the “brain in a vat” argument263. In both of these it is difficult to prove that the 
universe was not created five minutes ago, or that one is not simply a hallucinating 
brain in a laboratory artificially being kept alive.  
 
The third challenge was more specifically about cause and effect. In the context of 
the world appearing to be a Newtonian rational place, where simple mathematical 
formulae once discovered, will explain everything, Hume challenged the 
scientifically axiomatic conservation of momentum using the classic billiard ball 
example;  
 
Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion 
in the first... May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not 
the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any 
line or direction? … Why then should we give the preference to one, 
which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? 264 
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As the porcelain jug falls to the ground, one feels one should be able to predict that 
it will break, but until it has actually done so, one cannot be certain; it may bounce; it 
may be caught. One cannot predict what will happen next purely by considering the 
items in front of one. Hume argues that the inductive notion of cause and effect is 
not to be found within the objects themselves, but rather by an “association of 
ideas.”265  
 
Where epistemology looks for Descartes' clear and distinct truths, Hume substitutes 
belief, 
 
All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from... a 
customary conjunction between that and some other object. … If flame 
or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by 
custom to expect heat or cold… This seems to be the case with that 
belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect266 
 
Thus reducing the certainty promised by the natural sciences to mere familiarity and 
faith.  
 
Finally, the certainty promised by the Logical Positivists was substantially qualified 
by later Wittgenstein, who argues that language, far from being a metaphysical 
bedrock, is like a game of “ring a ring of roses”, tennis or chess which have a 
process in common, but actions at variance. General linguistic definitions are of 
limited usefulness as the only user of the word is likely to know the current local, 
shared active usage and meaning.267 
 
We can also think of the whole process of using words in as one of 
those games by means of which children learn their native language… 
 102 
 
I shall call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into 
which it is woven, the “language game” 268 
 
While the success of the natural sciences cannot be denied, its epistemological 
grounding remains unstable.  
 
 
5.1.3 Doubting positivism; the sociology of science.   
The preceding section challenged the epistemological basis of positivism. This 
section moves on to examining practiced science as a social phenomenon. More 
commonly, a positivist critique is made of the knowledge claims of the social 
sciences; the “Sociology of Scientific Knowledge” (SSK) reverses this, to challenge 
the objectivity of the natural sciences themselves.  
 
Merton described aspects of the structure of science, linking its culture with 
protestant piety269 (as Weber had linked capitalism with its ethic), and described its 
norms, including communality and “organised scepticism”.270 Kuhn’s “Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions” would be classified in the subsequent debate as “weak” SSK, 
focussing in the main on evidence from what turned out to be  historical, scientific 
blind alleys: the adherence during the dark ages to Aristotle’s physics, stones falling 
to earth as it is their “natural place” for example, or Ptolemy’s astronomy with the 
Earth at the centre of the universe being replaced by Copernicus271 placing the sun 
there. The 19th century belief in Phrenology provides an illustration; the “science” of 
external skull lumps and bumps articulating psychological and constitutional 
characteristics. It was popular, particularly among the developing late 19th century 
middle classes, and was proposed to be driven by this class’ anxiety related to 
changing social hierarchies and the dwindling authority of the aristocracy by 
providing a pseudo-biological legitimacy.272 
 
Kuhn’s criticism was more potent, however, with its defining of scientific “paradigms” 
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which organise the activity in a manner similar to religious orthodoxies. Within a 
“paradigm”; “normal science” proceeds, this is a process of clarifying and extending 
the science on the basis of broadly agreed assumptions and scientific techniques. 
Kuhn described this work as taking place within a network of “commitments”273 to 
the belief system set up within the original paradigm, but reified into a conformity 
required for individual researchers to obtain grants, publication and acceptance. A 
“scientific revolution” occurs after a long period of the active ignoring of findings 
contrary to the paradigm, but as these anomalies become overwhelming, a new 
theory emerges that explains them, leading to conflict between the schools. Kuhn 
quotes Plank, 
 
A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents 
and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents 
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with 
it."[274 
 
“Strong” SSK was developed by Bloor, in particular arguing that challenge should be 
made not only to scientific “facts” subsequently demonstrated to be false, but to all 
“facts” equally, including those currently held to be true. This was one of his four 
characteristics of the “strong programme”; that exploration and critique were 
impartial as to the acceptance of the construct, and treated successful and failed 
theories symmetrically. He cites Lord Kelvin’s disproof of the theory of evolution on 
the grounds that by calculating the sun as a body loosing heat, it was not of 
sufficient age for evolution to have taken place, accepted at the time. 275  
 
Collins explored the “experimenter’s regress”, found at the leading edge of science 
rather than where Kuhn’s “normal science” is taking place. The regress is that there 
is neither agreement on the nature or existence of the phenomenon (gravitational 
waves in his example) nor of how to measure them. To establish whether there are 
gravity waves hitting the earth, 
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We must build a good gravity wave detector… But we won't know if we 
have built a good detector until we have tried it [and found them]276 
 
Most significantly, at the time of this controversy, on the basis of interviews, 
physicists distinguished between data on the basis of factors irrelevant to the 
science; factors that included the researchers’, 
 
Reputation… style and presentation… size and prestige of university… 
nationality…277 
 
Latour, in the late 1960s, embedded in one of the teams racing to discover a thyroid 
hormone that is now a routine medical test, described the “construction of scientific 
facts” in a hierarchy of five stages, beginning with “speculation”, passing through 
“claims”, then “reports” to “new findings”, and finally “facts taken for granted”.278  
Radically, Latour denied that the thyroid hormone was “discovered” based upon his 
constructionist position, that the hormone occupies a particular place within his other 
theoretical contribution of actor Network theory.279 For Latour, the thyroid hormone 
construct is contributed to by other nodes in its network, including the winning of the 
Nobel Prize; the competition between the two laboratory teams; the medical 
conditions that it will help to alleviate and so on. To talk in terms of a “discovery” 
would be too final and complete for his constructionist relativism.  
 
Notwithstanding this degree of counter challenge280 and rapprochement281, the 
promise of the positivists for Crotty’s “assurance of unambiguous and accurate 
knowledge of the world”282 is significantly undermined by these illustrations of social 
forces disrupting the objective recording and evaluation of data. To the 
epistemological challenge to positivism is added a social one.   
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5.1.4  Doubting communication: Language and Rhetoric.  
Having challenged the assurance of certainty from the positivist sciences from an 
epistemological and sociological angle, this section articulates scepticism at the 
level of written and spoken language. Based on Jacobson’s work, it proposes that 
all language has a rhetorical dimension, and is therefore potentially untrustworthy. 
Because structurally, knowledge is equated with language, this comprises a further 
significant challenge.  
 
Structuralism broadly proposes that beneath the apparent randomness and choice 
in life there lie structures. For many, the underlying structure in the world has been 
some form of deity, for example confirmation of Descartes' clear and distinct 
perceptions because God was no deceiver,283 or coordinating Berkley's sensations 
of the world in different perceivers.284 Articulating the romanticism of his time, 
Feuerbach reversed this structural position by echoing the supremacy of man that 
had been declared by Hegel, by declaring that in fact man had created God,285 so 
that man, or the human mind or spirit comprised the underlying structure. With the 
dethroning of man by Darwin, returning him to the animal kingdom, 
rationality/reason; knowledge or “science” has become the core structure.  
 
Levi-Strauss proposed that all of this knowledge and reason itself are predicated 
upon, and located within language narrowly;286 within semiotic systems of signs 
more broadly. However, language can beguile and convey a false message, 
undermining its truth value, for example through rhetoric. The tradition of antipathy 
to rhetoric dates back to Plato, who railed against the Sophists, whose rhetoric 
had…  
 
… An inferior degree of truth… being concerned with an inferior part 
of the soul; and… awakens and nourishes and strengthens the 
feelings and impairs the reason. 287 
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The subjective experience of realising one has made a decision having been 
emotionally manipulated through rhetoric is ubiquitous and traumatising. However, a 
critical reading of Plato might propose that Socrates himself is a rhetorical flourish 
deployed poetically to amplify Plato's views, and time and time again in his writing, 
one is struck by the beauty of the language, even in the short citations above.  
 
Gadamer argues that the problem of truth and rhetoric extends into the physical 
sciences.  
 
All presentations of physics… owe their effect to the rhetorical 
element… even Descartes, that great passionate advocate of method 
and certainty is in all his works a writer who handles the tools of 
rhetoric with consummate skill. 288 
 
He goes on, 
 
Plato had discovered… that the appropriate arguments [are] brought 
forward in regard to the specific receptivity of the souls of those to 
whom they [are] directed.289 
 
Language does not simply convey facts, it influences and manipulates through the 
action of rhetoric.  
 
A linguistic account of how all discourse has a rhetorical element is to be found in 
Jacobson. Building on Peirce’s and Sassure’s semiotics290, he argued that 
sentences, or communications operate in two dimensions; the first being the 
dimension of combination, which is horizontal, and the second being the vertical 
dimension, in which the poetic and metaphorical communication is articulated. “The 
cat sat on the mat” for example, has a simple structure of subject, verb predicate in 
its horizontal combination. However the construction of the communication crucially 
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involves the selection of metonyms for the different elements of the communication. 
The communicator has chosen “cat” rather than “domestic feline”, or “pussy”; has 
chosen, “sat” rather than “was seated” or “relaxed” or “rested” or “settled”; and has 
chosen “mat” rather than “rug” or “carpet” or  “door mat”. “The cat sat on the mat” 
means pretty much the same as “Tiddles settled on the rug”, but each sentence has 
a different “feel”. It is this “feel” that is the rhetorical or poetic function of the 
sentence.  
 
For Jacobson, the metaphorical meaning content of the communication comprises 
the vertical axis with the poetic impact determined by the selection of words: 
selection between metonyms. In each semiotic system, the different signs or 
signifiers have different “values”, meaning that they have different relations within 
the particular linguistic or semiotic field that is specific to that field. For example “cat” 
in English has associations to “dog” and other common household pets, but also to 
the “big cats”, lions, tigers, leopards and so on.  “Cat” also rhymes with “fat” and the 
association of feline laziness may explain the effectiveness of the combination ”fat 
cat”. “Pussy” on the other hand has an alternative value in the (vulgar) sexual realm, 
such that substituting “the cat sat on the mat” with “pussy lounged on the shagpile” 
provides an entirely different vertical poetic function. 
 
To the epistemological and social challenge to positivistic certainty is added a 
linguistic one; that language can contain emotionally manipulative rhetorical content 
that distorts its message.  
 
 
5.1.5 Doubting discourse: Derrida and deconstruction.  
Having challenged the assurance of certainty from the positivist sciences from an 
epistemological, sociological and communicative angle, this section articulates 
scepticism more generally at the intelligibility of discourse through Derridian 
deconstruction.   
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Throughout the western philosophical tradition, the emphasis has been on reason, 
on knowledge. All of this Knowledge is discourse, consisting of “statements” in the 
sense used by Foucault in his Archaeology of Knowledge.291 Within the 
mystic/Gnostic Christian tradition, all of this knowledge is also man, or the essence 
of being human, echoing Hegel292. In the preface from Johns Gospel, the Greek 
“Logos” also means knowledge. 
 
“In the beginning was the word [logos], and the word was with God, 
and the word was God”293   
 
The post structuralists refer to “discourse”, what Beneviste termed “enonce”. 
“Statements”294 represent the entirety, not only of linguistic communication, but of all 
communication understood as the totality of semiotic systems. Discourse is written 
and spoken language, as well as other modes of communication that can be 
understood as signs and symbols within the Sassurian sense.295 It is this entirety 
that is challenged by deconstruction.  
 
In considering Derrida, the researcher would propose that there is a need to 
distinguish the substance of deconstructionist ideas on the one hand, from the at 
times theatricality of the movement on the other. In the latter may be found the 
extremes to which the rejection of knowledge is taken, and the, at times, fetishistic 
denial of meaning and value in discourse. From the former, the ideas, comes a 
recognition of the flimsiness and unreliability of discourse as a substantial 
knowledge medium, and in articulating several other structures of discourse of note. 
 
Derrida points out that the history of thought revolves around binary oppositions 
such as male/female, straight/gay, Marxist/capitalist. His method involves identifying 
the superior, or superordinate binary, and requesting its definition. It will be defined 
in terms of its binary opposite. What is a “man” is “not a woman”. What is “straight” 
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or “heterosexual”, eventually it is defined as “not gay”, or not homosexual.  The 
superordinate binary relies for its definition on the subordinate binary. So why is one 
superordinate, and one subordinate. If “man” depends on “woman” for definition 
then surely “woman” is superordinate.296 Such a critique can be highly corrosive to 
the various traditional cultural binaries, presence/absence; good/bad; mind/body 
and so on.  
 
A second critique revolves around the French neologism “différance” which is a 
misspelling of “différence”. The point is that when spoken, the two are 
indistinguishable.297 One would distinguish them by definition, but this brings up the 
tautologous nature of Saussurian linguistics. For Saussure, a sign signifies a 
concept.298 However, this concept is itself defined in terms of another sign, also 
defined by reference to another sign, and so on and so on in a never ending chain 
of signifiers.  One cannot define “différence” to distinguish it from “différance” 
without eventually spiralling into tautological argumentation in an endless line of 
signifiers.  
 
To the epistemological, social and linguistic challenges to positivistic certainty is 
added a more general critique that discourse; statements; knowledge is tautologous.   
 
 
5.1.6 Doubting everything: The postmodern condition.  
This chapter develops the research paradigm on which the method rests. This first 
section has critiqued positivism from the perspectives of epistemological scepticism, 
science as a social action, in terms of the reliability of communication and the 
intelligibility of discourse. The aim is to articulate the “post modern condition” 
deriving from this critical process, and then build an alternative epistemology, and 
research paradigm out of it.   
 
Lyotard summarises the postmodern tradition as an “incredulity toward meta-
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narratives”.299 He argues that prior to science, overarching narratives were provided 
by myth; religious myths; the evolution of the human spirit; pursuit of wealth or a 
Marxist dialectic and so on; and that science maintains it is not a myth based upon 
the narratives of its reason and epistemology. However, using the concept of 
language games, he argues that the proliferation and specialisation in science 
results in a profusion of these specialist languages that cannot be contained by one 
narrative, including moralistic ones. The postmodern condition is the mourning of 
their loss.300  
 
Postmodernism takes up the counter enlightenment theme of anti-rationality, 
characterised by Kierkegaard’s deliberation on Abraham’s triumph of obedience to 
God (belief) over reason in the instruction to kill his son;301 of Nietzsche’s 
exhortation of Dyonisianism over a slave morality.302 But post modernism’s critique 
of rationality extends this; it is the central Hegelian process of thesis and antithesis it 
rejects. Deleuze promotes “another sensibility”,303 one of comparison; one of the 
examination of “difference”, rather than the binary right and wrong.  
 
Contributing to the postmodern condition is “derealisation”. Kant’s phenomenology 
of the “things in itself” being unknowable304 is extended to the subject, the 
individual's sense of self, by Deleuze and Guattari.305 The self as ego is fractured by 
Freud’s mental structures and conflicting drives.306 Lacan presents the self as 
illusory, built at the mirror phase of development.307  
 
These challenges to the subject represent a challenge to a core theme of the 
western philosophical tradition, challenging the “I” at the centre of Descartes’ Cogito. 
It is from this point of epistemological scepticism, or even nihilism that the research 
paradigm builds an alternative episteme and then research paradigm.  
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5.2 Constructing a research paradigm.  
 
In the process of building a research paradigm on which to rest the method for this 
research, the first section has critiqued positivism through epistemological 
scepticism; science as a social action, in terms of the reliability of discourse. This 
section will construct an alternative non-positivist episteme starting with a dualist 
ontology, and will develop arguments for a research paradigm of hermeneutic 
phenomenology.   
 
 
5.2.1 Ontology: “...Speaking as the ghost...” 
The researcher's ontology is dualist, essentially the mind/brain problem ridiculed by 
Ryle as “the dogma of the ghost in the machine”,308 dating back beyond Descartes’ 
distinction between two separate substances, the physical (extended) matter, and 
the mental (thinking) matter.309 
 
The argumentation in favour of this dualism derives from there uncontrovertibly 
being an inner psychic realm of ideas, and equally uncontrovertibly, an outer 
physical world. Exactly how the two interact, or how the physical world and brain 
create and sustain the subjective experience remains a mystery. But the cognitive 
dissonance from this unknown is less than that involved in either an idealistic or 
materialistic monism. Dualism will be explored by looking at arguments for the 
existence of a mental realm followed by those for a physical realm.  
 
For Descartes, the Cogito begins the development of some certainty about what 
exists  
 
... There is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not exist 
at the very time when it thinks…  I THINK, THEREFORE I AM, is… most 
certain…310 
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Russell subsequently challenged (or rather he qualified) this basic ontological 
statement as follows  
 
 I think, therefore I am' says rather more than is strictly certain311  
 
But he concedes that  
 
… There are thoughts312. 
 
Plato's theory of forms is more than an account of the philosophical problem of 
universals; Plato is making a claim for “what is” namely that “what is” is ideas. 
Things in the physical external world are dubious, confusing, changeable and 
inconsistent, whereas the ideas of things in the internal world can be perfect and 
unchanging. The primacy of ideas, of his forms, is illustrated by his allegory of the 
cave, a complex thought experiment where a group of prisoners raised in a cave 
watch shadows cast on a wall by people with puppets using a light from a fire 
behind both them and the prisoners. The prisoners get to understand and recognise 
the shadows in all their indistinctness. He compares this with the prisoners' 
experience when they emerge from the cave and see objects in the full light of day, 
equated with the world of forms, or ideas, which can be known clearly and distinctly, 
the same as when the prisoners emerge from the cave, and see   
 
… the sight of ... the objects themselves; … gaze upon 
the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled 
heaven …313 
 
Bishop Berkley extended this idealism to argue that the existence of a physical 
world was not necessary, by challenging the validity of sense data. In his fictitious 
dialogues Philonious' deconstruction of Hylas' belief in a material world proceeds 
 113 
 
through his challenging of the reliability of his sense data. For example, that tepid 
water feels hot to a hand previously in cold water, and cold to one previously in 
hot314, resulting as mentioned above in his conclusion that “to be” was to be 
perceived, only: “Esse EST percipi”315.  
 
The existence of an internal world, of the experience of consciousness, is difficult to 
deny. The researcher, as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst has spent a career 
assessing and treating troubled minds, and would share Descartes’ “repugnance” in 
the denial of an internal psychic world.  
 
Having argued that there must, ontologically, be some form of thinking, or internal 
psychic experience, there is a need to explore the ontological basis of the physical 
world. The starting point for physicalism is common sense or natural realism, which 
argues broadly that there is a world of physical objects that can be perceived. In the 
late 18th century, as a reaction to the sceptical philosophising of the enlightenment, 
the Scottish Common Sense Realists advocated for this naive realism as follows 
 
Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke, have all employed their genius 
and skill to prove the existence of a material world; and with very bad 
success. Poor untaught mortals believe undoubtedly that there is a 
sun, moon, and stars; an earth, which we inhabit; country, friends, and 
relations, which we enjoy; land, houses, and movables, which we 
possess… I despise Philosophy, and renounce its guidance—let my 
soul dwell with Common Sense.316 
 
Common sense or naive realism is summarised by Dewey thus 
 
The plain man, for a surety, does not regard noises heard, lights seen, 
etc., as mental existences; but neither does he regard them as things 
known. That they are just things is good enough for him. 317 
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The philosophical arguments in favour of physicalism by the ancients was 
summarised by Aristotle, who combined it with the idealism of his Platonic teacher in 
the Metaphysics. According to Aristotle 
 
...Primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of 
the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else.318 
 
Aristotle’s primary substances were a particular thing, a “real being”; a man or a 
horse or rock.319 Descartes' division of “what is” into mental substances and physical 
substances significantly into a more accurate distinction with the physical as devoid 
of the meaning content, such as “man, horse, rock”. For Descartes, material objects 
are characterised by 
 
...The extension of body: ... SOMETHING THAT FILLS SPACE, that can 
be protruded by the impulse of other bodies, or resist their motion.320 
 
Then carrying out scientific enquiry he proposes that  
 
SOLIDITY, EXTENSION, MOTION or REST, NUBMER or FIGURE. These, 
which I call ORIGINAL or PRIMARY qualities of body, are wholly 
inseparable from it;321  
 
Locke made the same distinction322, proposing that secondary are those thought to 
affect sense organs; colour, taste, smell, sound.  
 
… The ideas of SECONDARY qualities are… produced by the 
operation of insensible particles on our senses323 
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For the researcher, the principal argument in favour of some form of dualism is 
pragmatic, deriving from the other two potential monistic positions being 
counterintuitive. Understanding the physics and biology of sound transmission; 
understanding the physiology of sight; understanding how Philonious' challenge of 
hands from hot and cold water, giving conflicting sensations works through the 
process of cortical sensory adaptation. These are all explanations, understandings 
and developments that have come from the physical sciences, starting with the 
effort noted above to distinguish between primary and secondary qualities. These in 
turn are based upon assuming the existence of the external world and finding out 
about it. Thus, vis-à-vis the external world, the researcher adopts a reconstructed 
common sense realist approach.  
 
Dualistic ontology, however, has been criticised. Ryle describes his book “The 
Concept of Mind” as a polemic, with his target the “Descartes myth”. Where 
Descartes had mind as a separate substance, Ryle argues that it is a function; a 
verb rather than a noun. To describe mind as an entity is a “category mistake”; (to 
use his example) like someone, having been shown the colleges and libraries in 
Oxford, but then asking to see the university.  
 
“She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair” is a well known 
joke based on the absurdity of conjoining terms of different types… 
Now the dogma of the ghost in the machine does just this...324  
 
Although Ryle argues that his model of the mind is not reductionist, and does not 
follow the “hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of matter by Mind”325, it has 
not silenced the debate, for example recently reformulated as the “hard problem of 
consciousness”326.  
 
Descartes' Cogito crystallises the ontological chasm that requires William James’ 
“leap of faith”327 between the two realms of ideas and the physical world. On the 
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basis of a dualist ontology, the different domains can be studied independently, and 
are more complementary rather than conflicting.  
 
These two approaches were manifest in German universities within their overall 
systematic scientific study (Wissenschaft) divided into the natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaft) and human sciences (Geisteswissenschaft), or sciences of the 
soul. The physical sciences can proceed and explain by bracketing out problems of 
how an individual perceives truth absolutely. The psychological and social sciences 
can proceed with understanding (verstehen) social phenomena and constructs, 
bracketing out the need for positivistic or verificationist proof. 
 
The adoption of a dualist ontology explains the dichotomy of the success of the 
natural sciences contrasted by their inability to quell scepticism of the possibility of 
knowledge or certainty about the existence of the physical world. The reason is that 
there are two complementary epistemologies, one for the Naturwissenschaft 
comprising Baconian scientific method, positivism and so on; and a different 
epistemology for the geisteswissenschaft. The researcher submits that the research 
question in the current study is located in the geisteeswissenschaft, so that the 
remainder of the chapter explores an alternative epistemologies and develops a 
research paradigm appropriate for this ontological domain.  
 
 
5.2.2 Verstehen and Hermeneutics.  
Comte’s vision for sociology328, was that it would proceed positivistically, as did the 
others; this was partly realised by Durkheim’s method employed memorably in his 
treatise on suicide329.However, a positivist approach for sociology or the human 
sciences was criticised by Weber, who advocated that the science should be built on 
a basic process of understanding (verstehen) human actions and motivations, which 
would be non positivist.  
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Weber’s focus on verstehen derives from his construction of sociology as a 
discipline, identifying “ideal types” of social action.  
 
… Sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalised 
uniformities… to formulate pure ideal types of the corresponding 
forms of [social] action…330 
 
Social action is distinguished from action directed at inanimate objects, or actions 
such as “at the beginning of a shower, a number of people put up their umbrellas at 
the same time”331. Actions are  
 
… Social action only so far as they are orientated to the behaviour of 
others332 
 
And the action is formulated on the basis of the attitudes and reactions of others. In 
this context, verstehen, understanding is an 
 
… Explanatory understanding… in terms of motive the meaning an 
actor attaches... what makes him do this at precisely this moment and 
in these circumstances …333 
 
So that  
  
Sociology… is a science concerning itself with the interpretive 
understanding of social action, and thereby with a causal explanation 
of its course and consequences.334 
 
Such a science is explicitly non positivist, because social actions could not be 
 
.. thought of as somehow objectively 'correct' or 'true' by some 
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metaphysical criterion.335 
 
Hermeneutics is knowledge founded on interpretation and understanding. 
Hermeneutics as a practice has a long history, long predating Weber. Especially 
within religion; the interpretation of sacred texts has been widespread, from 
Talmudic scholars, to the Scholastics’ biblical exegeses 336 on the one hand, and in 
philology (interpreting the Greek masters) and history more generally on the other.  
 
A contemporary of Descartes, and writing against his dualism, Giambasttaia Vico 
(1668-1744) is cited by Gadamer and other later hermeneutics theorists, for his 
insistence on the cultural situatedness of knowledge; man makes himself the 
measure of all things. Vico built an alternative model of “poetic wisdom” 337 to 
describe this alternative form of knowledge.  
 
Hermeneutics proper, however, began following the reformation, and Luther's Sola 
Sciptura doctrine, which required everyman to read and make his or her own biblical 
exegesis, leading to a rush to understand the interpretative, and thereby 
hermeneutic process. Schleiermacher described the “hermeneutic circle”, a process 
where one goes from the specific item being studied to the larger picture (the rest of 
the text, the historical context) and back again in an iterative process338. 
Schleiermacher’s and other writings at this time have been termed “Romantic” 
hermeneutics because of the subjectivist trope therein contained339. Dilthey had a 
lifelong “Critique of Historical reason” project340, attempting to found the human 
sciences, particularly philology and history, in hermeneutics, as Kant had founded 
the physical sciences, in his Critique of Pure Reason.   
 
Humbolt (1767-1835) described the hermeneutic process as he proposed that the 
historian 
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… Must take the scattered pieces he has gathered into himself and 
work them into a whole...He can do so, like the poet only through the 
imagination. 341  
 
Droysen (1808-1884) argued that 
 
The essence of historical method is understanding… The possibility of 
this understanding arises by the kinship of our nature with that of the 
utterances lying before us as historical material 342 
 
In understanding and interpreting the actions of individuals, Dilthey hypothesised a 
psychological model of the “psychic nexus” itself derived from a process of 
abstraction, concentration and completion343. 
 
On the basis of this empathy… there arises the highest form of 
understanding – re-creating or re-living… attitudes, powers, feelings, 
aspirations and ideas contained in our own lives [enable] us to re-
produce the mental life of another person. 344 
 
Recreating and reliving what is past and alien… This art is the basis of 
philology. The science of this art is hermeneutics. 345 
 
Husserl's approach to hermeneutics reverses the process, moving 
verstehen/understanding from one of a set of ways of looking at things, to it being a 
core and active process in basic perception. For Husserl (following Kant), 
“verstehen” is the fundamental, primary, active process bestowing sense on 
perception. The meaning comes first, and then the perception of the object in the 
external world is built around that meaning. Perception is founded upon the activity 
of meaning (see below in the discussion of phenomenology)346. Heidegger, following 
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this, took meaning a step further, and placed it at the centre of ontology; for him, 
meaning was core to the process of being347 
 
Gadamer, still the authority on hermeneutics now after 40 years348, was heavily 
influenced by Heidegger, but his project was to extend the hermeneutic dimension 
of phenomenology as an underpinning for the human sciences. This culminated in 
his book Truth and Method in 1960 which presented a number of important 
concepts349. These included that: 
 
 There is a historical and cultural “horizon” which bounds the 
researcher/reader, and a distinct and different historical and cultural horizon 
that bounds the historical/text.  
 
 “Prejudice”, “authority” or “tradition” compose the historical and cultural 
horizon of the researcher; the post enlightenment obsession with 
objectivity is unachievable. 
 
 A correct reading of Plato is that truth emerges from the dialogue; 
emphasising phronesis (practical knowledge) which is achieved through the 
use of (praxis) the ideas. 
 
 Contradicting the romantic hermeneutic tradition, a researcher cannot 
completely or empathetically resonate with the meaning of a text given 
the historical or cultural distance between them.  
 
 The hermeneutic task is to find areas of overlap between the cultural and 
the prejudicial horizon of the source text and that of the researcher. 
Within this overlap, the researcher can develop understandings. 
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 Crucial to this process is the researcher developing a self awareness of 
their own historical and cultural context/horizon that contributes to their 
perception of meanings 
 
Gadamer argued that the “in vitro” logical positivist mathematical and theoretical 
method had become hegemonic within the post enlightenment period, such that the 
human and historical sciences were now judged with this inappropriate frame350. As 
noted above, Gadamer argued that all discourse has a rhetorical element and there 
is no such thing as neutral language conveying a message351. Gadamer's model of 
hermeneutics is that because all discourse is rhetoric, hermeneutics are required to 
untangle it.  
 
A Weberian view of knowledge about the social advocates the development of 
understanding. Hermeneutics provides a method, with the use of the hermeneutic 
circles of iteration between consideration of parts and the whole of the issue as 
understanding develops, and an iteration (following Gadamer) between the text and 
self reflection to include the researcher’s context and prejudices. This hermeneutic 
process comprises the first part of the hermeneutic phenomenology research 
paradigm.  
 
 
5.2.3 Phenomenology  
A dualist ontology has been articulated, and verstehen argued as the 
epistemological grounding for the geisteswissenschaft, in its systematised 
hermeneutic form. The second component in the hermeneutic phenomenology 
paradigm is phenomenology, a method from the existentialist movement in the first 
half of the last century. .  
 
Because of this subjective focus, “Existentialism” comprises a collection of disparate 
traditions and writers, and is difficult to define, but they share a preoccupation with 
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the examination of experience in itself, devoid of prejudices and pre-formed 
conclusions. The term itself was coined by Jaspers, but not until the mid 1930s with 
his calling his version of authentic being “Existenz”352, (Heidegger's Dasein) 
characterised particularly by freedom. The term was made much more popular, 
particularly by French writers Sartre and Camus. Retrospectively, the work of 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard grouped within this philosophical movement.  
 
If existentialism is the “weltenshaung” or world view, phenomenology is the method. 
Phenomenology has been described as the “study of essences”353 Kafle cites van 
Manen in summarising that  
 
… The structure of a lived experience is revealed to us in such a 
fashion that we are now able to grasp the nature and significance of 
this experience in a hitherto unseen way.354 
 
Husserl tackled the core, classic ontological problems, attempting to develop 
something close to a classical philosophical system like those of Kant and Leibniz, 
and attempting to provide a foundation for science355. Husserl, like Descartes, was a 
mathematician, and he sought apodictic truths in philosophy that could be as clear 
and incontrovertible as those of geometry, developing Kant's notion of the 
phenomenon into the discipline of phenomenology356.  
 
For Kant, the “phenomenon” is the personally constructed and active experience of 
the individual initiated by the perceptioin of the external object “thing in itself”357. 
This active process combines sensations and understanding, memory and 
familiarity. The same word was used by Hegel to entitle the human “mind” or “spirit” 
in his account of the unfolding of human history and development, in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit358. Husserl's use of the term is much more circumscribed, 
and closer to Kant as he extends the focus on the subjective, making it the 
foundation of knowledge and experience359.   
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Husserl articulates a phenomenological method. The first step is the “eidetic 
reduction,” focusing on the experience that one is having at the time. For example, 
in looking at the researcher's coffee, he sees, not a set of shapes and colours, he 
sees a cup of espresso coffee.  Husserl performs an “epoche” from the researcher’s 
experience of the coffee which brackets questions of the metaphysical or material or 
“thing in itself”, leaving the researcher to focus on the personal experience of 
specifically the cup of coffee. The researcher is unable to credibly deny either the 
experience or the knowledge of what the cup of coffee is. In this way, Husserl 
achieves his requirement of knowledge being apodictic, namely incontrovertible. 360 
 
Part of the reason why the researcher's experience of his coffee is apodictic is 
because of what structural linguistics would term the associative trains from it. The 
researcher’s knowledge of different coffee making techniques, and the turn of the 
last century Italian invention of the pressured steam/water technique; the awareness 
that the espresso coffee is both darker roasted and finer grained; the variability in 
the size, from the tiny first liquor served in Italy, to the French “petit cafe” served to 
puzzled  English tourists expecting a mug full. All of these personal associations 
together constitute the “meaning” of the phenomenon as the researcher experiences 
the cup in front of him. Within the Kantian stage of the researcher’s investment in 
the phenomenon, the bare perception of shape, colour and smell combine because I 
can tell in advance it is a cup of coffee. For Husserel, this extends; the researcher 
further invests the phenomenon with the thoughts and feelings mentioned above. 
The researcher’s cup of espresso is a cup of espresso because it has the personal 
meanings to him noted above; because he actively and intentionally invests 
meaning in it.  
 
Heidegger then developed this phenomenology further and takes on this issue of 
“the world out there”. Heidegger proposes that the basis for an ontology is to be 
found in examining the question of being, of how things “be” as it were361. Being, is 
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a more immediate experience to perception. He proposes that the human “Dasein” 
is defined as a thing that strives to make meaning in the world. Dasein’s activity is to 
“be something” (a psychiatrist; a professor; a father). Dasein’s striving after meaning 
distinguishes it from things like hammers and stones which do have being, but do 
not strive after meaning, and are therefore not Dasein beings.362 Thus for 
Heidegger, meaning takes on an ontological significance as a core experiential 
phenomenon.  
 
In psychiatry, Jaspers revolutionised the conception and classification of psychiatric 
illness by applying phenomenological techniques of the value free exploration of the 
mental phenomena of the psychiatrically ill363. By simply attending to the patients’ 
experience (voices, irrational and abnormal beliefs) rather than immediately trying to 
diagnose, treat and suppress the madness, a new and extended taxonomy of 
psychiatric experiences was able to be adumbrated 
.  
The challenge of phenomenology is to describe what is given to us in 
immediate experience without being “obstructed by pre-conceptions 
and theoretical notions”.364 
 
Weber’s advocacy of verstehen derives from his defining social action as having 
motivation which required to be understood. Phenomenology pulls back to the level 
of the individual, and the need to understand and describe the subjective 
phenomena that they experience, as far as possible, eschewing the usual 
explanations and assumptions.  
 
 
5.2.4 Hermeneutic phenomenology 
If the study of essences defines phenomenology, then hermeneutic phenomenology 
is the deepening of understanding of these phenomenological essences through the 
hermeneutic processes described. Hermeneutic phenomenology is a recognised 
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combination of disciplines, where there is already a considerable amount of overlap.  
 
Various writers distinguish between Husserl as a phenomenologist, and the group 
Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur, as hermeneutic phenomenologists.365 
Hermeneutic phenomenology is a  
 
… research methodology aimed at producing rich textual descriptions 
of the experiencing of selected phenomena in the life world of 
individuals366 
 
which  
 
occurs through increasingly deeper and layered reflection by the use 
of rich descriptive language.367 
 
hermeneutic phenomenology challenges the researcher to reflect 
deeply on what it is that the texts of the field have to say. The 
researcher is called to play with the texts – to get lost in deep 
conversation with them.368 
 
The subject under study are phenomena, personal and social, as far as possible 
perceived, experienced and described  as free of assumptions as possible within the 
researcher’s Gadamerian cultural horizon. The epistemology and research process 
is hermeneutic, with its iterative circular process from the whole picture to the 
specific and back, and similarly the hermeneutic circle in the dimension between 
subject to the researcher’s subjective reflection and back. 
 
In the current study exploring the question of how managers enact agency within 
organisations, there are a number of social action type questions, of motivations and 
actions. There are also a number of more subjective and phenomenological ones, 
 126 
 
for example the personality of the manager, and the follower’s acquiescence. In 
both, addressing the phenomenological essence of the issue, and the historical 
exploration of the case study, the research process requires deep reflection in a 
hermeneutic circle.  
 
 
5.2.5 Psychoanalytic theory: Unconscious “logic”   
This section is building the epistemological case that the “Geisteswissenschaft”, has 
legitimate foundations by looking at the alternative form of “logic” proposed by 
psychoanalytic theory in its exploration of the unconscious. Examination in some 
detail is justified for three reasons. Firstly, heuristically, it describes the 
weltanshauung of the researcher. Secondly, it articulates a particular application of 
the hermeneutic phenomenology paradigm, but most importantly the following. 
Unconscious “logic” from psychoanalytic theory provides a post modern 
epistemology, and the psychoanalytic technique of “free floating attention”, provides 
a practical research method. 
 
When asked to give an example of something that they can be certain of, many turn 
to mathematics, and to simple mathematical equations like seven and five make 
twelve (using Kant's example). Such truths survive both Cartesian and Phyrronian 
scepticism. Psychoanalytic theory begins from a different position with regard to 
such a priori analytic truths, namely that they assume linear logic, and rationality. 
Psychoanalytic theory proposes that such rational logic is a developmentally late 
acquisition, which supersedes a more primitive and archaic form of thinking that 
continues to operate in the unconscious.  
 
For Freud, rational logic is secondary process thinking. Unconscious logic is primary 
process369. The unconscious mind operates within a different model of logic, an 
example of which is illustrated by the following playground joke 
 
 127 
 
Q. What is the past tense of speak? 
A. Spoke.  
Q. What is the white of an egg? 
A. The yolk.  
Q. Are you sure? 
 
Lacan argued that the unconscious was structured like a language370, or more 
accurately like a semiotic system, where the rational/conscious linkage between 
thoughts and concepts is replaced by metaphorical, homonymic and contiguous 
association from personal history. “Seven and eight make nine” not because they 
mathematically, logically and rationally do so, but “because” one is familiar with the 
sequence “seven, eight nine”. The white of an egg is the yolk “because” it has an 
association with egg and rhymes with “spoke”.  
 
In his Psychopathology of Everyday Life 371, Freud challenges the assumption that 
such mistakes as that around which this playground joke turns (slips of the tongue) 
are to be dismissed, explaining them in terms of unconscious processing which 
groups and classifies ideas in terms of similes, homophony, contiguity and other 
associative chains, not in terms of logical connections, which are used by the 
conscious mind. Freud argues that the content of parapraxes (slips of the tongue); 
the crazy content of dreams and of psychotic patients’ delusions, are illustrations of 
this alternative, unconscious way of thinking. 372 Years later, Derrida argued that “il 
n'y a pas hors text,”373.  So that the text of the joke above is extant and has an 
impact, so that it must have some legitimacy at some level. As a phenomenon, it 
requires some form of explanation. The psychoanalytic theory of the primary 
process logic of the unconscious provides an explanatory theory374. 
 
In his Interpretation of Dreams, Freud in particular describes the functions of 
“condensation and displacement”. The task of the dream is to disguise mental 
contents (unacceptable wishes), which is done by condensing ideas together. For 
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example, take the dream fragment that the Eiffel Tower is in London, combined with 
the dreamer’s real world issue that the dreamer's father having arrived in London. 
The Eiffel Tower might be a phallic symbol (paternal), and is both a strong and 
sturdy thing (the dreamer's attitude to their father), but also (built to be) temporary 
19th Century technology bound to fail at some point (the dreamer’s anxiety about the 
father’s mortality or state of health). The father is “displaced” in the dream by the 
Eiffel Tower, and the symbol of the Eiffel Tower “condenses” thoughts about the 
father, masculine power yet frailty, and something where it should not be.  
 
The Russian Formalists had argued that the artistic technique in poetry was to de-
familiarise the text, to “roughen” it such that its meaning was obscured, thus 
challenging and drawing in the reader in.375 A psychoanalytic perspective takes an 
opposing view, suggesting that the Jacobsean “vertical” or rhetorical/poetic 
dimension376described above (5.1.4), far from obscuring the meaning, augments it 
with the fecundity of rhyming and associative links of “primary process” thinking. 
Psychoanalytic theory suggests the poetic function expands and enriches the 
meaning with the Jacobsean vertical metonymic condensations and associated 
metaphors.  
 
The statement, “seven and eight make nine”, or that “the white of an egg is the yolk” 
in the joke, are “true” not in the rational, linear logical sense, but in a sense that 
Jacobson might call “poetic”. Freud would account for in terms of this different mode 
of logic that exists in the unconscious mind.377.  
 
Briefly stated, psychoanalytic therapy attempts to understand unconscious mental 
contents on the assumption that the neurotic patient’s symptoms are caused by the 
denial and disavowal of unacceptable unconscious thoughts.  In his description of 
the psychoanalytic method, Freud advocates the use of “free floating attention” in 
the analyst, as they listen to the patient's thoughts. What this means is that the 
analyst does not try to follow in detail the patient’s linear narrative, but rather they 
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(the analyst) try to use his or her own unconscious to decode and process the 
unconscious of the patient by attending to their own (the analyst’s) thoughts and 
associations to the patient’s narrative. It is assumed that the patient’s unconscious 
contents have been censored, displaced and shaped into a rational (secondary 
process) narrative, so that they won’t be saying what they mean, so   
 
The attitude which the analytic physician could most advantageously 
adopt was to surrender himself to his own unconscious mental 
activity, in a state of evenly suspended attention, to avoid so far as 
possible reflection and the construction of conscious expectations, 
not to try to fix anything that he heard particularly in his memory, and 
by these means to catch the drift of the patient's unconscious with his 
own unconscious.378 
 
Thus precedes the psychoanalytic version of hermeneutic phenomenology, as a 
clinical exploratory method, in which a rich and deeply reflective hermeneutic 
process focuses upon the mental phenomena of the patient.  
 
In the current research, this method as far as possible, has been focussed on the 
research subject, the phenomenon of leadership and followership, and on the case 
history, cycling between these and the theoretical material in a Dilthean hermeneutic 
circle from which hypotheses emerge379.   
 
 
5.2.6 Postmodern knowledge 
The first half of this chapter ended with the “post modern condition” based upon an 
all encompassing scepticism, such that all is reduced to irony and entertainment. 
There are, however, types of knowledge that survive, and are proposed by 
postmodern writers. Derrida’s “differance” is a comparative approach to knowledge 
rather than a competitive thesis/antithesis one.  
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Similar to this is the post-modern epistemology of Deluze and Guattari 380, who liken 
the traditional rational linear scientific narrative to being a tree, with a central 
“arboreal” trunk of a hypothesis or paradigm from which sub-hypotheses branch out. 
They propose an alternative “rhizomic” structure of knowledge. In Botany, plants like 
ferns and knot grass spread and propagate using underground stems (rhizomes) 
that spread out from the original plant, and create a sibling plant up to several feet 
away, which repeats the process, so they can propagate over large areas. Rhizomic 
knowledge does not have a central trunk, but rather multiple stems; multiple entry 
and exit points; multiple manifestations and versions.  
 
The epistemology on which the current research rests assumes two things. Firstly, it 
assumes the legitimacy of  post deconstructionist comparison based knowledge, 
and the wider non linear “logic” of Freud’s “primary process” thinking of the 
unconscious. Secondly, it assumes the legitimacy of a Delusian “rhizomic” (non 
“arboreal”, not solely linear/logical) epistemology and psychoanalytically derived 
“free floating attention” method. On this foundation it builds theory through the 
development of hermeneutic circles elucidating complex phenomena to develop 
complex verstehen based formulations of the social and psychological phenomena 
being studied.  
 
 
5.3 Critique of research paradigm.  
 
The epistemological basis for the research is summarised as being hermeneutic 
phenomenology, which it has been argued can constitute a form of knowledge that 
survives a postmodern critique of knowledge. This foundation can itself be critiqued 
from several different standpoints.  
 
Postmodernism has of course come under sustained criticism. A Marxist first 
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principles challenge is that it denies the reality of materialist fundamentals such as 
class. This is similar to the “Mumbo-Jumbo” critique, where the ethical relativism 
implied by postmodernism is anathema.381 A more nuanced Marxist account is that 
post modernism itself is a function of late capitalism, providing a trivialisation of 
reality to entertain and confuse the masses. In this way it is a latter day “opiate of 
the masses”, previously a function of religion.382   
 
The “Art bollocks” essay provides a test for post modern writers (art critics 
specifically), namely that if their sentence can be reversed to mean the opposite and 
still make logical sense in its context it must be nonsense383. This argument echoes 
the point of the Sokal paper384 where a physicist published a paper that was self 
consciously nonsense. The defence in both cases is the same, it is that Derridian 
“difference” frees thought from the simply linear binary truth/falsity dyad, to a point 
that knowledge becomes comparative, and that self contradictory statements can 
both have some relative truth value. 
 
Moving to phenomenology, arguments against this include its being chimerical and 
subjective, impossible to replicate and objectively demonstrate. A philosophy that 
places the individual fundamentally alone in the universe is indeed going to find it 
difficult to construct a generalisable and agreed account of its self. More practically, 
Dennett argues against what he calls  “lone wolf autophenomenology” 
researchers385, on the grounds that they have been unable to agree basic tenets. 
He argues this to introduce his adaptation, heterophenomenology, where mental 
contents is compared third person, although such  model seems to closely represent 
the reality of the psychoanalytic scientific discourse.  
 
 A critique of a hermeneutic approach also challenges phenomenology, given that 
from its Kantian origins, basic cognitive processes such as perception are seen as 
interpretative processes, such that interpretation is a core psychological function. As 
summarised by Neitzche, “there are no facts … only interpretations”386 Sontag’s 
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“against interpretation” is not directed at this metapsychological interpretative 
stance, but referring to art she complains that   
 
Interpretation excavates, and as it excavates it destroys …Marx and 
Freud[‘s] …elaborate systems of hermeneutics, [are] aggressive and 
impious …To interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the world”387 
 
Relating to the current study, one might argue that deciphering some of the 
mysteries of effective leadership is to reduce their effectiveness; or that relating to 
Hitler as the case, to explain may be to forgive, and that instead, one should rather 
stand in uncomprehending awe of the evil.  
 
The principle argument against hermeneutics is reletavism; the opportunity for as 
many interpretations and explanations of the meaning of material as there are 
hermeneuticians such that hermeneutically derived knowledge collapses into a 
hopeless relativism. This argument emerged more specifically, in Habermas’ critique 
of Gadamer’s emphasis on the authority of the standing point of history and tradition 
in the development of a hermeneutic perspective, arguing that it was politically 
naive388.  
 
This relativist critique needs to be held alongside the critique of positivist knowledge 
as essentially un-knowable. Notwithstanding this philosophical challenge, the 
physical sciences progress. Similarly, notwithstanding hermeneutic relativism, useful 
verstehen (understandings) emerge and scholarly verstehen research activity leads 
to evolving and legitimate debate and discipline formation.   
 
 
5.4 A hermeneutic phenomenology paradigm: Conclusion and critique 
 
This chapter has elaborated the research paradigm on which the method rests. 
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Critiquing  positivism and extending this to a more general epistemological 
scepticism, it has then described a verstehen based hermeneutic phenomenology 
as a research paradigm suited to the topic of inquiry, extending this to post modern, 
psychoanalytic, “rhizomic” knowledge, exemplified by primary process thinking and 
psychoanalytic free floating attention method.  
 
The question of how managers enact agency within organisations, and to what 
extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable in 
determining their effectiveness was triggered by a “clinical hunch”. This chapter has 
sought to explicate the epistemological foundation that underpins the “clinical 
hunch” by arguing that alongside the pragmatic legitimacy of the positivistic 
experimental sciences, there is an equally legitimate corpus founded on subjective 
understanding.  
 
In the next chapter, the specific methods based on the identified hermeneutic 
phenomenological paradigm will be articulated, namely a crucial case history 
approach.  
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6. The crucial case research method.  
 
 
 
 
 
Having laid out the ontological and epistemological foundations of the hermeneutic 
phenomenological research paradigm, this chapter articulates the more specific 
research strategy and tactics.  
 
The distinction between strategy and tactics in the management literature derive 
from their military use389, where the strategy is the broader plan and objectives 
based upon the political policy, and the tactics are the battle plan to achieve a 
particular goal or target. This chapter has been divided into two sections, one 
looking at research strategies, at a more operational level than the research 
paradigm being utilised, and the other looking at the specific tactics, or method 
involved in the research.  
 
There are three broad strategies described; firstly the traditional linear method of 
hypothesis, literature search, empirical case study and conclusions; second the 
process of analytic induction, and thirdly, a more chaotic post modern approach to 
method closer to the postmodern epistemology arrived at in the previous chapter, 
namely a “bricolage” approach.  
 
At the next level of specificity, the tactics and therefore the specific method 
employed have included an extended and divergent literature search, followed by a 
case study, the case study triangulating a psychobiographical/clinical case study; a 
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historical account exploring particularly the context of the case; and finally a case 
study account of the organisation that mediated these two. 
 
  
6.1 Methodological strategy 
 
The exploration of research paradigm proposed that a hermeneutic phenomenology 
approach was appropriate for the post modern epistemological position of the 
researcher. The work of Deluze and Guattari, distinguishing between traditional 
rational, linear “arboreal” knowledge formation with its central trunk and branches of 
main hypothesis and sub hypotheses on one hand, and on the other, a more 
“rhizomic” knowledge structure fitting with the post modern and post structuralist 
thinking and the Freudian metapsychology of the researcher.  
 
At the level of the research strategy, both approaches, the traditional, linear, rational 
“arboreal”, and the more chaotic, post modern have been utilised as follows.     
 
 
6.1.1 Strategy of enquiry I: Traditional/Linear/Arboreal   
Linearly, the first task has been to complete a literature search in two areas. Firstly, 
to understand the question of how managers enact agency within organisations, and 
to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable by  
through looking at the managerial and leadership literatures, then the sociological 
and personality literatures, and glancing into various others such as the 
philosophical dimension of freewill and determinism390. Secondly, there has been a 
process of methodological research through the literature, with the development of 
an ontological and epistemological position that provides a foundation for a 
psychoanalytically informed case study method. (See Fig 5 below) 
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Figure 5. Linear, “Arboreal” sequence of research. 
 
 
The second linear stage has been conducting the case history, with much reading 
around the man and the historical context. Finally, there has been a process of 
synthesis of this with further reading to develop theory. 
 
 
Initial literature search 
 Personality literature 
 Sociological literature 
 Management literature 
 Philosophy/ontology/ 
epistemology 
Case study 
 
 Historical context 
 Biographical context 
 Leadership and personality 
Development of theory 
 Gearing literature and case 
data 
 Identification of further 
relevant literature 
 Synthesising theory 
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Conceived as a linear/arboreal project, the process of the research is summarised in 
Figure 5, where an initial literature search is followed by the case history and then 
by gearing the literature and data from the case study in the development of theory. 
 
 
6.1.2 Strategy of enquiry II: Bricolage  
In contrast to the linear “arboreal” research method noted above is the notion of 
qualitative research as a “bricolage” of methods and approaches. Feyerabend's 
“Against Method”, begins its polemic in favour of a more divergent chaotic and free 
epistemology thus 
 
“Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise: theoretical 
anarchism … is more likely to encourage progress than its law- and-
order alternatives” 391 
 
He cites Mill that stultifying scientific method, “maims by compression, like a 
Chinese ladies foot” 392 going on to conclude that anarchy makes “bad politics but 
good epistemology”393. Feyerabend’s account might be seen as “post modern 
method”, resulting in Deluzian rhizomic distributed nodes of knowledge which may 
combine and interact from multiple dimensions, rather than in a linear, “arboreal” 
centrally structured way.  
 
Denzin presents qualitative research as “bricolage”. 394 Levi-Strauss contrasts the 
modern engineer’s praxis with the his postulate of “Savage Mind” fixing something. 
The modern engineer enacts an exact solution, whereas the “savage” uses 
whatever is at hand to achieve a piece meal fix.395  
 
Derrida, citing Levi-Strauss extends the notion of “bricolage” to language and 
discourse in general, thus confirming the bricoleur as a postmodern response to the 
collapse of structuralism.  
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The bricoleur, says Levi-Strauss, is someone who uses "the means at 
hand,"…  every discourse is bricoleur. The engineer …  is a myth. 396  
 
For Denzin,  
 
The multiple methodologies of qualitative research may be viewed as a 
bricolage, and the researcher as a bricoleur … deploying whatever 
strategies, materials or empirical materials as are at hand … The 
researcher-as-bricoleur-theorist works between and within competing 
and overlapping perspectives and paradigms. 397 
 
And that  
 
The product of the bricoleur's labour is a bricolage, a complex, dense, 
reflexive collage like creation that reflects the researcher's images, 
understandings and interpretations of the world or phenomenon under 
analysis. 398 
 
The etymology of bricolage, deriving from French, has no exact English translation, 
but it might be located somewhere close to a “bodge”; making do with what is 
realistically available and achievable. Within the lexicon of the managerial literature 
is the concept of “satisficing”, where decisions have to be made moment to moment, 
prior to all the pertinent facts being known, or where the complexity of the issue 
precludes this.  
 
6.1.3 Strategy of enquiry III: Analytic induction.   
A third research strategy is to recognise the inductive nature of the research 
process, concluded to be a form of inductive method. The direction of this research 
is inductive; from a specific observation (the experience crystallising the “clinical 
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hunch”); to identifying a pattern, to developing a tentative hypothesis, rather than 
deductively, proceeding from a theory to a hypothesis, to an arranged set of 
observations to confirmation.   
 
Znaniecki’s account of “analytic induction” in 1934 399 as a sociological method 
forms part of the challenge to positivism written nearly half a century after the 
success of empirical sociology typified by Durkheim’s study of suicide. Essentially, 
he argues for a method of 
 
… inducing laws from a deep analysis of experimentally isolated 
instances 400  
 
His argument is that the analytic inductive method is not new and contrived, but 
rather it is how science has proceeded. The full quotation cites one of the scientific 
stars  
 
… Galileo, who, after investigating thoroughly a few systematically 
differentiated causes of movements drew conclusions which bear on 
all movements…  
 
And that  
 
And there are all those innumerable laboratory workers… who have 
made physics, chemistry and general biology, not by agglomerating 
large masses of superficial observations, but by inducing laws from a 
deep analysis of experimentally isolated instances. 401 
 
Versions of Znaniecki’s method have been used by sociologists investigating in 
depth social phenomena, some in the process modifying and refining the method 
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proposed. For example, Cressey, in his book about embezzlers, sets out an 
extended version of analytic induction:  
 
First, a rough definition of the phenomenon to be explained is 
formulated. Second a hypothetical explanation of that phenomenon is 
formulated. Third, one case is studied in light of the hypothesis with 
the object of determining whether the hypothesis fit the facts in that 
case… 402 
 
Then going on to describe an iterative process which increases certainty in the 
findings and evolves the formulation 
 
… a single negative case disproves the hypothesis and requires a 
reformulation … examining cases, re-defining the phenomenon and re-
formulating the hypothesis is continued … 403 
 
Different researchers have modified the method, for example, in Becker’s research 
on medical students, where data-gathering preceded the theoretical exploration of 
the hypothesis 404 emphasising the inductive element of the method. Further 
elaborations of the method were summarised by Pope et al in the BMJ, in the 
context of emphasising the legitimacy and reliability of the method.405 
 
The current research, as others, has modified and emphasised particular elements 
of the method, emphasising the “deep analysis” and theoretical exposition elements. 
This modification can be understood as the use of the analytic induction 
methodology within a more phenomenological frame, where the emphasis is on the 
clarification and definition rather than objective demonstration.  
  
6.1.4 Strategy of enquiry IV: Grounded theory  
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Grounded theory as a quasi (or pseudo) empirical method is explicitly not being 
used in the current study, although in the spirit of bricolage, it is a “found” method. 
“Found” in the sense of “objects trouvee” used by post modern artists, such as 
Duchamp’s “fountain”406. 
 
In their 1967 book, Glaser and Strauss describe the process of “constant 
comparative analysis”407, which formed one of the foundations of grounded theory.  
They argue that the method combines the process of  
 
conver[sion of] qualitative data into crudely quantifiable form … [to] 
provisionally test a hypothesis 
 
On the one hand with that of the mere 
 
generat[ion of] theoretical ideas. 408 
 
In the latter process the researcher  
 
… merely inspects his data for new properties of his theoretical 
categories, and writes memos on these properties409.  
 
They go on to argue to describe their constant comparative method as combining 
 
… the explicit coding procedure of the first approach and the style of 
theoretical development of the second. 410 
 
Znaniecki complains about the positivist rush to classification and judgement using 
the concept of “pseudo-deduction” 411. This can be expanded to a broader critique of 
the coding and scoring elements of the Strauss and Corbin method as being 
“pseudo-positivism”.  
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Znaniecki’s core argument is that real science proceeds by the “deep analysis of the 
experimentally isolated instance”, from which non logical, psychological 
processes412 produce a hypothesis inductively, which hypothesis is subsequently 
subjected to empirical investigation and testing following a traditional positivist 
scientific methodology. Becker’s argument in favour of “quasi-statistics” 413 seems 
suspect in this regard, although overtly he argues for it simply providing detail. 
 
Eschewing pseudo-empiricism, the researcher is “inspecting his data” and “writing a 
memo” about his findings, which Hammersley points out is Glaser and Strauss’ 
summary of an analytic induction methodology414. There is a hope that some truths 
and legitimate explanatory models and mechanisms emerge. Rather than grounding 
emergent theory within a pseudo empirical method, it is grounded within the 
epistemological foundation and hoped for intuitive coherence of the emergent 
theory. It may be, following Znaniecki’s model, that, as with Weber’s initial verstehen 
based theory of charismatic leadership, subsequent empirical exploration of the 
conclusions sheds further light on the phenomenon, but such exploration is not part 
of the method within the current study.   
 
6.1.5 Strategy of enquiry V: Postmodern method.  
Foucault’s method “archaeology” eschews a central “arboreal” historical narrative, 
rather opting instead for the examination of a single issue examining the apparent 
chance and contiguous events taking place at the same time. For example the 
exclusion of the mentally ill from society and the development of lunatic asylums  
being contiguous with the closure of leprosaria, and often on the same site415.  
 
Psychoanalytic “free floating attention” (5.2.5 above) and Foucault’s “archaeology” 
constitute postmodern methods. The knowledge derived, like postmodern discourse, 
is characterised by multiple versions and qualifications requiring comparison rather 
than linear logical arbitration of truth and falsity.  
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6.2 Methodological tactics.  
 
Having explored the research paradigm and some methodological strategies, the 
tactics and specific methods used will be described.  
 
 
6.2.1 Methodological tactics I: Literature search 
Part of the method of the research is to acknowledge that the research is 
interdisciplinary, and that the literatures that impinge upon the subject are multiple, 
and illuminate different aspects of the issue. The research question is 
multidimensional, and the different literatures reflect these different dimensions.  
 
Broadly, the process of literature search was in the context of a familiarity with the 
personality literature delving into the sociological structure and agency debate in 
some detail, then looking at power and domination. Having established this 
grounding, the management and leadership literature was explored to examine the 
phenomenon of leadership and authority, the same issue through the lens of a 
different discipline, alighting on the charisma literature, and then having to move to 
that of ethical leadership.  
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Figure 6. (above) Dimensionality of literature 
 
Figure 7.(overleaf) The rhizomic character of the literature search
Philosophical literature 
 Freewill/determinism 
 Ontology/dualism 
Sociological literature 
 Strcture/agency 
 Power 
 Charisma 
 
Personality literature 
 Pathology 
 Psychopathy 
 
Management literature 
 Leadership 
 Organisations/change 
Ethical literature 
 Nature of good 
 Ethical leadership 
Development of theory 
Initial 
Development of 
theory 
Exploration of 
case history 
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The philosophical literatures were mainly related to the development of a coherent epistemology, 
the freewill/determinism dimension of the structure/agency seeming to be a word game rather than 
having a practical application. Reading around the case history has also been extensive and 
rhizomic, the researcher having not previously studied modern history.   
 
6.2.2 Methodological Tactics II: Case study method 
Yin’s case study research manual 416 sets out a number of stages and definitions required for 
quality case studies. These will be rehearsed and briefly annotated from the current study.  
 
 The question. Yin argues that the case study method is more appropriate for “how” and 
“why” type research questions, on the grounds that the answers they evoke are more 
explanatory. Questions in this study include  
o “How” people in a leadership role exercise such influence, 
o “Why” can that influence apparently arbitrarily be used for good or evil, 
o “How” do the clinical and psychological concepts of personality and psychopathy 
illuminate these processes.  
 
 The propositions of the study, “direct attention to something that should be examined 
within the scope of the study” 417 This would include 
o Whether and how the nature and force of an agent’s personality wrought a change 
in their social structures/organisations 
o The mechanisms whereby this takes place 
 
 The unit of analysis: the case study examines a single leader, namely Hitler, and more 
specifically the detail and the mechanism of his rise to the peak of his power. The study is 
not about his behaviour 1941-45. The unit of analysis is the man, and the achievement of 
his rise to a pre-eminent position in Europe.  
 
 147 
 Linking data to propositions.  The research is presented and set out in such a way that, 
the theories developed will be used as explanatory lenses to structure the exploration of 
the data.  
 
 The criteria for interpreting findings will consist of the explanatory power of the theory 
developed.  
 
 The contemporaneous nature of the case study such that accurately, this study is a 
case history rather than a case study.  
 
Crotty and others argue that the case history method epistemologically rests heavily on a 
constructivist paradigm418, the method deriving from the tradition of medical, clinical case histories 
where the individuals life and background are presented as elements that together construct and 
contextualise the phenomenon being studied; they have to make sense.  
 
Various authors have developed typologies of case studies. Mitchell describes a spectrum of 
increasing complexity from the more simple ‘apt illustration’ through the more complex “analysis of 
a social situation”, to the potentially very complex “extended case history”. Yin distinguishes 
between explanatory, exploratory and descriptive studies419; Stake between intrinsic and 
instrumental420, where the former is an everyday example to illustrate context, and the latter is 
chosen to examine some specific phenomenon. 
 
 
6.2.3 Methodological Tactics III:  Hitler as a “crucial case”  
In an essay on the case study in political science, Eckstein 421 describes the “crucial” case. In the 
context of arguing for the legitimacy of case study methodology in the development of theory that 
can be studied later by more comparative studies,  
 
… A well chosen case, one that is somehow… crucial for a theory422 
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Has the same targeted contribution that the “well constructed experiment” has to test a hypothesis 
“in the physical sciences”423.  Yin424 writes of the “critical case” as one where the circumstances are 
particularly unusual or extreme such that it has illustrative purpose.  
 
The essential abstract characteristic of a crucial case… [is that it] must closely fit a 
theory 425 
 
Gerring426 cites Popper’s example of the power of the crucial case method, carried out by Einstein 
at a solar eclipse, where the theory of relativity predicted that the gravitational field of the sun would 
alter the apparent position of stars by bending their light. The confirmation of the theoretical 
prediction in the particular set of circumstances was a powerful confirmation of the theory.  
 
Gerring, however, emphasises the corollary disconformatory power of the method. In the current 
research, this is critical relating particularly the second limb of the question about the extent to 
which the personality or psychopathy of the leader might be a critical factor in their effectiveness. 
Given the violence and mendacity associated with Hitler’s NSDAP on the one hand as indicating 
psychopathy, and the personality cult and personalisation of authority characteristic of the NSDAP 
on the other, Hitler is a strong case for the argument that these two variables are critical. If the 
personality and/or psychopathy of the leader are critical factors, they would definitely be found in 
Hitler as a case. If not found in Hitler as a case, they are unlikely to be so elsewhere and in 
general.   
 
The researcher submits that Hitler closely fits the theory on the grounds that he both was an 
extremely successful leader, and because he is possibly the archetypal psychopathic charismat. 
The choice of Hitler as the case derives from the following considerations 
 
 The articulation of potent agency. Hitler’s achievement between 1918, being a broken 
down “private first class”  and 1938, having led one of the greatest nations on Earth, and 
playing on the world stage to the extent of being able to dupe the British prime minister into 
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letting him take Czechoslovakia without a fight, evidences astonishing agency. The 
consistency of his vision and enactment of this supports the singularity of this agency.  
 
 The relevance of the dialectic with structure. In the account of the origins of the 39-45 
war, a significant structural account can be made, arguing that the post war dynamics in 
Western Europe coupled with the development of dictatorial communism in Russia and the 
emergence of Fascism in other European countries and the various extreme market 
events, made it inevitable that some form of conflagration and conflict would emerge.  
 
 The psychopathic question. Within the popular conception of psychopathy, the notion of 
malice and evil emerges. For many, the NSDAP culture and values culminating in the 
Holocaust typify this; so that Hitler lead a psychopathic regime, and that he must therefore 
have been a psychopathic leader.  
 
 The centrality of charisma. While Hitler’s speeches can be looked back on with hindsight 
as melodramatic, at the time they were bewitching not only to those who were invested 
followers. The centrality of the charismatic element in the Hitler phenomenon, both positive 
in the development of the movement, and negative in terms of its overall outcome, 
combines a number of the emerging themes of the research.  
 
 “Playing” people.  Accounts of Hitler’s dealing with the various heads of state 1936-38 
detail a master of political manipulation, and illustrate that the control of the person equates 
to the control of the structure that they own. Hitler was a virtuoso player of/manipulator of  
people.  
 
For the current research Eckstein also describes an alternative possible case study type to the 
crucial case, namely the plausibility probe case,427  although this he describes as  
 
Preliminary to testing …to determine whether potential validity may reasonably be 
considered great enough to warrant the pains and costs of testing428 
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Figure 8. Hitler as a crucial case combining themes of the research 
 
More practically, in terms of being a research subject, there is a vast literature of both primary, 
secondary and tertiary, which would facilitate the applied clinical examination of the case as in the 
method below. 
 
 
6.2.4 Methodological Tactics IV: Triangulating case study methods  
This final section describes the triangulation of perspectives applied, roughly grouped into the 
following three chapters that in turn focus upon the man; the structure; and the agent.  
 
The development of a quasi clinical formulation of the man reviews his biography as a quasi clinical 
case history. Secondly, exploration of the structure invokes the historical context in which the case 
emerged and thirdly, his career as an agent adopts more of a management or leadership case 
history approach and examines his rise to power.  
 
6.2.4.1 The Structural context: Historical method. Historical research method can seem invisible 
as the reader gets caught up in the narrative of the account that has been researched. There are 
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two disciplines underlying, firstly philosophical, and secondly a historiography. Chiming with the 
history of leadership theory, Carlyle concluded that  
 
The history of the world is but the biography of great men 429 
 
The earliest history, accounts of the Graeco-Persian wars by Herodotus from the 5th Century BC 
also heavily focus on the personalities involved; 430 Carlyle continues  
 
In all epochs of the world's history, we shall find the Great Man to have been the 
indispensable saviour of his epoch;— the lightning, without which the fuel never 
would have burnt. (Ibid) 
 
The critique of this “great man” approach to history began with Spencer  
 
… Ask whence comes the great man, we find that the theory breaks down 
completely…  the great man is natural… a product of his antecedents... 431 
 
Broadly, in place of “great men” as the nodal points in historical narrative, were then substituted 
“great metanarratives”, which provided these “patterns” and “laws”. In the 19th century, the Whig 
interpretation of history as evolutionary towards the Victorian British constitution was common; 
subsequently, Marx’s dialectical materialism became the fulcrum.  
 
Spalding describes the unveiling and then challenge of these metanarratives, for example the 
Marxist/materialist interpretation of the French revolution being undermined by empirical evidence 
that it was in fact “started” by the bourgeoisie. Similar stretch of a metanarrative is seen with the 
contortions of the Whig British Constitutional narrative explaining away the American War of 
Independence as  
 
the triumph of the English settlers’ love of liberty and representative institutions  432 
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Aside from these differing “historicist” accounts is the question of the extent to which history can be 
a science, in the 19th century, von Rank set out an ideal for historical evidence, framing history as a 
narrative, but one evidentially supported by sufficient facts from primary sources to be able to 
“know” and “recreate” the past 433.  
 
This approach is to be contrasted with the post-structuralist “archaeology” of Foucault where a 
single phenomenon is focused upon, with the implications radiating outwards as the facts are 
rearranged to articulate and illustrate a particular point, for example comparing breaking at the 
wheel and modern penal practice as a change enacted in only several hundred years434. Spalding 
435 extends Deluze’s arboreal metaphor, where a Rankean central narrative trunk is replaced by a 
post modern focus on the leaves, the mass of detail without the underlying structure to define its 
position. Thus the modern museum approach reproducing 1940s front rooms or 1918 trenches to 
convey a historical message.  
 
In the 20th century, Popper wrote disparagingly of “The poverty of Historicism”,   
 
I mean by historicism an approach… discovering the “rhythms” or the “patterns”, 
the “laws” or the “trends” of history. 436 
 
What is more, it is self evidently absurd to suggest that, as Rank implies, the narrated past is 
accurately recreated; the past is gone. The leaves are on the ground. Postmodernism is the 
gathering together of a set of leaves to create a narrative. Any narrative can be argued as the 
leaves can be arranged in whatever way. Thus, history is made by the victors in wars;  thus the 
meta-history of “totalitarianism” in the post war years, when the evil of Hitler’s state was replaced 
by the Soviet block in the cold war; thus the meta-history of globalisation; thus the “axis of evil” to 
justify the Iraq war and so on.  
 
The second dimension of historical method is historiography, the study of the specific method of 
gathering historical data, and its reliability. Data can be primary, secondary, tertiary sources, and its 
reliability affected by the degree of impartiality, the trope and assumptions of the writing and so on.  
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In the current study a wide variety of  primary, secondary and tertiary materials have been used in 
order to develop an understanding and narrative of the different “rhythms and patterns” that were 
extant at the time of the emergence of Hitler. The aim has been to get a “feel”, and “primary” 
material used has included engagement with the turn of the century arts, literature and music as 
well as including some contemporaneous news reports and film footage, and longer study of 
Hitler’s partially penned autobiography, Mein Kampf.  
 
In a sense the historical debate between Spencer’s “antecedents” and Carlyle’s “lightning”, the 
structure and the agent respectively, are the core question of the study. The aim of the historical 
element of the triangulated method is to describe the “fuel”, to be able to assess to what extent 
Hitler was a potent agent or a cork on the tsunami of contemporary political and cultural events. 
 
6.2.4.2 The man; Clinical formulation/psychobiographical method. Dreyfuss argues that the 
notion of an inner sense of me, or “self-hood” is a relatively recent phenomenon437, and so the 
attribution of motivations to Carlyle’s “Great Men” are a quite recent phenomenon. The narrower 
psychobiographical idiom seems to date its own origins to Freud’s case histories438, where in 
addition to his in depth clinical discussions of the “wolf man” and the “rat man”, he wrote a shorter 
essay on Leonardo daVinci439. Hitler also figures in the discipline’s development, in particular the 
psychoanalytically orientated biography commissioned by the US military in the early 1940s from 
Henry Murray440, referred to elsewhere. Frequently they have a psychoanalytic or psychodynamic 
bias, although a broad criticism has been that so called psychobiographies can be very bad, given 
the ease of fabrication and attribution of irrelevant and spurious motivations and interpretations of 
those long dead and unable to defend themselves441.  
 
The second method being used in developing an account of the man is a modified clinical process 
and activity.  In the researcher’s clinical practice, this involves a long period of observation, and 
discussion with colleagues and the patient. In classical psychoanalytic practice, a gradual piecing 
together as the patient's story emerges. In both cases, the therapeutic activity is the presentation to 
the patient of manageable/digestible pieces of the clinical formulation that emerges, are tested with 
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the patient, and that then where correct, contribute to the patient’s insight. It involves developing 
and providing for the patient their own psychobiography like a map so they can avoid repetitive 
pitfalls.  
 
A significant (and unanticipated) criticism of this process as a research method, therefore, is that 
there is no “patient” to be able to engage with.  The psychobiographic researcher is unable to test 
out emerging hypotheses on the subject, which is a core element of the psychoanalytic clinical 
process.  
 
In the development of a clinical understanding of a patient, there is an iterative process whereby 
the therapist develops a possible understanding, outlines it to the patient, and observes the 
response. It is not only the question of whether the patient affirms or denies it: it is rather that 
inferences are drawn about the effect that the proposal has; anger; indignation; indifference; 
elaboration, acceptance and so on. This backwards and forwards iterative process has not been 
possible in the study of Hitler.  
 
Instead, as an alternative, the researcher immersed himself in a variety of biographical sources, 
with the different perspectives to some extent mimicking the back and forth of dialogue with the 
patient. The researcher has been immersed in other people’s prejudices and preconceptions. This 
has been a partial solution, given the extensive number of sources available, the number of 
different biographical accounts providing different overall impressions. For example, Bullock’s 
contempt for a man whose values and vision could be reduced to there being more cakes available 
for Arian Germans442; Fest (a contemporary journalist who fled, and whose biography ends prior to 
the outbreak of war) clearly actively hates him443; the master biographer Kershaw seems to focus 
on the structures around him rather than the man himself, so avoiding a personal reaction444; Shirer 
seems fearful of the efficiency of the political machine445; Waite’s biography of the “Psychopathic 
God” tries to capture the utter powerlessness of those caught in his path446.  
 
A second important source has been, after general historical accounts framing the issues and 
establishing the basic historical facts, Hitler’s own Mein Kampf. This has been closely read on the 
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grounds that it consists of primary material, notwithstanding the accounts of it having been partly 
ghost written and edited by his followers, there is an impression that the man speaks through.  
Other primary sources include transcripts of speeches447 and archive film material448 
 
6.2.4.3 The Agent; Management /leadership case. During the development of management as 
an academic discipline driven by the needs of the burgeoning US capitalist economy, to try to train 
young executives to be effective in industry, Harvard developed the “case history” method of 
teaching. The argument was that each business situation was unique, and the way to package the 
wisdom of experienced industrialists was to mimic their long-lived experience by taking trainees 
through the sequences of significant industry events and developments in the form of in depth case 
studies449.  
 
Management/leadership MBA type courses do not dwell on the societal, economic and cultural 
structures, perhaps because their task is to foster the belief that individual leaders can make a 
difference, they are supporting the Carlyle rather than the Spencer version of history being created 
by great men. This culture of leadership training is based on the assumption of agency being 
extant. Consequently the culture of management/leadership case histories focuses on critical 
strategic decisions made by the leaders of organisations and the effect these had on the 
organisation and their environments.  
 
It has been argued450 that the use of case histories is a legitimate research tool on the grounds of 
the uniqueness of the particular industry and business situations. Conceived as a management 
case history in this research, Hitler is explored in terms of the sequence of events from the point of 
the crystallisation of his vision of engaging in politics to the point at which his power in Germany 
was consolidated. The issue of interest was not about the process of his self destruction 
(Kershaw’s “Nemesis”), but at the culture of the man as a leader and how he was successful.  
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6.3 Critique of method: Randomised controlled trials vs the clinical hunch.  
 
In summary, the research process has involved a hermeneutic phenomenological process firstly 
focussing on the background literature, circling hermeneutically around the phenomena and 
understandings of leadership and management as they are differentially refracted through 
leadership, personality and sociological literatures. Secondly, it has been the utilisation if a similar 
process firstly through different accounts, perspectives and direct presentations of Hitler as the 
case and the phenomena described therein, and then the circling between these and the previously 
explored theoretical models that emerged in the literature search.  
 
This overall research method adopted can be criticised in a number of ways. For example, Miles451 
describes qualitative data, particularly case study method as an “attractive nuisance”, a legal term 
for something that puts people at risk. He complains that  
 
…there are very few for protection against self-delusion, let alone the presentation 
of “unreliable” or “invalid” conclusions452 
 
More dismissively, Campbell and Stanley reported of the “One shot case study” that  
 
such studies have such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific 
value … Any appearance of absolute knowledge, or intrinsic knowledge about 
singular isolated objects, is found to be illusory upon analysis 
 
The method can be defended in two ways; firstly, as did Yin453 by appealing to method and rigour of 
technique and analysis so that  
 
Case study practice can be dramatically improved by applying what is already 
known454 
 
The second defence is more general rather than specific. The critique of this research method 
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compared to more statistical methods parallels the dialectic in medicine between the “clinical 
hunch” and the “randomised controlled trial” (RCT)455. In an RCT, the efficacy of a treatment is 
investigated by randomly allocating patients to a treatment and non treatment group, where neither 
the patients nor the researchers knows which each patient is in, with a comparison of relative 
improvement. According to the critique, clinical hunches are untrustworthy subjective whims, and 
scientifically evidenced based treatment is legitimate, evidence based and certain.  
 
Utilising a the biological sciences distinction between research “in vitro”, in the laboratory, and “in 
vivo”, with live subjects, (“in the field” in sociological research language), the researcher submits 
that the subject of the study, namely leadership and the development of influence among a follower 
group are “in vivo” phenomena, about which the positivistic sciences’ “in vitro” certainty must be 
relatively silent. While a case history method within a hermeneutic phenomenological paradigm 
does not provide the “in vitro” certainty of the positivistic sciences, it is all that is available in trying 
to intellectually grapple with such evanescent social and psychological issues.  
 
6.4 The crucial case research method: Conclusion 
This chapter’s aim has been to justify and build a method upon the epistemological foundation laid 
in the previous discussion, to describe why Hitler is a legitimate critical or crucial case study, and 
the way that the case study approach has been triangulated into an historical, psychobiographical 
and managerial case method to illuminate the different aspects.  
 
In the previous chapters, there has been an exploration of structure and agency, and the next three 
chapters, can be understood in two ways. Firstly, as complementary accounts providing layers of 
data from which patterns emerge.  Secondly, the chapters about Hitler’s biography and the 
historical context can be understood as a description of the agent or case, and a description of the 
structure, or context, respectively. The third chapter of case data of the management/leadership 
case history describes the actions of the agent/case, from Hitler’s adoption and development of the 
NSDAP as his organisational grouping, to his use of this to seize power.  The fourth chapter pulls 
together some themes from the data regarding the culture of the NSDAP as Hitler’s organisational 
grouping.  
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7. Psycho-biography: The man 
  
 
The volume of secondary source material means that the basic facts of Hitler’s biography are well 
rehearsed and repeated in outline rather than detail here. This familiarity is increased by Hitler’s 
own repeated emphasis on his humble beginnings in speeches, and further confused by the 
manufacture of the conscious creation of the Hitler myth in the 1930s on the one hand, and the 
disinformation of contemporaneous political enemies, for example making the most of the idea that 
he might have illegitimate Jewish lineage, on the other.  
 
 
7.1 Linear biographic narrative 
 
Biographical accounts of Hitler are striking by their relative mundanity. There seem to be few, if any 
nodes or events that have potent explanatory power harbingering the man who would emerge. His 
father was gruff and authoritarian; mother submissive, doting and depressive dying painfully when 
he was a late teenager. He lost a brother in a family in which there had been several losses 
previously; there was some sibling rebellion, but he was fed and schooled, forming part of a family 
of a rural Austrian civil servant in the developing middle class.  
 
7.1.1 Hitler’s parents. 
Hitler’s father, Alois was a custom’s official, at that time a semi-military profession; a proud and 
ambitious man until he achieved a certain level of seniority as a middle ranking civil servant. He 
had initially left his home village refusing to return until he had made something of himself; he 
seemed unashamed of being illegitimate, and there has been much debate about who his father 
(Adolf Hitler’s paternal grandfather) was. Alois, at the age of about 40 was legitimised by a local 
man with whom he was close, and who many believe was in fact his father (and therefore Adolf 
Hitler’s paternal grandfather). This late legitimisation led to much speculation about some Jewish 
ancestry,  
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Alois’ mother having been in service to the Rothschilds and a second local Jewish family, and there 
has been an account that the Baron or other master had sired the illegitimate child. Kershaw 
concludes that the evidence “simply does not stand up”456. Irrespective of the biological reality, 
Adolf Hitler’s later secrecy about his background and the research carried out by the Gestapo 
suggest that he himself in fantasy believed that he might have a Jewish paternal grandfather.  
 
In “Mein Kampf” (MK) Hitler refers to his father in an affectionate and very normal way as “the old 
man”  and gives an account of his struggles when declaring that he wanted to be an artist rather 
than a civil servant, the career planned out by Alois.  
 
The father would not abandon his 'Never', and I became all the more consolidated in 
my 'Nevertheless'.457  
 
However, other accounts describe Alois as an autocratic and dictatorial man who was by that time 
on his third wife. His first wife had been a woman some years his senior, apparently, an 
instrumental marriage, she had some wealth, and died some years after their marriage, but not 
before there was an awareness of Alois’ infidelity. In Adolf’s mother, he married a young woman 
who came into his house as his stepdaughter, and who remained subservient, continuing to call her 
husband “uncle” through the marriage458. Accounts report Alois continuing to wear his full uniform 
whenever in public, and lording it over the locals by insisting that they address him by his full title 
Finanzwach Oberaufseher Heidler. In the context of this proud Austrian serviceman, Adolf’s 
German nationalism must have been provocative, and this, together with other evidence constructs 
an account of considerable tension between Adolf and his father until father’s death in 1903 when 
Adolf was 14.  
 
Biographers argue that the only person Hitler was ever genuinely close to was his mother Klara, 
apparently a quiet diffident, religious (Roman Catholic) woman who age 16 had married her uncle 
age 45. Hitler’s attachment to his mother is evidenced both by direct accounts and by his sequence 
of being “adopted” by maternal figures later in life (e.g. the Wagner’s widow; the Bechstein wife 459, 
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etc), and the fact of his having had a picture of his mother on his wall in is bedroom for the rest of 
his life460.  
 
7.1.2 Early years and school1889-1906 
Hitler was born in Brannau um Inn, a small Austrian Village near the German border on 20.4.1889. 
Hitler’s early years were disrupted by frequent moves of the family; they moved from Brannau 
when he was three across the border to Passau, Germany, where his father had been posted. 
Subsequently, there were four further family relocations.  In 1894, they moved back to Austria, (to 
Lintz) father’s last posting prior to his retirement. In 1895 in Hafeld, father had bought and then 
struggled to maintain a smallholding he had bought as an attempt to recreate his own pastoral 
youth in his retirement, replete with his children, including the young Adolf having a list of farm 
chores to complete at the end of the school day. After two years, Alois gave up the farm. By this 
time, Adolf was age 6; his full sister Paula had been born, and his half brother Alois Jr had left 
home ostensibly because of father’s gruff abuse.  
 
Hitler’s mother, Klara buried four of her six children, and the somewhat sickly Adolf was her only 
surviving son such that all accounts agree that she spoiled the young Hitler.  
 
Adolf’s early years were spent, then, under the smothering protectiveness of an 
over-anxious mother in a household dominated by the threatening presence of a 
disciplinarian father, against whose wrath the submissive Klara was helpless to 
protect her offspring.461 
 
By 1897, Adolf was age 8, and things settled somewhat with a move to nearby Lambach, Father 
adopted a more normal retirement pattern, living off his pension. Hitler lived across the road from, 
and attended the local monastery school, identifying with the religious ritual and ceremony and 
apparently for a period thinking of going into the church. The following year when Adolf was 9, they 
made their last move to Leonding in 1898 where the family settled. Adolf’s brother Edmund died 
after a long illness in 1900, when Adolf was 12, being buried in the cemetery next to the house, 
where the grave could be overseen from the young Adolf’s room.  
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While Hitler’s school record had always been mixed, in 1904, age 15, he only just passed the year 
in the Linz Realschule on the grounds that he left the school, instead, having to enrol in a school 50 
miles away in Setyr 462 where there was something of an improvement in his performance. In MK, 
Hitler argues that he did well in the subjects that he was interested in, but from various sources, 
there is no consistent account of underachievement through poor behaviour or boredom, his 
performance seems to have been generally patchy, although his interest in history and military 
history was clear.   
 
7.1.3 The indolent young dandy: Linz; Vienna, 1906-09 
Having left school age 16, Hitler spent about a year as something of a drone in the family flat, rising 
late and attending various cultural events in Linz. Following a visit to Vienna, he resolved to move 
there, notwithstanding his school failure, but with the backing of his doting mother, ostensibly to 
study at the Academy of Fine Arts. He failed the entrance exam, and failed to gain admittance the 
following year again, although seems not to have disclosed this to his family and friends. Over this 
time, he was supported by his “orphan’s pension” and by the family at home. He chose not to 
obtain any gainful employment to support himself throughout this time, instead being a young man 
about town with independent means463.  
 
During this period – as described in an account by his then best friend Kubizek, Hitler was well and 
stylishly dressed, cutting the figure of a young middle class dandy in Vienna where he shared a 
room with Kubizek. Hitler would spend his money on going to Wagner operas, preaching to 
Kubizek (who was by that time studying music) his views and critique.  Also, over this time he 
developed an unrequited obsession with a young woman, would stand at the street corner awaiting 
her passing, and soliloquise about her at length to Kubizek, planning their wedding and life 
together, but whom he never actually approached. Kubizek describes Hitler critiquing Viennese 
architecture and regaling him with characteristic one sided monologues about how he (Hitler) would 
redesign the city, these seeming to be empty grandiose fantasies at the time.  
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Hitler’s mother died in December 1907 when he was 18, after a long struggle with breast cancer, 
accounts suggesting that towards the end she was in considerable pain, and that she had endured 
significant and painful treatments involving the application of caustic remedies to her wounds 
following surgical intervention earlier in the year. Hitler returned home from Vienna and was very 
devoted during her last weeks, and devastated following her death, not returning to Vienna for a 
further few months after this. Kershaw cites the (Jewish) family Dr Bloch in supporting his MK 
statement that he had lost his only genuinely warm and affectionate attachment and was very 
affected by the bereavement464. 
 
7.1.4 The drift into vagrancy 1909-13 
Following the death of his mother, in 1908 Hitler was ordered by the courts to forgo his orphan’s 
pension, it passing instead to his sister.  In 1909 (aged 20) Hitler was left to his own financial 
devices. Having failed for a second time to get into the academy, he left the house he had shared 
with his student friend Kubizeck and was formally homeless, for several months sleeping rough or 
in overnight hostels and eating in soup kitchens465. Having pawned all his belongings, his physical 
appearance strikingly changed from the former young dandy, to his having long lank hair and dark 
beard and dressed in a large black overcoat. It was over these months that he may have done the 
casual labouring work that he described later in MK as where he first came across unionism (see 
below 9.4). Given his physique, it is unlikely he did much of this work.  
 
As a vagrant, various accounts of Hitler’s lost years put him in libraries and reading rooms where 
he may have sought the combination of warmth and shelter with intellectual stimulation. Eventually, 
in 1910, age 21, after time in homeless hostels, he found a poor men’s house to stay in for the next 
three years.  
 
As Hitler stabilised at his new level, having to live off his own means rather than handouts and 
pensions, he obtained a meagre but dependable salary from selling his drawings of local 
landmarks copied from postcards. This business was initially in partnership with a friend Hanisch466 
who would do the selling, and who apparently was frequently frustrated that Hitler would paint 
when it pleased him, rather than regularly, until the two fell out. By 1913, Hitler was well 
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established within the home, an acquaintance Hanisch describing him as having his regular place 
there where he would read and draw and would “keep his distance and ‘not let anyone come 
close’”467, but by that time again in a suit, albeit worn, and clean shaven.  
 
It is likely that his reading diet was papers, journals and pamphlets rather than the lexicon of 
German enlightenment and romantic literature claimed retrospectively by NSDAP propaganda. 
Bullock points out that Hitler was manifestly not widely read 468 and cultured, but he does seem to 
have built an extensive and encyclopaedic knowledge on several somewhat limited areas, 
including continental political and military history of the previous century; he seems to have spent 
these lost years developing this knowledge base through superficial means mentioned as driven by 
his preoccupations and obsessions, then by reading more in depth..  
 
His growing sophistication in the local Austro-Hungarian political scene (demonstrated later in his 
account in MK) seems to have led to contempt for this and it is interesting to speculate whether a 
political awareness developed in that context, or whether a pre-existing political interest sensitised 
him to the politics going on around him. Either way, these activities will have deepened his rejection 
of the proposal that he would serve in the Austrian military, which he was required to do from 1909 
 
7.1.5 Move to Munich 1914 
In Vienna, Hitler had apparently been avoiding the draft, which may have contributed to his move to 
Germany (Munich), but he left shortly after becoming eligible for a legacy from his father when he 
turned 24. 469 Munich became his home city, and he reported that the 15 months there before the 
war were among his happiest. He rented a small room in a family house that he shared with his 
travelling companion from Vienna for several months, and established himself painting tourist 
watercolours from postcards, spending his time reading the papers in the cafes, and solitary other 
than when engaging in political debate. However, in January 1914, he was briefly taken into 
custody for avoiding military service, sending to the Austrian authorities a fawning note in 
mitigation, so was not prosecuted. He was found physically unfit at examination, and so able to 
recommence his previous lifestyle470.  
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Continuing to make a modest living drawing and selling his paintings, together with his lack of 
direction; his political preoccupation and artistic activity fitted him quite well into a role prevalent at 
the time of the “bohemian” romantic hero, the artist/revolutionary, focussed solely on their work, 
without a care for their material well-being. Later, Hindenburg would contemptuously dismiss him 
as the “bohemian corporal”,471 it not being clear if the president was in error over Hitler’s lineage, or 
being figurative about this somewhat odd man.  
 
7.1.6 Hitler as a soldier 1914-18 
Hitler was reported to be very pleased with the German declaration of war in August 1914 and can 
be seen in a photograph of a crowd celebrating this in the Odeonplatz on 2.8.1914472. He received 
a special dispensation from Ludwig III to join the Bavarian army, the 16th Bavarian reserve 
regiment, the List Regiment. Having joined up on 16.8.1914, by 29.10.1914 he was involved in the 
first battle of Ypres. 
 
The German Schlieffen plan was that the war in the west would be quickly won so that troops could 
be transported to the Eastern Front while Russia slowly mobilised. Resistance from the French and 
British armies resulted in a “race to the sea”, as the battle line was drawn that would constitute the 
Western Front for the next four years. The first battle of Ypres was a desperate push by the 
German army to end the war, and the equally desperate effort of the French and English to halt 
their advance, and particularly to protect the Pas-de-Calais ports.  
 
Hitler and the List regiment arrived near Ypres473 shortly after the German losses, later 
characterised as the “massacre of the innocents”, when enthusiastic student volunteers repeatedly 
charged against French and British defensive positions, using 19th century battle-craft techniques 
made anachronistic by the amplified lethality of modern weaponry which cut them down. By 
December 1914, the 250 men of the List regiment had been reduced to 42. Over the next 4 years, 
the List regiment was involved in the Battle of the Somme; the Battle of Arras; the Battle of 
Passchendale and so on.  
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The traditional view of Hitler’s war 474 is that he served bravely at the front with his regiment. 
Differing accounts have him as using his time between battles reading the German classics 
(probably not true), and being somewhat alone and aloof among his peers (as he articulates in 
MK), believing in the war and engaged with the glorious vision of victory, rather than falling prey to 
the cynical pragmatism of his peers; eschewing leave, and requesting to return to the front from a 
job in Berlin while convalescing from his first wound. Similarly, various stories are attached to his 
two Iron Cross awards, including his having come across, and single handed, capturing a group of 
English soldiers sheltering in a bomb crater. The traditional account has Hitler’s war experiences as 
his “university” in the sense of his bravery and developing direction and determination. 
 
Williams’ conclusion was that “There can be no doubt that he was a brave and fanatical 
soldier…”475, in the context of having been in the fighting, and having spent several years as a 
dispatch rider, a dangerous job. This is challenged, however, by Weber with primary research, 
citing Hitler as a “rear area pig”476, working behind the lines where he could curry favour with the 
officers with the potential for un-earned medals.  Weber’s account 477 of the role of dispatch rider 
acknowledges that at times, this could be dangerous work under fire. But that, because it was 
attached to the regimental HQ, some way away from the front line, Hitler’s war was lived in rooms 
with beds and sheets rather than in the mud of the trenches. Furthermore, it is suggested that at 
times, particularly dangerous dispatch missions, for example, would be “bartered” in exchange for 
dispensations by the officers, and medal recommendations. Weber’s criticism demolishes 
something of a straw man argument that Hitler’s wartime experiences “explain” his later activities. 
Accounts acknowledge that he was thought of as odd and did not fit in well; that, unusually, he was 
less interested in time away from the battlefield, but of course, he did not have another life to speak 
of. Kershaw attributes his subsequent sense of providence to his survival in that theatre where vast 
numbers did not.  
 
Hitler’s own account of his war years in MK is written from the perspective of the whole sweep of 
his Pan-German Social Darwinist vision, with a critique of the political and tactical way it was being 
run, as if a German world hegemony was inevitable, but in the current war was not being achieved 
on account of the bungling and the treachery of the Berlin political elite.  
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In March 1918 Hitler was involved in the briefly successful German Spring Offensive. In the drive 
towards Paris478, Hitler and the List Regiment were involved in the 3rd battle of Aisine, retaking 
Chemin-des Dames, a strategically important ridge, Hitler was triumphant at his involvement in this 
success.  
 
By October the German Offensive had run out of steam, and the List Regiment was back near 
Ypres; Hitler was the victim of a gas attack, being blinded and evacuated to hospital in Pasewalk, 
where he learned of the armistice.   
 
In MK Hitler ascribes his decision to go into politics to this crisis of hearing of the German defeat, 
which some biographers doubt, arguing that this decision was a more gradual process. Langer479 
reports that the hospital psychiatrists later used Hitler’s blindness as a case illustration of hysteria 
for lectures, suggesting Germany’s defeat was an enormous personal wound. 
 
Notwithstanding the subsequent critique of the “university” theory of these years, something did 
happen between 1914 and 1918 for Hitler. In the five years before, he is a vagrant and failed 
aesthete. In the 5 years after, he has taken over and developed a political movement characterised 
by a nuanced and sophisticated use of propaganda and instrumental use of violence, his party 
having recruited the support of Ludendorff, who had effectively been the executive lead of the army 
and indeed the country during that war.  
 
7.1 7 Post war and politics.  
Hitler’s post war activity is outlined below (Ch 9) as the “management case history” as it is at this 
point that his political career commences, but to summarise, following his recovery, he returned to 
Munich, like the rest of Germany, in political upheaval, remaining in the army for a further few 
years, but increasingly becoming involved in politics.  
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7.2 Personal themes 
 
Having outlined Hitler’s early personal history, some overarching personal and biographical themes 
will be annotated; relationships; work patterns and so on. Broadly, the selection of the themes in 
section 7.2 and 7.3 is a combination in oart of those aspects normally included in psychiatric 
histories and evaluations480, and in part heuristic, identified by the researcher as worthy of 
comment for an adequately rich description of Hitler’s personality.  
 
7.2.1 Relationships 
Different accounts rehearse Hitler’s aloofness and aloneness, even living cheek by jowl in the 
trenches, where he disapproved of his peers’ cynicism and keenness to get home from the front. 
Kubizeck, his friend in Vienna, commented that their relationship worked because he was someone 
who would listen to his long monologues, passively481. A striking characteristic of Hitler’s 
relationships was the nature of his immediate and intimate social circle, who a previous century 
might have said lacked “culture and breeding”; in the world of the developing new media attracting 
ridicule and contempt. For example, Goering’s cladding of his obese frame in a sequence of garish 
self styled uniforms; Goebbels’ serial infidelities; Hitler’s own early use of traditional Bavarian 
clothing in sophisticated political society; Hess’ other-worldish naivety and the more frankly boorish 
violence of Rohm and Bormann. And yet notwithstanding this, he won the acquiescence and 
probably the respect of the most cultured, sophisticated and educated nation at the time.  
  
Accounts give the impression that the success was partly achieved by ruthless control of the 
“message”, illustrated by the fastidious control Hitler had over published images and material about 
himself, practicing his photographic poses and oratorical flourishes482. Relationships were not 
something to be spontaneously engaged with, but something to be carefully constructed and 
managed. Normal people meeting Hitler would be entranced by the steady gaze of his blue eyes, 
by his handshake or other contact which seemed to convey his deep understanding and intimacy 
with them, but any intimacy this was completely one sided on the part of the observer, a 
consciously constructed habit of Hitler’s combined with their subjective susceptibility to the his 
charisma.  
 168 
 
His real intimates seem to have been his closest political colleagues, many of whom were old army 
contacts; and possibly more importantly his domestic staff, his chauffeur and photographer. Given 
that there is much evidence that Hitler felt he was superior (in the Neitzschian Ubermensch sense), 
it would be reasonable to suppose that Hitler felt comfortable with his more artisanal staff on the 
grounds of sustaining this feeling of superiority. It also seems clear that Hitler was antagonistic 
towards the “establishment”, older political, cultural and academic elites.  
 
In terms of his more intimate and romantic relationships, Kershaw notes his fondness for dogs, 
latterly Blondi, and in the trenches a small terrier called Foxl, whom he “liked… so much” as he 
“only obeyed me.”483 Kershaw extends this formulation to all his relationships, which were “based 
upon subordination to his mastery”484 His relationships with women can be understood within this 
model, he met them when he was in his 30s and 40s, and they only aged 16 or 17: Hitler was 
quoted as saying he liked a woman to be a “naïve little thing – tender, sweet, and stupid”485.  
 
Kershaw suggests that Hitler took the prevailing 19th century sexual morality at face value while 
eschewing the hypocritical other side in the form of the burgeoning Viennese sex industry. The 
chaste infatuation with a young woman in Vienna was previously noted, and there was a date with 
a Maria Reiter in 1926 (age 16). She wanted marriage, but for him she was an “attractive 
temporary distraction”486.  
 
Hitler’s two big loves were first Geli Raubal, the vivacious 16 year old daughter of his half sister 
who had come to act as housekeeper in 1928; she (Geli) lived with her mother in his flat. Hitler was 
proud of her, but jealous and controlling, a strain given her flirtatiousness. She eventually felt 
trapped, and following his forbidding her to leave and move away to start a singing career, she 
apparently committed suicide using Hitler’s gun in his apartment in 1931487. This was at the height 
of his political manoeuvring for power in Germany, Hitler became significantly depressed and 
withdrawn for a period afterwards.  
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His “partner” Eva Braun was an office worker and a model for his official photographer488, who he 
met when she was 17, but whom he began to see more regularly following the death of Geli two 
years later. Hitler did not have the same passion for Eva as he had for Geli; she remains in the 
background, Hitler keen to maintain a public image of his being a single man, although she was 
frequently present at gatherings in the Berghof, having to make herself scarce for official business. 
She insisted on staying with him in the Berlin bunker at the end489, the two marrying shortly prior to 
their joint suicide in April 1945.  
 
Hitler was discrete with his relationships; he seems not to have been celibate, but there are several 
accounts belying the more lurid stories of perversity. Kershaw remarks 
 
And even if the alleged repulsive perversions really were his private proclivities, 
how exactly they would help explain the rapid descent of the complex and 
sophisticated German state into gross inhumanity after1933 is not readily self-
evident.490 
 
7.2.2 Accommodation.  
Hitler’s modest living quarters prior to the 14-18 war has been noted above. On leaving the army, 
he rented a sparse two-room apartment in Vienna, which he would stay in between 1920 and 1929, 
by which time he was a significant political figure.  
 
At this point, Hitler’s asceticism changes to becoming more grandiose.  In 1929 he bought with 
party donated funds a luxury apartment491, the Nazi party eventually buying out the whole building. 
This is the apartment where Geli was found dead in 1931. In 1928, he had rented a holiday retreat, 
a small chalet in the Obersalzberg where he wrote the second volume of MK. In 1933 he bought it 
apparently from profits from MK, then in 1935 it was extensively renovated, becoming the Berghof, 
a concrete hill fort. The NSDAP bought out most of the local residents, and high ranking party 
colleagues built houses nearby.  
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Similarly, with the offices of the NSDAP, they operated out of smaller premises until the conversion 
of the Brown House, a large former residential building bought in 1929 and renovated it to be  
 
a building of tasteless grandiosity that he was singularly proud of. Pictures of 
Frederick the Great and a heroic scene of the List Regiment’s first battle in Flanders 
in 1914 adorned the walls492 
 
where Hitler had a “huge work room”.  Neoclassical grandiosity in the NSDAP was the house style, 
explicitly to intimidate visitors, with long high wide corridors and pillared facades493, this intimidation 
being effective, according to the memoirs of visiting politicians.  
 
Hitler lived between these three settings, and a regular set of cafes and restaurants, until the turn 
of the war, by which time he had built a series of bunker/fortresses around the occupied 
territories494. The 12 Fuhrer Headquarters (FHQs) included the Berghof, where there was further 
fortification; the Fuhrerbunker in Berlin beneath the Reich Chancellery where, as the Red Army 
approached in spring 1945, he died alongside the Goebbels family; and the “Wolfs Lair” in central 
Poland where Hitler spent several years directing the ill fated operation Barbarossa. Between them, 
he would use a fortified train field headquarters, the Fuhrersondersug, which he used to follow the 
speedy advance of the Blitzkrieg invasion strategy through Western Europe.  
 
Hitler’s accommodation in the FHQs was not luxurious, but rather functional in line with his lifestyle. 
The major facet in relation to municipal buildings was the grandiloquence of Hitlerian architecture, 
more a function of his leadership style and vision than his personality.  
 
7.2.3 Personal Finance 
Exact details about Hitler’s personal finance are difficult to clarify. For six months pursuing his 
political career in the small NSDAP he remained in the army, drawing his salary. This set the 
pattern of a link between his political and personal finance and income. Kershaw concludes that  
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His proclaimed modest demands in matters of food and clothes – a constant 
element of his image as a humble man of the people – fell within a context of 
chauffeur-driven Mercedes, luxury hotels, grand residences, and a personal livery of 
bodyguards and attendants.495 
 
Hitler’s personal finance was controlled by Martin Bormann, who as his personal secretary and with 
a lead role in the NSDAP, was in an extremely powerful position, latterly (following the departure of 
Hess) controlling access to Hitler.  
 
His sources of income have remained largely in the dark. They were kept highly 
secret, and totally detached from party finances. Schwarz, the party treasurer, had 
no insight into Hitler’s own funds…496 
 
Broadly, Hitler seems to have received income from  
 
 Sales of Mein Kampf – income inflated by the Government after 1933 buying thousands of 
copies for soldiers and education 
 “Expenses” from the NSDAP for his appearances and delivering speeches 
 Charges made for the use of his image – for example on postage stamps 
 Payment for articles written for the NSDAP papers and periodicals 
 Charges for press and other interviews 
 Personal donations from admirers and supporters. 
 
 
7.2.4 Developmental relationships.  
If personalities are forged in the intense developmental relationships of childhood, Langer points to 
a passage in Mein Kampf where an apparently fictitious account of a disaffected youth is given 
which may well be autobiographical and articulating an attitude to his own father specifically and by 
extension, authority more generally ;  
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...the biting impudence of his [the disaffected youth’s] behaviour combined with an 
immorality which makes ones hair stand on end...The three year old child has now 
become a youth of fifteen who despises all authority...now he loiters about and God 
only knows when he comes home497.  
 
Langer interprets the death of Hitler’s brother498 as a solution to competition for his mother’s time, 
and the death of his father as Oedipal triumph, thus inculcating omnipotent murderousness as an 
effective strategy. Equally, however, these traumata can be seen as enhancing the natural degree 
of anomie that develops in young adults as they move on from the value sets of their parents and 
have to develop their own.  
 
At the time of these deaths, Hitler failed that year at school, having to leave, and enrolling at 
another some distance away, which he was also required to leave consequent on disruptive 
behaviour in his second year there499, for example, his getting drunk and tearing up his school 
report, which he used to wipe his backside, suggesting these deaths were destabilising traumata, 
possibly enhancing a natural tendency to maintaining his distance and staying aloof. 
 
 
7.2.5 Health 
Kershaw attributes Hitler’s sexual naiveté to the same cause as his general asceticism and 
vegetarianism, namely that it was preached by Schonerer and the Pan German Movement 500 by 
whom he had been influenced as a teenager and subsequently. Schonerer501 preached that men 
should be celibate until age 25, not use prostitutes, and that meat and alcohol should be avoided 
on the grounds of weakening the man.  
 
In addition, Hitler was a hypochondriac, in part prompted by chronic digestive symptoms502, which 
in the last decade of his life drove his demand for increasingly bizarre and addictive treatments and 
therapies provided by his personal Physician Morell. In addition, however, Hitler was extremely 
conscious of his own poor/puny physique  
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The walks were always downhill, with a car stationed at the bottom to ferry Hitler 
and his accompaniment back up again. Hitler’s detestation of physical exercise and 
fear of embarrassment through lack of athleticism remained acute503 
 
such that the emphasis on physical prowess and excellence of the Aryan and Nazi Youth 
movements might be interpreted as a reaction to his own feelings of inferiority in this regard.  
 
A further apparent reaction formation to this ascetic attitude was Hitler’s fondness for cakes and 
pastries, which he would frequently eat large quantities of504, and would happily receive from his 
surrogate mother figures505. 
 
 
7.2.6 Asceticism.  
Hitler’s vegetarianism, teetotalism and maintenance of a public belief in his celibacy was to some 
extent his natural preference, and also somewhat foregrounded as part of the mythology of the 
dedicated leader focussing on his country and above corruption. Langer writes 
 
Although he is a vegetarian, …his meals are scarcely to be considered as a form of 
deprivation. He eats large quantities of eggs prepared in 1O1 different ways by the 
best chef in Germany and there are always quantities and a large variety of fresh 
vegetables prepared in unusual ways. In addition, Hitler consumes incredible 
quantities of pastries and often as much as two pounds of chocolates in the course 
of a single day. Nor are his personal tastes particularly inexpensive. Although his 
clothes are simple, he has an incredible number of each article of clothing. All are 
made of the finest materials that can be procured and made up by the best 
workmen.506 
 
Hitler had a lifelong addiction to chocolate, cakes and pastries, and accounts describe him nearly 
being on the border of starvation, but when money was available, binging on cakes and pastries. 
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7.3 Descriptive psychological/characterological phenomena 
 
There are a number of personality traits that are characteristic, and illuminate some of his 
leadership characteristics.  
 
7.3.1 Hysteria.  
Langer cites one of the Pasewalk physicians who looked after Hitler following his second 
hospitalisation at the end of the war as diagnosing his “blindness” as hysterical507. Mustard gas 
causes severe swelling of exposed mucous membranes, so Hitler’s eyes would have been swollen, 
but blindness other than through bandages would have been psychogenic, that is psychological 
and without physical basis. Further, the account is of a significant deterioration in the patient 
following the news of the armistice, possibly a classic account of the “conversion508” of a 
psychological trauma into a physical symptom.  
 
Secondly, the phenomenon of “group hysteria” describes mysterious non organic sicknesses and 
fevers spreading through groups such as schools and monasteries509. The mass adulation and 
collective emotional experiences of groups with their favoured celebrity mirror this phenomenon, 
and “group hysteria” described the effect that Hitler’s oratory had on the NSDAP rallies.  
 
Hitler’s tantrums and aggressive outbursts were feared and were effective at bullying subordinates 
and within negotiations. 
 
Rauschning, in describing one of these uncontrolled exhibitions, says: "He was an 
alarming sight, his hair dishevelled, his eyes fixed, and his face distorted and 
purple. I feared that he would collapse or have a stroke." … The more extreme 
descriptions claim that at the climax he rolls on the floor and chews on the carpets. 
Shirer reports that in 1938 he did this so often that his associates frequently referred 
to him as "Teppichfresser" [carpet-eater}510 
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Hysterical outbursts characteristically are extremely emotional, but are only superficial for the 
hysteric, while having a full emotional impact on observers. There are accounts of his summoning 
these on demand, for example, in his intimidation of Schuschnigg the Austrian premier, in the 
choreography leading to the Anchluss with Austria, raising the possibility of their having a dramatic 
instrumental quality.  
 
7.3.2 Suicidality, fatalism and providence.  
Hitler several times threatened suicide to emphasise his belief in a project or his devotion to it, for 
example, that he would kill himself should the 1923 putsch fail. Although striking, these threats 
were relatively unusual during Hitler’s lifetime; at this point, and following the death of Geli (below). 
Nevertheless, it is of note that he did eventually suicide simultaneously with a cyanide capsule and 
self shooting. His completed suicide, however, seemed relatively “rational” given his situation with 
the Red Army in Berlin, his notoriety, responsibility for the war, its failure, and the genocidal 
programmes under its cover.  
 
Following the death of Geli, Langer reports 
 
Gregor Strasser actually feared that he might commit suicide during this period and 
stayed with him for several days. There is some evidence that he actually tried to do 
so and was prevented from carrying it out.511 
 
This may be linked to a more general fatalism and to his preoccupation with “providence”. All 
soldiers who survived service at the front in the Great War will have had “near miss” experiences, 
with the development of various degrees of superstition and accounts of their luck. Hitler linked his 
survival with “providence”, a quasi religious belief in his destiny512.  
 
Following the war, and in the context of developing a political persona, “providence’s” role was 
expanded from protecting his person to guiding his destiny to lead and then save Germany and 
German peoples. Having established vast tracts of “lebensraum” by 1941 both to the east and 
west, he disastrously turned on his Soviet neighbour. This was the avowed plan all along, to tackle 
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the perceived threat of Bolshevism, but would he have stopped at the Urals, the aim of 
Barbarossa?  The occupation of Western Europe seemed as remote a possibility in 1938 as the 
Germanisation of greater Russia does in retrospect. Hitler didn’t stop at the Ruhr; at the Anschluss; 
at Chekoslovakia, Belgium, Poland, France. There is an implication that he would have carried on 
until stopped in some way, and that the only way he could have been stopped was defeat. Neither 
was a defeat negotiated, it was total immolation; “annihilation”, in the language of Barbarossa513. 
For Hitler, life seemed to be a choice between annihilation or being annihilated.  
 
7.3.3 Depression and indolence.  
The contrast between Hitler’s effectiveness, drive and ambition later in his life from age 29, and the 
period of drift and passive homelessness age 19-22 in Vienna has been difficult, biographically, to 
assimilate. Langer interprets the distinction as a qualitative difference in personality brought about 
by the psychiatric illness of a biological depression according to the monoamine theory514. Thus, for 
three or four months between 1909 and 1910 Hitler became a different man, subjectively 
depressed and hopeless and biologically slower with altered brain chemistry that materially altered 
his personality and characteristic way of reacting to his environment. Within this hypothesis – his 
depression may have been triggered by the combination of the death of his mother and his twice 
being rejected by the Viennese Academy of Art combined with the narcissistic wound of being 
penniless in a city with a prominent and affluent middle class with whom he identified but was 
excluded from, following the drying up of his allowances.  
 
A second possibility is that rather than being depressive, that the period of vagrancy was an 
exacerbation of his indolence, which was also a characteristic of Hitler. Kershaw links his 
characteristic daily routine as Chancellor with that when living at home, having left school age 16, 
sleeping late, working desultorily and not at all regularly, the same habit as during his late teenage 
years.  
 
… recalled Wiedemann, ‘Hitler appeared as a rule only just before lunch, quickly 
read the press summaries provided by Reich Press Chief Dr Dietrich, then went to 
eat’ … When Hitler was at his residence on the Obersalzberg, it was even worse. 
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‘There he invariably left his room only approaching 2p.m. Then it was lunch. The 
afternoon was mainly taken up with a walk, and in the evenings, straight after the 
evening meal, films were shown.515 
 
 
7.3.4 Other personality facets 
 
 Hypochondriasis. Hitler’s mother had died horribly at the relatively young age of 47, and 
this may have set the stage for an obsessive hypochondriasis that will have been 
maintained by ongoing abdominal discomfort caused by his chronic excessive wind with 
his vegetarian egg based diet.  
 
During the war years, Hitler was seldom far from his personal physician Morel (former 
society dermatologist) who gave Hitler various potions and remedies, graduating to 
injections of both conventional medications (the opiates and amphetamines) to more 
outlandish preparations from horse serum and so on. Hitler in the last years, became both 
increasingly disabled by these “remedies” and addicted to them both psychologically and 
physically516.  
 
 Paranoia. Being an effective political strategist requires a significant element of paranoia, 
reading between the lines and evaluating motivations with a critical and suspicious attitude. 
Hitler was the consummate political strategist, accurately reading his opponents.  
 
Politically, Hitler seemed to organise his thinking, and developed support through an 
orientation to the “other”. In the first war, this was the Allies; the resolution of his hysteria 
seems to have been through the creation of an “othered” political class of Jewish people 
and democratic liberals. In the early days of the NSDAP it was the communists, then the 
Communist/Jewish conspiracy”.  Melanie Klein describes the power and ingrained 
character of such thinking in her description of the “paranoid schizoid position”517, the 
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fantasy that safety can only be achieved through the attack and destruction of the bad and 
dangerous “other”.  
 
 Narcissism. Lees’ analysis puts Hitler’s fund of hatred at the centre of his drive. Unlike 
some other characteristics of Hitler, his narcissism is central from Kubizeck’s accounts of 
his redesigning Linz and beginning writing an opera to sit next to Wagner’s age 16. The 
hatred derives from the disjunction of the personal sense of omnipotent certainty and the 
real world ignominy and inconsequentiality518.   
 
 Obsessionality and magical thinking. The obsessional “thinks” that by enacting their 
ritual they will be able to erase their general angst, so called “magical thinking”519. Hitler 
demonstrated significant “magical thinking” as the course of the war was reversing, 
believing that the German “secret weapons” programme, the v1 and v2 for example, would 
magically reverse the inexorable progress of the allies. It is less clear the extent to which 
this was genuinely what he believed and a position to hold to rally the troops.  
 
 
7.4 Specific psychiatric diagnostic conclusions: Psychosis, Psychopathy or Asperger’s 
 
Some psychological and caracterologically descriptive comments have been made about Hitler’s 
personality, including the possibility that he experienced a period of depression while in Vienna.  In 
this section, some more broad diagnostic comments are made, concluding that Hitler was not 
psychopathic or psychotic, but that aspects of his personality may support an Asperger’s diagnosis.  
 
 
7.4.1 Psychosis.  
Hitler was not mad in the sense of his being formally psychotic. Citing the World Health 
Organisation International Classification of Diseases, he did not have  
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hallucinations, delusions, or a limited number of severe abnormalities of behaviour, 
such as … catatonic behaviour 520 
 
Hitler’s belief in the “November criminals”, Jewish politicians, and businessmen who conspired to 
“stab in the back” the Wehrmacht in Autumn 1918; was a firmly held false belief, therefore looking 
like a delusion, but was not one because it was collectively held: It was normal within that particular 
subculture of indignant defeated German people. Similarly, Hitler’s few purges (of Rohm and the 
SA in the “night of the long knives” in 1934; in the post Reichstag Fire violence in 1932 and 
following the 1944 assassination attempt) seem instrumental and strategic, foresightedly taking out 
significant potential foci of resistance, unlike the purges of Stalin which have a paranoid feel.  
 
Hitler’s weaving together the Jewish race; their success in German and Austrian society; their 
involvement in finance; the Jewish people involved in the 1917 Russian Revolution and communist 
movements in other countries to create an “International Jewish conspiracy” could be argued to 
have been “delusional work” (knitting together the disparate issues to form a delusional coherence) 
and was held with delusional intensity, but again it is significantly dismantled by it having been 
widely shared at the time as an anti-Semitic preoccupation.  
 
 
7.4.2 Psychopathy.  
Controversially, perhaps, the researcher would argue that Hitler personally was not psychopathic. 
The defining characteristics from the International Classification of Diseases (ICD10) for “dissocial 
personality”521 will be looked at in turn. 
 
(a) Callous unconcern for the feelings of others; there are numerous stories of his 
concern and thoughtfulness for individuals on the one hand and sensitivity to the public 
and audience’s mood; he was grossly callous for politically or culturally defined “others” 
which is not unusual. 
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(b) Gross and persistent attitude of irresponsibility and disregard for social norms, 
rules and obligations.  In holocaust research, a significant difficulty is tracing the orders 
back to Hitler, he having made considerable efforts to distance himself from the euthanasia 
and Jewish “transport”, this evidences regard for the norms rather than disregard. In 
contrast he ostentatiously and with apology and reasoning owned responsibility for the 
1923 putsch and the Rohm purge.   
 
(c) Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships, though having no difficulty in 
establishing them; Hitler did maintain long term relations with his entourage and Eva 
Braun and there is little evidence that he was socially or sexually promiscuous. 
 
(d) Very low tolerance to frustration and a low threshold for discharge of aggression, 
including violence; It is a matter of conjecture to what extent Hitler’s tantrums were 
strategic, or a genuine loss of control. Much he did patiently, for example, his waiting for 
the Chancellor post. Importantly, other than as a soldier, there are very few examples of he 
himself being actually physically violent. 
 
(e) An incapacity to experience guilt or to profit from experience, particularly 
punishment; There is little evidence of subjective experience of guilt, but objectively he 
learned from adverse experience, for example, after the failed putsch, he “learned” to 
operate legally following his imprisonment. The apparently genuine grief over mother and 
Geli’s death may rather have been at his own loss rather than a sense of guilt.  
 
(f) Marked proneness to blame others, or to offer plausible rationalizations, for the 
behaviour that has brought the patient into conflict with society522. Hitler was not 
personally in conflict with his own society of inter war Germany, arguably he was in tune 
with it, and shaped it. During the decline from 1940 onwards, with setbacks on the Eastern 
Front, he would always blame his generals, then even when Berlin was surrounded, 
blaming the German people, although again, this might be seen as politically instrumental.  
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Hitler’s personality clearly was exceptional and unusual, but it was not formally disordered or 
pathological; his personal eccentricities and oddities were not disabling in terms of his 
achievements. For example, his apparently ascetic vegetarian diet was punctuated by chocolate 
and cream cakes; his temper tantrums were far outweighed by his successful performance in his 
chosen field of politics, such that the oddities in his personality did not compromise his 
performance, at least from about 1912 by which time he had become established in his small trade 
in art prints.  
 
Regarding the extent of his involvement in violence and mendacity to obtain electoral success, 
violence was ubiquitous in 1920s Bavarian politics, and mendacity may still be in politics in general. 
His construction of the “big lie” as a political strategy he himself attributed to the allegedly Jewish 
protocols of the elders of Zion. There are questions about how intimate he was in his social circle, 
his remaining aloof and detached for the most part, but he did have a collection of friends and 
sustained relationships including romantic.     
 
7.4.3 Aspergers’  
If Hitler falls into any broad psychiatric classification, it might be Asperger’s syndrome (not a new 
idea)523. In the ICD, Asperger’s is  
 
Characterized by the same kind of qualitative abnormalities of reciprocal 
social interaction that typify autism, together with a restricted, stereotyped, 
repetitive repertoire of interests and activities… Most individuals are of 
normal general intelligence but it is common for them to be markedly clumsy 
524 
 
 “Abnormalities of reciprocal social interaction” All biographies and commentaries note 
Hitler’s inability to engage in discussion for the most part, he was lecturing or he was quiet 
and uninvolved. He would lecture for hours as dinner guests would attest, with the house 
staff in despair if certain subjects were touched upon as this would lead to extended 
monologues. Similarly, the calm stare and steely blue eyes that were said to reach deep 
 182 
into the soul and significantly move people can be reinterpreted as a socially awkward man 
sticking to a script and role, and unable to relate in a “normal” way. Soldiers from the List 
Regiment reported that he was not one of them, but that he was aloof and separate, more 
likely to deliver an admonition for their cynicism about the war, or criticise their enthusiasm 
to get leave and have respite.  
 
On the whole, he always maintains a considerable distance from other 
people. Ludecke… writes: "Even in his intimate and cosy moments, I sensed 
no attitude of familiarity towards him… there was always a certain distance 
about him, that subtle quality of aloofness...."525 
 
One might interpret the need for the development of a personality cult, and a Hitler myth in 
part because Hitler was incapable of being his own spontaneous man, instead requiring a 
pre-ordinate self-role that he could play. Similarly, his obsession with his own appearance 
in photographs, poring over his appearance, and tightly controlling those that were 
published to ensure they conformed to his stereotyped presentation of self.   
 
 “Restrictive, stereotyped, repetitive repertoire of interests and activities”. Rees 
argues that Hitler’s clarity, consistency and utter certainty was a significant contributor to 
his overall charismatic appeal526, and this can easily be reinterpreted as restricted, 
stereotyped and repetitive content. Rees (as do others) also analyses Hitler’s speeches, 
noting their beginning with the usual breathless anticipation and his being late, followed by 
his grand entry; his stumbling beginnings about his humble beginnings, and lowly war 
experience, the sense of humiliation and indigence at the “stab in the back” on the brink of 
winning the war; the explanation in terms of “International Jewry”, and the uplifting 
exhortative message of the racial superiority of the German people, and the need to 
struggle and fight on. This sequence is interpretable as a repetitive stereotypy.  
 
Hitler’s nearly savant knowledge of specific narrow issues has also been frequently noted, 
summarised by one of Langer’s interviewees 
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"He knows exactly what kind of armament, the kind of armour plates. The 
weight, the speed, and the number of the crew in every ship in the British 
navy. He knows the number of rotations of airplane motors in every model 
and type existent. He knows the number of shots a machine gun fires in a 
minute, whether it is a light, medium, or heavy one, whether it was made in 
the United States, Czechoslovakia or France."527 
 
 “Markedly clumsy” Hitler was well known as someone daunted by physical activity, and 
ashamed of his lack of physical grace and prowess, possibly contributing to the NSDAP 
focus on youth and physical excellence culminating in Germany winning the 1936 Olympic 
Games.  
 
“Autistic psychopathy” was described in a paper by Asperger in 1944, rediscovered in the 1990s. 
Broadly, Asperger’s model was that these people were autistic, but not learning disabled and 
without the usual delayed language528. Seen through such a diagnostic lens, a number of Hitler’s 
personality characteristics fall into place. For example, another citation from Langer 
 
Particularly noticeable is his inability to cope with unexpected situations… when he 
laid the cornerstone of the House of German Art in Munich… he was handed a 
dainty, rococo hammer for delivering the three traditional strokes to the 
cornerstone, but not realizing the fragility of the rococo, he brought the hammer 
down with such force that at the very first stroke it broke into bits. Then, instead of 
waiting for another hammer, Hitler completely lost his composure, blushed, looked 
wildly about him in the manner of a small boy caught stealing jam, and almost ran 
from the scene leaving the cornerstone unlaid 529 
 
The “small boy” element of Hitler was in evidence both in his very close relation with his own 
mother, and his sequence of surrogate mothers, Helene Bechstein and Winifred Wagner’s widow 
for example. Indeed, a significant element in his electoral appeal seems to have been to women, 
 184 
possibly based in this “small boy” element of his personality, the lock of hair over the forehead and 
slightly comical moustache. Also falling into place are both his renowned fits of blind rage a 
common catathymic reaction of people with autistic spectrum disorders when over-aroused, such 
as by unexpected stimuli or when the normal rituals are being or have been disrupted.  
 
Were Hitler somewhat autistic, it would also propose an alternative motivation for the murderous 
antipathy to Jewish people and what Wilson characterises as the Wagnerian self immolation 
fighting to the bitter end530, namely that it articulates the catathymic obliterative violence that is 
reported in autistic spectrum disorders531. It is not a cruel violence, because it lacks the perception 
of suffering of the subject. Hitler’s word in the Barbarossa campaign, that the Russians were to be 
“annihilated” or obliterated rather than killed, the latter having a human quality which the former 
does not. 
 
Arguments against this include that retrospective and remote diagnosis cannot be accurate, and 
that an autism diagnosis is made more commonly with actuarial instruments532 that combine clinical 
observation with history and collateral accounts.  
 
 
7.5 Biographic conclusions: Personality summary/clinical formulation 
 
The conclusion to this chapter is in the form of a brief clinical and biographic formulation.  
 
Hitler was born at the turn of the century in an ideologically fecund period leading up to the 
“seminal catastrophe” of the great war; and in the Viennese crucible of modernity and 
disintegration of the old world order. As a young man, he was unable to settle to a regular 
job and professional direction, on account of indolence and/or narcissistic contempt for 
workaday mediocrity.  
 
His evolving German nationalism was galvanised by the declaration of war in 1914. When 
this was lost, his achievement as a soldier of a sense of direction was hardened into 
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fanaticism. An intelligent man, previously desultorily preoccupied with political issues and 
their historical antecedents, Aspergic traits amplified his sense of focus and singularity of 
purpose. This synergised with his intuitive charisma, and enabled him to manipulate and 
ride a cultural zeitgeist in a Germany humiliated in 1918 but feeling undefeated.  
 
His sense of providence, confirmed to him by his survival through the 14-18 war, combined 
with his army network of fellow zealots, enabled his involvement and success in the violent 
post war political maelstrom in post Great War Germany. Later, this sense of providence, 
in German and then European politics, supported him psychologically in his series of 
audacious all or nothing gambles, which until Stalingrad, were largely won. His 
catastrophic decline seems to demonstrate that setback and compromise were simply not 
part of his narrowed Aspergic repertoire such that he was unable to adapt
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8. Historical context: The Structure  
 
 
The perspective taken in this chapter is brief overview of the historical and structural factors that 
provided a context to, and structural scaffolding for, Hitler’s personal professional development, 
and the growth and then electoral success of his agent grouping, the NSDAP..  
 
 
8.1 Austria 
 
Hitler was born in Austria. The History of the House of Hapsburg had been glorious, as a leading 
European dynasty from the 13th century on, although through the 19th century it was in slow 
decline533. The Hapsburgs lead the confederation of states that comprised the Holy Roman Empire 
until the formation of the Austrian Empire in 1804 after Napoleon’s dismantling of the former.  
 
In the first half of the 19th century, the “Concert of Europe” had stabilised Europe in the wake of the 
Napoleonic wars534, and involved the major powers maintaining a balance between them. The first 
half of the century was the “Age of Metternich” after the conservative Austrian chancellor who was 
central in coordinating both the German Confederation, and the European Powers following the 
Congress of Vienna (1814). 
 
In the middle of the century (1848) there were a series of revolutions across the European states535 
in the context of food shortages, population increases, and the growing popularity of Marxist ideas. 
In Austria these were resolved partially by the resignation of Metternich and abdication of the 
Emperor Ferdinand I.  Franz Joseph I, who became emperor aged 18 in 1848, provided a long 
period of continuity, remaining in power until his death in 1916. 
 
The Austria that Hitler was born in was in significant decline. It had been out-manoeuvred by 
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Bismarck and Prussia over Schleswig-Holstein536, and had lost the seven weeks war in 1866. It 
had to cede not only significant territory to Prussia and Italy, but also the role of being the pre-
eminent Germanic nation and indeed the most powerful European nation, to the new North 
German Confederation from which Bismarck strategically excluded it.    
 
Through the 19th century, Austria’s integrity was undermined by the growing nationalistic demands 
of its nine different non-Germanic ethnicities. The Magyars in Hungary had revolted in 1848 
unsuccessfully, but a weakened Austria after the Austro-Prussian war had to negotiate the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the creation of a dual monarchy537. The other major agitator 
group was the ethnic Serbs in the south, a separate Serbian nation having been created in 1815 
following a period of revolt against the crumbling Ottoman Empire538. These ethnic tensions 
continued, fuelled by the mixture of the developing concept of the nation state, and demands for 
liberal reform. Tensions crystallized in the form of the assassination of Franz Joseph’s heir 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian agitators during a visit to Belgrade, and Austria’s 
subsequent ultimatum began the sequence of war declarations between the European powers in 
1914539.  
 
There are accounts of the political process in the post compromise Austro-Hungarian Empire mired 
in bureaucracy exemplified by the incorporation of two national languages. It was this political 
process that Hitler observed while living in Vienna and which in MK he is critical of.    
 
 
8.2 The 19th century 
  
Hitler was born in the last decade of a century that had seen a sequence of technological, cultural 
and political revolutions. Politically, the whole century can be seen overshadowed by the events in 
the last decade of the 1700s in France; the revolution and installation of the enlightenment rubric 
“Liberte; Egalite; Fraternite”; but also with the resulting “terror” and political instability of the largest 
country in Europe as an unstable republic540. In turn, it had been preceded by the American War of 
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Independence, where the yoke of an autocratic ruler had again been removed by a popular 
uprising.  
 
In Europe, not only was the 19th century lived under the shadow of the powerful ideas of the 
political enlightenment, the French annexation of most of Europe in the first decade of the century 
had extended the reach of the “Napoleonic Code” with its culture of liberal enfranchisement541.  
However, more concretely, the temporary resolution of chaotic France into the bellicose 
“Caesarism” of the Napoleons extended the quarter of a century of war. Consequently, the powers 
at the Congress of Vienna were determined to structure a lasting peace, which largely held until 
1914.  
 
The short tactical wars and revolutions that took place during the century did not serve to 
undermine the optimistic assumption as the century wore on, that in the (Hegelian) evolution of 
man and his spirit; that total war was a thing of the past, and that mankind had graduated from 
such behaviour to an age of reason and diplomacy.  
 
As the century progressed, egalitarianism crystallised into Marxism, and other ideas took hold, 
including Nietzsche’s death of God542, Weber’s death of the protestant magic supporting 
capitalism543, and the antecedents to Freud’s further Copernican revolution, placing man’s 
rationality in orbit around his animalistic unconscious544. 
 
Technologically, it was the century of industrialisation. The high-powered steam engine was 
invented in 1802 and Stephenson’s Rocket in 1829. The development of technology was a 
concrete articulation of the vision of an unfolding enlightened humanity, again an apparent 
Hegelian evolution of spirit545.  
 
In contrast to this, in the middle of the century as unrest and revolution swept across the world, 
Marx’s Capital in 1867 delivered its gloomy message of individual alienation; of class struggle, 
conflict and the collapse of the economic and social system546 and in January 1889, Nietzsche 
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collapsed psychiatrically having (arguably) presaged the post-modern philosophical and cultural 
debates of the subsequent century.  
 
Economically, the two decades preceding Hitler’s birth were characterised by the “Long 
Depression”; Bismarck’s abandonment of the silver standard after the Franco-Prussian war of 1871 
and falling prices and mining stocks and unsustainable bubble in investment in the developing 
technologies of railways and steamships lead to the “Panic of 1873”; a Viennese stock market 
crash and the failure of a large American Bank Jay Cooke and Co547.  
 
The final decade of the century was more optimistic in Europe, as living standards increased with 
some trickle down of the benefits and wealth of industrial development.  The economic recovery 
lead to the “Belle Époque” in France548, late Victorian and Edwardian prosperity in the UK and the 
expansive Willhelmine years in Germany, where the new, young Kaiser articulated the pre-
eminence in Europe of the Germany he had inherited from Wilhelm I and Bismarck549.  
 
 
 8.3 Germany.   
 
In contrast to  Austria-Hungary as an empire in decline, the new German Empire, declared in the 
palace of Versailles in 1871, victorious over the old Napoleonic adversary, was in its ascendancy. 
The myriad of small German states had consolidated somewhat following the revolutionary 
instabilities of 1848 with the development of the Frankfurt parliament (to which Bismarck was 
Prussia’s envoy)550. An underlying tension was whether these small states would federate around 
the Austrian Hapsburgs, or Prussian Hohenzollerns.  
 
As allies, Austria-Hungary and Prussia fought a brief victorious war with Denmark over the 
Schleswig-Holstein territories, but tensions developed, and Austria lead the majority of the German 
states against Prussia in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 after Prussia annexed Holstein. After just 
seven weeks, the Prussian army won the decisive battle of Koniggratz551. With this Austrian defeat, 
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the question was whether a unification of the German peoples should be of a “greater” or “lesser” 
Germany; that is, including or excluding Austria. Bismarck favoured and enacted the latter552.  
 
The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 was also engineered by Bismarck by fabricating an insult 
allegedly delivered by the French ambassador to Wilhelm over a tension that a Hohenzollern might 
succeed to the Spanish throne, which Napoleon III was keen to prevent553. The war was longer and 
more messy than that with Austria, with the Sieges of Paris and Metz, but the French were beaten 
at Worth by the smaller German 2nd army, which for the first time was comprised of soldiers from 
the different German provinces, forging a new national identity.  
 
Hostilities continued following the surrender of Napoleon at Sedan, but Bismarck capitalized upon 
his eventual victory over the self declared French “Third Republic” to seal Prussia’s leadership of 
the former North German Confederation, and declare Wilhelm Kaiser of a new German Empire. He 
had humiliated the French, taking Alsace/Lorraine back, and five billion Francs in war reparations, 
and declaring this (as mentioned), the new German Empire in the Palace of Versailles in 1871.  
 
Now the preeminent force in continental Europe, Bismarck focused inward, fuelling various internal 
cultural rivalries (for example against the Catholic Church) to consolidate the power of the state, 
the “Iron Chancellor” being apparently sensitive to the precariousness of the new empire’s 
achievements.  This attitude chafed with Wilhelm II, who succeeded the year before Hitler’s birth in 
1888. The new Kaiser was keen to flex the power of the empire he had inherited, such that 
Bismarck was dismissed in 1890.  
 
The loss to the new Germany of a master strategist arguably contributed to a gradual deterioration 
in its international position. By 1914 Germany was encircled by countries with alliances with 
France, the prevention of which had been Bismarck’s central strategy. However, in the last decade 
of the 19th century and the first of the 20th, Germany rode high, was prosperous and successful, 
and Wilhelm II’s bellicose hubris, illustrated by the bungling of the two Moroccan crises, was more 
in keeping with the new nationalist mood554.   
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8.4 German Nationalism. 
 
Hitler is reported to have had a German Nationalist history teacher. Understanding the 
development of nationalism in the 19th century is complicated by the recognition that it was 
advocated by liberals rather than conservatives. The notion of the nation state with its assumption 
of law, a system of enfranchisement and rule by a parliament was a powerful counterpoint to the 
alternative of autocratic dynasticism, monarchism and the divine right of kings. Particularly in 
Germany, but also elsewhere in Europe, the concept of the nation was further complicated by the 
historical precedent of small city or regional states, each with their own royalty and civic society, 
albeit federated in the context of Germany under the Holy Roman Empire and its subsequent 
iterations. Further, there is a difficult distinction to be drawn between German and Prussian 
nationalism; if the triumph of 1871 was a continuation of the glorious tradition of Fredrick the Great, 
this was specifically a Prussian rather than a German tradition. German nationalism and the 
Prussian tradition were different, but opportunistically combined by Bismarck.  
 
The “German People” were broadly the Germanophones distributed across the small city and 
regional states that comprised the Holy Roman Empire and its post Napoleonic successor German 
Confederation of more consolidated states. The region of “Germania,” to the East of the Rhine, and 
including modern day Poland, was defined by the Romans in the context of their eastern frontier. 
The different German dialects were significantly coordinated following Martin Luther’s translation of 
the Bible in the early 16th century, and with it, the sense of continuity of the German speaking 
peoples. This was the foundation of a German national identity as theorised by Herder555.  
 
Within the small Germanian principalities, along with the different royal families and sate 
bureaucracies was duplication in educational institutions and universities, such that German 
literature, philosophy science and culture both flowered and was disseminated. German identity 
consolidated around the writing of Goethe and Schiller, the philosophies of Kant and Hegel; 
Mozart, Beethoven then Wagner and so on.  
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Politically, pan-German nationalism emerged as a reaction to the Napoleonic wars556. French 
republicanism was about loyalty to “La France” replacing the Monarch. As French armies swept 
through Germania, dominating through conquest or alliance, the embattled and billeted 
Germanophones reflected on what distinguished them from their oppressors. The Hapsbergs 
explicitly declared an Austrian Empire in 1805; the rest of Germany; occupied, reorganized and 
conforming to an imposed alien culture/code wanted to follow.  
 
The inventor of physical education, Father Jahn had earned the Iron Cross for actions against 
Napoleon but was imprisoned for involvement in, among other things the book burning at the 1817 
Wartburg Festival. This articulated protest against the conservatism of the Treaty of Vienna, and 
failure to consolidate a German nation in the post Napoleonic peace557. Crucially, the core of 
Jahn’s rhetoric and writing was about German identity, the Wartburg festival, for example being 
held on an anniversary Martin Luther’s theses. The movement anticipated later anarchist/terrorist 
political activism in its sensationalism and stirring of debate.  
 
Romantic “sturm und drang” (literally “storm and urge”, perhaps “passion and energy”) in mid 
1700s Germany had literary and musical influence558. Consisting of the enhancement of the 
emotional content of art, it developed into the counter-enlightenment preoccupations of 
romanticism, the emphasis on the subjective; a challenge to the rational and enlightened thinking559 
of the Napoleonic Code.   
 
Although its origins were German, Romanticism was international. The German protagonist, 
Wagner, was somewhat anachronistic, the artistic world having moved on from the middle of the 
1800s. However, in Germany, romanticism became combined with nationalism. The Volkish 
movement, with notions of idealization of the German peasantry and rural working values provided 
an underpinning to the conceptualization of a greater Germany for Germanophones560. This 
combined with the quick development of radicalism and socialism consequent on the almost feudal 
relations between the classes in the country and in the fast developing industries. These divergent 
forces fuelled the development of the concept of the state as an entity to inspire fealty in all.  
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8.5 Prussia. 
 
The Old Baltic Prussians were pagans, invaded and Germanised by the Teutonic Knights as a 
crusade during the 1200s561. The Hohenzollerns were the Dukes of Nurenberg, to whom in 1398 
the Electorate of Brandenburg succeeded, and subsequently, the Duchy of Prussia in 1618562. 
Thus the two geographically separate areas were joined by a Hohenzollern personal union, albeit a 
distance apart.  
 
The area was ravaged by the thirty years war, but strengthened by the development of a martial 
culture by Fredrick William I (1640-88), and the subsequent declaration of the Kingdom of Prussia 
in 1701 on the grounds of Baltic Prussia being outside the Holy Roman Empire, and therefore able 
to be a monarchy. The subsequent Hohenzollern strategy was to extend territory to unite the two 
geographical areas greatly facilitating administration and strengthening the empire. Significant 
steps were taken by Fredrick II (“the Great” 1740-86) particularly with the Partition of Poland 
(1772), obtaining Royal Prussia, which linked the Brandenburg and Prussian Duchy lands, 
integrating the Kingdom. The first Silesian war with Austria extended Brandenburg southeast into 
the rich Silesian Province563.   
 
While Prussia was defeated by the Napoleonic armies in 1806, losing about a third of its territory 
and becoming a French satellite, it was a crucial actor in the final Battle of Waterloo, and benefited 
in the Treaty of Vienna (1815), having its territory returned, and gaining the Rhineland and 
Westphalia, which included the rapidly industrializing Ruhr valley564.  
 
Bismarck, not a nationalist, carefully de-emphasised the Prussian hegemony; but his successes 
were predicated on Prussian culture and attitude. The Prussian tradition was military and 
bureaucratic, so the struggles that shaped both England and France in the 17th and 18th century 
between the Monarch and the Nobles were finessed. Societal legitimacy was predicated on 
national service, either in the army or in the civil service, and both of these structures developed 
meritocratic admission and promotion processes. The Junkers, as the equivalent of landed gentry, 
while conservative and resisting of democratic reform, were not lazy and decadent, but were 
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actively engaged in their property locally, and politically or militarily active and engaged 
nationally565.  
 
During the 1700s, the Fredricks had maintained very large armies, which were hired out as 
mercenaries to other states. By allowing the soldiers to return home at sowing and harvest times 
for the peasantry, and having a short national service and continuing connection for the 
professional and Junker classes, militarism was inculcated at all levels of society, and as part of the 
everyday rural village life566.  
 
This culture of widespread identification and active involvement with the military and civil society 
was complemented by values of selfless hard work, inculcated by the behaviour of the Fredricks 
themselves, particularly the personal example set by Fredrick II “The Great”, seem to have had a 
very deprived childhood with his abusive and tyrannical father who executed his best friend in front 
of him; who derided his interest in the arts and music, forcing him to learn the martial arts, and who 
for the good of the country became a master military strategist and triumphal leader567.  
 
It was on this cultural foundation that Bismarck was able to build the effective and militarily potent 
state that declared an integrated German Empire in 1871568, and many of these cultural factors 
contributed to the efficiency of the NSDAP state in the subsequent century.  
 
 
8.6 Religion 
 
Regarding the issue of religion as a cultural influence, there was a differentiation of religion 
between Bismarck's German Empire, and Austro-Hungary, the area having been heavily influenced 
by the reformation. Catholicism and Protestantism had been fought over during the 30 years war 
(1618-1648), ending with reaffirmation the 1555 Augsburg "cuius regio, eius religio" confirmed in 
the Treaty of Westphalia569. Broadly, the more northern of the German states had followed Luther; 
with the southern, in particular the Hapsburg Empire remained loyal to Rome.  
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These agreements largely enabled religious differences to lie dormant, but they subsequently were 
used in Bismarck's struggle with Austria-Hungary. The German Empire from 1871 
being predominantly Protestant, Bismarck enacted a series of laws later termed the "kulturekampf", 
persecuting the German Catholics whose numbers had grown, but who remained relatively 
unintegrated570. The effect of this was for Catholics to politicise, with the formation of the German 
Centre Party (Zentrum).  
 
Hitler attended the Benedictine monastery school in Lambach for the year 1897-98. In MK he 
writes 
 
In my free time I practiced singing in the choir of the monastery church at Lambach, 
and thus it happened that I was placed in a very favourable position to be 
emotionally impressed again and again by the magnificent splendour 
of ecclesiastical ceremonial. What could be more natural for me than to look upon 
the Abbot as representing the highest human ideal worth striving for571 
 
Hitler's family and he himself were Catholic, his mother devoutly so, and Hitler never formally left 
the church. 
 
 
8.7 Vienna  
 
In some analyses, Vienna 1900 was the birthplace of modernism572. In the arts, music, politics and 
philosophy, it was fulcremic between the new and what went before in the same way as its 
geographical position put it at the axis of east and west. Surrounded by the Alps, the industrial 
revolution in transport had a particularly dramatic effect on the city in the second half of the century. 
The third quarter of the century was dominated by the development of the architecturally 
grandiloquent  Ringstrasse, the Emperor having given a belt of military land comprising the city 
walls and associated glebes to the city.  
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The grassy areas around the walls had ensured the visibility of invading armies maintained since 
the siege of Vienna in 1529 by the Ottomans573, but which had been ineffective during the uprisings 
in revolutionary 1848. The new Ringstrasse aped the Parisian wide boulevards, both architecturally 
impressive, but more importantly, difficult to barricade during periods of civil unrest. A decade of 
triumphalist building of large municipal and residential buildings in historicist styles followed; a 
grand Parthenon for the parliament; a gothic Town Hall; a baroque War Ministry, renaissance 
Palace of Justice and so on. This exuberant development culminated in the World Exposition in 
1873 with its large Rotunda, Machine Hall and (Hellenic) Kaiser Palace574.  
 
Emerging modernism in Vienna has been seen as a reaction to the ubiquity of traditionalism and 
historicism concretely surrounding it. In the Arts, the Vienna Secession lead by Klimt split from the 
Association of Austrian Artists, attempting to free art and architecture from a perceived conformist 
straightjacket575. In Music, the Viennese tradition of Mozart and Hayden then Beethoven, Brahms 
and Bruckner gave way to Mahler, Schoenberg, Berg, and the “Second Viennese School”, 
developing 12 tone atonality576.  
 
In philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein grew up contemporaneous with Hitler, as a scion of one of the 
richest families in the Hapsburg empire. Although Wittgenstein followed Frege and then Russell to 
Cambridge, it was in pursuit of the same logical positivist approach that characterized the work of 
the later “Vienna Circle” of Bergman and Carnap. At the time reading circles studying the work of 
Wagner, Nietzsche and so on were popular, bringing together the significant intellectuals in the city 
including Freud.  
 
Schorske’s analysis is that the core Viennese Fin de siècle zeitgeist was about the failure of 
liberalism. The revolutions across Europe in 1848 had not brought about radical social and political 
change, so the move was from the practical to the internal; the psychological577. Hence the “turn” to 
the more surreal, atonal, and with the development of Psychoanalysis, attempts to chart the 
chaotic, sexual and animalistic beneath the 19th century veneer of respectability.  
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Finally, the beginning of the Great War turned around Vienna’s politics, based upon the analysis of 
that conflict being brought about by the collapse of the formerly vast Hapsburg empire. The 
secession was precarious, the Emperor having had no children of his own; and the empire itself 
was also precarious after the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, everything having to be agreed by 
both parliaments. The internal civil peace was also precarious in the context of growing agitation in 
the south, particularly by the Serbs, being visited by and resulting in the assassination of Archduke 
Ferdinand578.   
 
 
8.8 Anti-Semitism and discriminatory politics.  
 
Vienna was a politically complex city of contrasts, symbolized by the hubristic World Exposition 
opening on 1st May 1873, but immediately followed by a black Friday 9th May with a Viennese stock 
market crashed, and a cholera outbreak in the Danube World Exposition Hotel.579   
 
Along side the opulence of the Hapsburg Empire was a significant underclass. Central European 
cities including Vienna were still urbanising, augmented by migration from the east, particularly of 
Jewish people, fleeing the Russian Pogroms within the Pale of Settlement areas, and for Czechs 
and inhabitants of the Balkan states. This ingress led to the quadrupling of the population in the 60 
years between the 1850 and 1910 census 580 to over 2 million.  
 
Vienna was also the focal point of the instabilities and conflict consequent on the evolution of 
democracy within the Hapsburg Empire. Increasing enfranchisement exacerbated the ethnic and 
“racial” tensions that characterised Austria-Hungary, with its multiple ethnic groupings including the 
Magyars, the Balkan groups, the Czechs and Poles. For example, following the compromise with 
the Magyars in 1848 creating the dual monarchy581, the Czechs were granted a similar 
dispensation regarding the use of that language in the civil service in Bohemia, leading to uproar, 
and Franz-Joseph’s eventual suspension of the Parliament. Hitler’s period in Vienna enabled him 
to observe and participate in this political and cultural ferment, and to watch the mayor, Lueger, 
maintain his political position and influence through his political craft. 
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The history of anti-Semitism in Germany582 is complex. Moses Mendelssohn’s translation of the 
Torah into German and the establishment of Jewish schools teaching in German, expedited the 
integration of Jewish people into German society that was legislated as part of the Napoleonic 
Code in the first decades of the 19th century.  
 
In the Hapsburg Empire, the Jewish people had been further enfranchised by Franz-Joseph, 
moving out of their traditional areas of small money lending and agrarian middle man trading to 
joining the ranks of the industrialists and capitalists, becoming doctors, academics and culturally 
central.  
 
Writing at the time of the Nazi book burning, Roth could say.  
 
It would be true to say that from about 1900, German cultural life was largely defined 
by this “top class” of German Jews 583 
 
The success of Jewish integration was illustrated by the numbers of cultural and scientific leaders 
who were German Jews; Marx; Mahler; Einstein; Husserl; Freud to name but a few; and the 
increasing rates of intermarriage584. In contrast to this Germanised cosmopolitan group were those 
fleeing from the Shtetls in the east; poor with a more orthodox lifestyle and religious observances 
who gathered in the developing immigrant ghettos.  
 
Pre-war, Hitler was living within this diverse cultural mix. One influence was Lueger, about whom 
Hitler later wrote (in MK) that his initial judgment that Leuger was  
 
reactionary … [but] that opinion grew into outspoken admiration …585  
 
Hitler was critical that Lueger’s Christian Socialist Party’s anti-Semitism was religious rather than 
racial which  
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… did not upset the Jews very much … a few drops of baptismal water would settle 
the matter … 586  
 
While Kershaw concludes that Hitler took his anti-Semitism into his first war, deriving from the 
culture of Vienna at that time587, others disagree, for example, Weber, who cites his good relations 
with his Jewish senior officer in the List Regiment who recommended him for his Iron Cross. Hitler 
had lived in the rather deprived Jewish Quarter of the city, and ending up wearing a large black 
coat and beard, looking like the Jewish people that he describes disparagingly in MK.  
 
 
 
8.9 Wagner. 
 
Hitler’s love of Wagnerian opera is undisputed, supported by his late teenage friend Kubizeck’s 
account of his enthrallment588, and his subsequent engagement with the Wagner family.  
 
Richard Wagner himself had been something of a polymath developing a grandiose and all 
encompassing vision of the function of music in society in the romantic idiom for which, with its 
belief in music as the supreme art form because of the romantic notion that it had direct access to 
the emotions. Wagner’s output was, musical, mythological (via the narrative content of his operas), 
“philosophical”, and political. There are a number of themes that can and have been used to 
explain Hitler’s adulation.  
 
For example, Wagner had been a revolutionary, having to hide in exile after being pursued by the 
authorities from the barricades in Dresden during the 1848 riots589. He had a grandiosity of vision 
which resulted in the musical phenomenon of Bayreuth and the Ring cycle, but also in his always 
being in debt and several times during his life having to flee his creditors.  
 
Wagner also enacted a turn from being a social revolutionary supported by his turgid prose, to 
developing a vision of the ‘total artwork”, a construction of music, visual and text art that would 
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change society from the inside590. Whereas his contemporary Karl Marx preached liberation 
through uprising, Wagner preached the liberation through the spiritual redemption of a total 
aesthetic experience.  
 
 
8.9 The 1918 defeat. 
 
Hitler was distraught on hearing of the armistice. In the latter half of the war, the German state was 
an effective military dictatorship with Hindenburg as the nominal head of the army, but Ludendorff 
the effective one, and de facto head of state. When the Germans won in the east as the Russian 
revolution broke, they sued for peace at Brest Litosk, moved substantial troops to the west, and 
launched the 1918 spring offensive. The Reichweir were nearly successful, making considerable 
strides, and getting as far as the Marne, near Paris. However, the other facts of the German 
situation, the country being encircled; the effectiveness of the allied blockade and the US coming 
into the war following the continued sinking of neutral US vessels by German submarines, made it 
clear to the Generals that the war was lost591. Ludendorff instructed the chancellor to sue for 
peace, and personally withdrew592.  
 
The “Stab in the back” myth, attributed to a distorted comment of a British officer, broadly 
articulated the view that the Reichweir had not lost the war, but rather that the (liberal/Jewish) 
politicians, industrialists and trades-unionists had undermined the war effort such that the rug was 
taken from beneath the army’s feet593. To most, the surrender was a complete surprise, coming 
after the successes of the Spring Offensive. As late as early 1918, there had been popular 
discussions about how the newly annexed German territories acquired on victory, would be used. 
The difficulties in supplying the war effort caused by the allied blockade had meant that for the 
previous year, Germany’s activities had been unsustainable, although the population and many 
politicians seem to have been unaware of this, the military government maintaining a tight control 
on information.  
 
Within the Reichstag, through the war, there had been a group of doves, arguing for negotiation 
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and settlement with the allies, and it was broadly this group of moderates left in power (including 
some liberal Jewish politicians) following the abdication of the Emperor. It was these liberals 
(including Max Weber594) marched into the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles595, to be humiliated by the 
victorious allies, and to take the bitter reality of the terms of the Versailles treaty, with its 
opprobrium of war guilt, loss of territory and crippling reparation payments, back to the German 
people.  
 
 
8.10 Living in a time of revolutions. 
 
Hitler returned to Munich in 1918 having recovered. In the immediate period after the war in 
Germany there were a series of revolutions and challenges to civil society whose significance is 
amplified in the context of the overweening German culture of “peace and social justice” (a phrase 
oft cited at the time)596. Significant is that Hitler lived through a period where the structures of a 
society previously defined by its order and structure is dissolved or significantly challenged several 
times and in different ways. 
 
 The Kiel mutiny was a naval rebellion on 3.11.18 – sailors refused to sail on a cruise 
against the British Navy to go out with a final glorious battle several days before the 
armistice, and after Ludendorff had instructed the civil government to sue for peace. 
Revolutionary fervour spread across Germany. Aping the recent history in Russia, workers' 
councils emerged within the different German cities, prompting the abdication and flight of 
Wilhelm II on 9.11.18. With the creation of the republic, they deferred to the re-established 
local authorities, not extending the Bolshevism as in Germany’s neighbour Russia597. 
 In Munich, wither Hitler returned, having recovered from his blindness in Pacewalk, there 
were a number of political turns 
o Kurt Eisner had declared the Bavarian Republic on 7.11.18, prompting King 
Ludwig III’s abdication on 12.11.18.  
o The following February (1919) Eisner was assassinated as he travelled to resign 
his presidency, his Independent Social democrats having lost the elections.  
 202 
o Johannes Hoffmann unsuccessfully attempted to hold together a coalition 
government, from 7th March 1919 after this election.  
o From April 6th, Ernst Toller’s chaotic “Bavarian Soviet Republic” administration 
took power.  
o On 12th April, a communist coup d’état lead by Eugen Levine. More closely 
linked to the Russian Soviets, this government rounded up elite hostages, some of 
whom were shot, precipitating intervention by Weimar Republic President Ebert. 
o On 3rd May, the Freikorps marched on Munich, crushing the fledgling independent 
state, and realigning it into the Weimar republic.  
 The “Spartacist Uprising” in Berlin between January 4th and 15th, 1919 was a populist 
uprising supported by the communist groups. Following a general strike and barricades in 
the streets, it was crushed by Freikorps sent in by Ebert, with the infamous summary 
execution of Rosa Luxembourg, her body thrown into a canal598.  
 The Kapp Putsch in March 1920 was precipitated by the attempt to disband one of the 
more active Freikorps groups, and was a right wing attempt to establish a more 
authoritarian regime planned in disaffected right wing and military circles for some months. 
General Luttwitz ordered the Freikorps to take over government buildings in Berlin. 
Defence Minister Noske’s instruction to the Reichweir to suppress the rebels was refused 
on the grounds that the German army could and should not fire upon the German people. 
The Government fled to Dresden, but was not supported there by Generalmajor Maercker 
and had to move on to Stuttgart, where it called for a general strike. This received wide 
support which crippled the newly declared Chancellor Kapp’s cabinet, and after clashes 
across the country, the two putsch leaders fled into exile599.  
 In the Ruhr, the general strike on 13.3.20 was used for a larger political aim, and 
workers’ councils across the area seized power, creating a “Red Ruhr Army”. On April 2nd, 
units from the Reichweir and Freikorps suppressed the uprising600.  
 November 1923 – Hitler’s own “Beer Hall Putsch” took place in Munich. 
 
In addition to Eissner in Bavaria, there were a number of other high profile assassinations,601 this 
briefly being a legitimate part of the political process.  
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 Hugo Hasse, in 1919, a Social Democrat moderate, but pacifist, who with Ebert set up the 
provisional government in November 1918. 
 The Spartacists, Rosa Luxembourg; Karl Leibkenect, and then Leo Jogiches in 1919.  
 Matthias Ertzberger, in 1921: Finance Minister, from the Centre party and an influential 
Catholic, who campaigned against the war in the latter stages, and eventually signed the 
Armistice, being seen by the right as a traitor for doing so.  
 Walter Rathenow in 1922; Foreign Minister, who infuriated nationalists by arguing that the 
terms of the Versailles Treaty should be honoured. 
 
Bavaria, where Hitler was stationed saw 6 different governments over a short period, including two 
revolutions, an assassination and a military invasion. Within a five-year period, the German state 
was challenged by 5 significant uprisings (taking the Bavarian sequence as one).  
 
 
8.11 Weimar I; Disillusion, democracy; reparation and inflation.  
 
The Weimar constitution, named after a small town synonymous with the best of German literary 
and cultural tradition, was written during the difficult winter of 1918/19, being finally ratified in 
August602. With its universal suffrage, proportional representation; enshrining of the rights of 
citizens, it was a bold and progressive political structure603. While it had flaws, for example the 
ability of the President (serving 7 years) to rule by decree in an emergency (Article 48), and to sack 
the chancellor even if he had the confidence of parliament (echoing the recent imperial past and 
the role of the Kaiser), one can argue that these flaws were dwarfed by the challenges that it had to 
face. These included  
 
 The disillusionment of the German people at the loss of the war, the Generals 
(Luddendorf and Hindenberg), handing back the responsibility and opprobrium for suing for 
peace to the politicians. Those remaining in power had been active critics of the war or 
liberals and moderates. These were left to “negotiate” the peace.   
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 The terms of the Versailles Treaty, particularly the War Guilt clause, and the requirement 
to pay 50-225 billion Marks reparation depending on how this is calculated, and what was 
actually paid. This has been described as a Carthaginian peace; albeit reparations being 
mitigated by the subsequent Young and Dawes plans prior to being suspended in 1931, 
and there is debate about how crippling it actually was to the German economy604; but it 
did form a central dilemma for the Weimar government. They were divided between 
needing to enact the provisions of the treaty in order to re-establish an equal place within 
international relations, and the need to be seen to be resisting and protesting to maintain 
political legitimacy at home. In consequence, it seems there was a cat and mouse passive 
resistance, with at times reparations payments falling behind, leading in 1923 to the 
occupation of the Ruhr region, so the French could take the coal and industrial product 
component of the payments directly.  
 The hyperinflation of 1923 was crystallised by the instruction by the German Government 
to passive resistance to the occupation of the Ruhr, such that production ceased, but the 
government continued to pay the wages of the striking workers. Longer antecedents 
included the Mark leaving the gold standard during the war, and political denial of the 
pressures on the currency brought about by the reparations605.    
 
If the Government was Janus faced about the reparations, it was also about the disarmament 
requirement. The Versailles limitation of the Wehrmacht to 100,000 troops (from something like 13 
million during the war) was enacted by tolerating the thinly disguised “sports and shooting” groups 
that were paramilitary organizations, and in particular the groups of the Freikorps, explicitly used by 
President Ebert in his constitutional task to crush the insurrection; then themselves becoming 
dangerously powerful, with the Kapp putsch of 1920606.  
 
 
8.12 Weimar II; The Golden 20s.  
 
The “Golden 20s” in Germany started inauspiciously. By 1923, things were at crisis point, with the 
hyperinflation making savings worthless; Hitler’s putsch in Munich; the occupation of the Ruhr area 
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by France and Belgium; the declaration of an independent Rhineland Palatinate, and the vote of no 
confidence in the Reichstag against the Chancellor, who resigned.  
 
Although having resigned as Chancellor, Stresemann continued as Foreign Minister until his death 
in 1929607. In that role he was credited for the rationalisation of both foreign relations and sorting 
out the hyperinflation with the development of the new Rentenmark, backed by property as security 
rather than gold.  
 
Following the review of the reparations issue by Charles C Dawes, former US ambassador to the 
UK and Banker, there was a reduction in yearly amounts with a reorganisation of the Reichbank, 
and withdrawal of troops from the Rhine. US loans to Germany followed, that for the rest of the 
1920s fuelled an economic boom. The cycle was that US loans to Germany facilitated payment of 
war reparations which in turn enabled France, particularly, to pay its war debts back to the US.  
 
Globally, the 1920s saw economic prosperity, with new technologies like electric light and other 
appliances such as the radio608, fuelled by the rise of cinema articulating a Jazz Age consumerist 
ideal that was emanating from the buoyant US609.  
 
 
8.13 The structural, historical context: Conclusions 
 
This chapter has annotated some of the themes extant in the historical context that formed the 
cultural substrate from which Hitler, the NSDAP and its ideology emerged. This discussion provides 
a backdrop for the discussion in the next chapter of the agent, Hitler, as a leadership case history.   
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9. Leadership case history: The agent 
 
 
Having outlined the nature of the man, and looked at the historical context and cultural tropes 
leading up to the point at which Hitler seemed to galvanise himself into political action and potency, 
this management case history orientation follows his progress as a political agent.   
 
Fest (a contemporary journalist) maps Hitler’s strategy against the “Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion”610. This was a document purporting to be a manifesto for Jewish world domination written to 
promote anti-Semitism in Russia towards the close of the 1800s. Its central strategy involved the 
use of the democratic process to establish a dictatorship through the manipulation of public opinion 
using propaganda and civil unrest.  
 
Although outwardly, from the time of his imprisonment, Hitler was a legitimate politician, within the 
NSDAP, obtaining the chancellorship was not about the leadership of the pluralist Weimar 
democracy, but about the “seizure of power”.  
 
 
9.1 Political awakening 1919 
 
Post war Germany was ravaged by the allied blockade from the Armistice until the Versailles 
Treaty was signed in July 1919, which combined with the Spanish Flu epidemic and political 
upheaval made immediate post war German society unstable and chaotic. Notwithstanding his 
monologues about his opinions delivered to Kubizeck; to his fellow residents in the men’s hostel in 
Vienna, and to his peers in the trenches, Hitler had not been politically active or even engaged. 
Given the precariousness of the state and the centrality of the army as the broker of power, a 
programme of nationalist training for soldiers was arranged, with the view that the development of 
nationalism would be a stabilising cultural influence. In one lecture Hitler remonstrated with the 
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speaker utilising the vehemence and eloquence which he was to later develop, being noticed by his 
seniors, and as a result being asked to deliver lectures himself611.  
 
His clarity of authoritarian nationalist vision and aloofness from his peers was used by his superiors 
who employed him to inform on subversives612, and to visit the beer-kellars where political 
meetings were held; to keep an eye on and report back about the different political groups and 
movements that fermented at the time. By chance, Hitler may have found that he had an aptitude 
for practical politics in revolutionary times the same way that by chance he found that he had the 
right attitude of unswerving loyalty to Germany to be a soldier in the trenches.  
 
 
9.2 Finding and taking over the NSDAP 1919-23: The emergence of leadership 
 
In that fecund political environment, Anton Drexler613, a left wing locksmith, combined the socialism 
that had a resonance at the time with a local brand of nationalism, “Volkish” nationalism614. The 
“Volk” referred to a romantic notion of the German people and ethnicity, with an emphasis on 
folklore and agrarianism. Drexler had specifically excluded the word “socialist” from the name of the 
German Workers Party such that it was named the Deutsche Arbreiterpartei, abbreviated to 
DAP615. 
 
In September 1919 Hitler visited this group in his informant role, going to a meeting where with 
powerful rhetoric he heckled and trounced the speaker Gottfried Feder616 who was advocating 
Bavarian succession from Prussia. Thus, he came to Drexler’s attention who invited him to join; 
Hitler joined as the 55th member. Hitler reports in MK his ambivalence about accepting, but did so, 
and at his maiden speech at a gathering of about a hundred people, he realised that he could 
“make a good speech”617.   
 
Accounts have Hitler over this time becoming devoted to the development of the DAP, working 
tirelessly and long hours to develop publicity material and personally printing and distributing it; 
strategising about, arranging and managing speaking engagements. He worked with the other 
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leading figures, Drexler and Feder to mould and change the party’s ideology, articulated as the “25 
points”618. To the name he added, “nationalsozialistische” to the previous Deutch Arbeiterpartei, 
forming the NSDAP. By February 1920, Hitler had organised a successful meeting in the 
Staatliches Hofbrauhaus which held 2000; by February 1921 he had addressed a crowd of 6000619.  
 
In July 1921 in the context of concern within the party that Hitler was becoming too influential, there 
was a confrontation. Hitler resigned, and only agreed to return on condition that he became party 
Chairman620, replacing Drexler, appealing over his head to the broader membership of the party, 
who were unwilling to loose the success that he was bringing. On 29.7.21 he was declared 
chairman and was introduced as its Fuhrer (leader).   
 
 
9.3 Leading the NSDAP to the beer-hall putsch 1921-23 
 
Hitler’s “Beer Hall Putsch” took place on 8.11.23621 in the context of several significant factors. 
Firstly, after the French occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 on the grounds of German default 
of obligations imposed by the Versailles war reparations, the Berlin government’s popular protest in 
the form of passive resistance was abandoned in September 1923, inflaming nationalists. 
Secondly, in Italy in October 1922, Mussolini had been asked to form a government by the king. 
This success by a popular fascist movement in seizing power demonstrated the potential for the 
NSDAP in Germany, inspiring members and emboldening the leadership including Hitler.   
 
Thirdly, the country was in crisis with hyperinflation, so that on the day of the Putsch itself, the 
NSDAP newspaper the Volkischer Beobachter would have cost 5,000 million marks to buy622. 
Finally, Rohm’s SA (Sturmabteilung, the paramilitaries), and the newly formed “Hitler Youth” were 
hungry for action. The NSDAP, following a series of propaganda coups, had considerably 
increased its standing and influence, such that Hitler had been awarded executive leadership of the 
“Kampfbund”, a collection of nationalist political and fighting groups. Together, these factors had 
situated Hitler as a significant power in Bavarian politics.  
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To stabilise Bavaria, martial law had been imposed since September 1923 overseen by the 
“triumvirate”, comprising Gustav Kahr a strong politician as Minister President, and the heads of the 
Bavarian army and police, significantly blocking Hitler’s opportunities for influence. The triumvirate 
seemed to be taking the initiative from the Kampfbund, scoping the possibilities of overthrowing the 
government in Berlin623, until it became clear the Reichweir (German army) would not support it.  
 
Hitler and Kampfbund allies made hasty plans for their long anticipated putsch. Apparently to seize 
back the initiative, Kahr had arranged a large meeting on the evening of 8.11.23. Hitler surrounded 
the building with SA. Having placed a machine gun at the entrance, he walked in, shot his own 
pistol into the ceiling to get attention and declared that the revolution had broken out624.  He then 
took the members of the triumvirate into a back room, saying that they would keep their roles in a 
government headed by him and Ludendorff, then returned to the crowd and established their 
support for his actions. The captive triumvirate agreed and returned to the podium.  
 
Meanwhile, the SA and other factions making up the Kampfbund were having difficulties taking 
over the barracks and government buildings, so Hitler left the meeting to intervene; the triumvirate 
was allowed to leave by Ludendorff, as men of their word, but reneged on their agreement as soon 
as they were free, pulling in army reinforcements from nearby towns. 
 
By dawn it seemed clear that the putsch had failed, and after argument and confusion, a protest 
march through Munich was agreed, which began at midday with about 2,000 SA and Kampfbund 
troops, many armed. A first police cordon was swept aside, but a second, further into the city lead 
to a standoff, followed by a brief but intense gun battle leaving four policemen and 14 NSDAP 
dead. Hitler himself was bundled into an SA doctor’s car who treated his dislocated shoulder625, 
being picked up by the police several days later. 
 
 
9.4 Hitler as a national figure 
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Hitler was convicted at a trial that took place in February and March of 1924, along with several 
other Putschists, Hitler receiving a five year sentence with the option of parole after six months 
served626. This was Hitler’s second time before the court, and Judge Georg Neithardt. He had been 
convicted of breach of the peace after a violent break-up of a rival political group meeting in 1922, 
and served a month of a three month sentence. In interviews with the prosecuting council prior to 
the Putsch trial, Hitler made much of his potential to implicate the triumvirate government in 
Bavaria627, given that in the Bavarian army had trained Kampfbund paramilitaries, and they 
themselves had conspired against the Berlin government.  
 
In the event, Hitler’s principal strategy was to own responsibility for the putsch628 and thus to 
assume leadership of the anti-establishment movements. The courts at the time were lenient on 
nationalists accepting a defence of patriotism. Add the nationalist sympathies of the presiding 
Judge, and a situation was created where Hitler could use his oratorical and propagandist skills. At 
the trial itself, Hitler was allowed free reign to pontificate politically at great length (his opening 
speech lasting 3 ½ - 4 hours, for example) and cross examine his witnesses from the then 
governing triumvirate. 
  
He was allowed to turn the courtroom into a stage for his own propaganda, 
accepting full responsibility for what had happened, not merely justifying but 
glorifying his role in attempting to overthrow the Weimar state629. 
 
Attracting world-wide media coverage, Hitler developed an international reputation. His five year 
sentence was the derisory minimum the court could impose, and it took no account of the police 
fatalities, the destruction of property, or Hitler’s breach of his probation.  
 
 
9.5 Imprisonment, and reflection 1923 – 24 
 
Hitler was imprisoned for a total of 12 months, having been picked up by the police after the Putsch 
in December 1923, and being released having served nine months of his 5 year sentence in 
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December 1924. This was on the grounds of good behaviour and following fawning support of the 
prison governor630. However, there was a strong representation against his release from the 
Bavarian state prosecutor, whose arguments were overruled by the court.  
 
Hitler’s time in Landsberg prison involved three significant issues631 
 
 Time for Hitler to articulate his vision in writing, dictating his first volume of Mein Kampf.  
Exactly what this volume is, is difficult to define, but it is not the autobiography of the 
courtroom star that his publisher expected. It is part autobiography, part political manifesto, 
primer and polemic, Hitler always argued that the most effective means of communication 
for was face to face, and that his “performances” translated poorly onto paper. Accounts of 
heavy editing prior to the final indigestible version are illustrated by the change made from 
Hitler’s original title “Four and a Half Years of Struggle against Lies, Stupidity and 
Cowardice” to “My struggle”632.  
 
 Time for the NSDAP and the Volkish right movement to fragment and dissipate, 
evidencing Hitler’s centrality.  
 
 Time for his attitudes to grow and consolidate. According to Kershaw633 three particular 
aspects of Hitler’s personal attitudes and beliefs consolidated.  
o After the triumphant outcome of the trial, Hitler’s narcissistic self-belief in his 
leadership role expanded. Previously, he had spoken of being the “drummer”; a 
John the Baptist for a German leader to come. ‘I am nothing more than a drummer 
and rallier [Trommler und Sammler]…’634 But in Llandsberg he became convinced 
that he was that leader, a belief with almost a transcendental quality. Practically, in 
the context of his critique of democracy and belief in dictatorship as a 
governmental form, this attitude was articulated in the “furherprinzip”, the total 
command of the leader.  
o The development of the “leibenstraum” principle – namely that Germany needed to 
expand to the East and expand its available living space 
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o Allied to this, the consolidation of the link in his mind between Jewry and Marxism; 
on the grounds that Lenin had a Jewish background and a world view that there 
was a mutually exterminatory struggle between Arians and Jews, echoing that 
between the NSDAP and communism (or democracy more generally)  
 
 
9.6 Consolidation and development 1925-29 
 
Following his release in December 1924, Hitler’s strategy had three main objectives. Firstly, to 
confirm his own control and mastery within a movement that had become fragmented internally 
quarrelsome; secondly to extend and organise the movement nationally, and thirdly, to re-orientate 
the party to being (or appearing to be) law abiding.  
 
To establish control, in the New Year (1925) he announced the reformation of the NSDAP, 
declaring that all were required to register anew with the new NSDAP, rather than that existing 
competing organisations could affiliate. He staged a theatrical meeting in February 1926 (The 
Bamberg Conference635) where all of the previously squabbling factional leaders shook hands and 
agreed to take their places within the newly formed party under Hitler’s leadership. At the same 
conference, the Furherprinzip principal was confirmed; the expectation of complete loyalty to 
superiors within the party. The ideology of the party was also confirmed in terms of the previously 
articulated 25 points.   
 
The other main leadership rival nationally, the war hero Ludendorff was dispatched by flattery and 
persuading him to stand for the presidential elections in 1925. Ludendorff, who effectively ran the 
country 1914-18 polled only 1% of the popular vote against Hindenburg, thus being humiliated and 
discredited, gradually retreating to eccentric ignominy636.  
 
Second was the task of organisation and extension of the movement. The late 1920s saw the 
Weimar boom, with economic growth and prosperity, such that the NSDAP political ideology built 
on hatred and resentment attracted only the support of the minority, polling 2-3% in elections in 
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which it stood637. Hitler used these years of relative quiet to develop the organisation of the party 
across Germany, particularly appointing the able Gregor Strasser to organise the North of 
Germany, Hitler’s natural support to date having been more in the Bavarian South.  
 
Third was a significant cultural change; Hitler’s newly formed party was to try to work within the law. 
There were two aspects to this; the first was the restraint of the actual violence perpetrated by the 
SA, the paramilitary wing, as far as was possible. The second was to utilise the structures of the 
state to grow the party’s influence by contesting seats in the Reichstag. Hitler had initially opposed 
this strategy, given his antidemocratic stance, but the minor successes achieved by NSDAP 
members standing for election seemed to offer a new option. Following the 1923 Putsch, Hitler had 
been banned from speaking in most German states. As the 20s progressed, Hitler, the law-abiding 
politician, had these bans lifted one by one638.  
 
Notwithstanding legal proscription in parts of Germany, the SA continued to grow, to march the 
streets, and be engaged in street violence. From his release from prison, Hitler would use violence 
by the SA as a potent threat, but deny personal involvement639.   
 
By the end of the 1920s, the NSDAP was running a well organised and energetic political 
campaign, with frequent meetings, a network of drilled speakers, and with a strategy of identifying 
local issues and applying the NSDAP perspective to these. Although there was disappointment that 
this did not yield results in the 1928 elections, this strategy continued, and might be argued to have 
made people aware of an alternative that was available to them, which they would use as a protest 
at their situation in the coming period of hardship from the 1929 economic crash.  
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9.7 The seizure of power 1930-33.  
 
Having extended and reorganised the party, Hitler was in a good position to capitalise on the 
economic depression that radiated across the world from 1929. In Germany, unemployment 
reached nearly 30% in 1932. The NSDAP, having polled only 2.6% in 1928 federal elections, polled 
18.3% in 1930; Hitler was the Chancellor in waiting, though other political leaders sought to avoid 
this, particularly the aging president, Hindenberg .  
 
The sense of anomie and resentment that people felt in 1929/30 as Germany grappled with its 
second economic catastrophe in a decade, benefited the NSDAP with its clarity of uplifting 
message, and vague strategic detail. In addition, the primary statesman of the Weimar republic, 
Stresemann died in 1929 having briefly been chancellor, but latterly, an effective foreign minister 
and international advocate for Germany for the previous decade, leaving a vacuum as the aging 
Hindenberg was increasingly unengaged. Thirdly, there was an increasing tendency for democratic 
politics to be seen as part of the problem, and to be implicitly and then more explicitly undermined 
by the chancellor and president repeatedly ruling by decree under Article 48 of the constitution. The 
frequent elections were in part brought about by the Reischtag parliament objecting to this 
abnegation of its authority, and the President in turn being able to simply dissolve it.  
 
During 1930, the paramilitary SA, were difficult to manage for Hitler, straining at the leash to enact 
a violent coup, and provoked by Hitler’s efforts to confirm his political legitimacy as a law abiding 
political leader. In 1930 Hitler appeared in a trial to give evidence in the defence of several 
Wehrmacht officers who were NSDAP members (this being forbidden), using the opportunity to 
clearly state and confirm his determination to take power by lawful means, although conceding that 
a revolution would follow this640.  
 
In the face of the economic collapse, a grand coalition lead by Muller fell apart, and he resigned, 
with Hindenburg appointing Bruning as Chancellor. Bruning’s approach to the recession was 
economic austerity, cuts in social security, public sector wages and public spending in general641. 
These unpopular measures were pushed through by increasing use of presidential decrees.  
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Bruning, was aware that his legitimacy (and indeed his appointment in the first place) was entirely 
predicated on Hindenburg's patronage, so he pushed for elections to get public support for his 
measures. This lead to the dissolution of the Reichstag in July 1930, and elections in September; 
this in the context of a damaging recession. Hitler’s NSDAP extensively campaigned with a clever 
polemical strategy of presenting themselves as an almost religious revival of the German spirit. 
There was a landslide to the NSDAP at the expense of the governing coalition parties. The NSDAP 
obtained 107 seats642, such an unexpected surprise that they had not identified sufficient deputies 
to enter the Reichstag. 
 
The Bruning administration continued on, although the recession deepened with more bankruptcies 
and very high unemployment. Over this period, street violence was extremely common between 
the political factions. Simultaneously, the NSDAP used their large parliamentary party explicitly to 
frustrate and delay business. The SA and the SS fermented unrest with marches and violence, 
further undermining the democratic process, such that Bruning requested a decree to outlaw these 
two NSDAP paramilitary groups.  Schleicher brokered a “Gentleman’s agreement” with Hitler where 
new elections would be called, and the NSDAP would calm. The violence and political instability 
continued, however, and Hindenburg (continuing to be advised by Schleicher) grew impatient with 
Bruning, by presidential decree dismissing him in May 1932.  
 
In his place, Franz von Papen was made chancellor, a wealthy and politically experienced catholic 
man. Papen saw Hitler’s popular appeal as a resource that could be used to stabilise the country, 
and he repealed Bruning’s ban on the SA. Following the July 1932 elections, where the NSDAP 
increased their Reichstag seats from 107 to 280 (37% of the vote), with Hindenburg, Papen offered 
Hitler the role of vice-chancellor. There seems to have been a hope that Hitler’s appeal would 
become tarnished by his involvement in government, but Hitler refused, demanding to have six 
ministers, and to rule by personal decree.  
 
Following Hitler’s refusal, Hindenburg met him in August 1932643, being angry at Hitler’s position, 
and releasing the content of the meeting to the press. This infuriated Hitler, who amplified the street 
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violence and unrest which was appeased by fresh elections, Hitler expecting his swelling tide of 
support to continue. The new Reichstag sat in August 1932 to pass only one motion, in a “coup de 
teatre” with Goring as its chair, a vote of no confidence in Papen644.  
 
The new elections in November checked the advance of the NSDAP and they lost some seats, but 
the crisis continued; von Papen proposed suspending the Weimar constitution and introducing 
martial law rather than have his government fall in another apparently inevitable Reichstag vote of 
no confidence. Schleicher (as his defence minister) was clear that the Reichweir would not support 
this; von Papen’s situation became untenable645, and he resigned in November 1932.   
 
Hindenburg then appointed Schleicher Chancellor, again by decree in December 1932, the long 
term behind the scenes “fixer” taking the helm646. Chancellor for less than two months, Schleicher 
had been Hindenburg’s main advisor and a significant strategic political player since the mid 1920s. 
Shleicher’s plan was to split the NSDAP by offering Gregor Strasser a role in Government, as Vice 
Chancellor and Minister President of Prussia. These were central and significant roles, and this 
would also bring Strasser’s trade union support in line. Strasser was minded to accept, and 
resigned from the NSDAP647. 
 
Strasser’s resignation of his NSDAP roles was potentially the most significant crisis in the NSDAP’s 
history since the failed 1923 putsch, as Schleicher intended. Hitler acted decisively, with a whistle-
stop speaking tour of the NSDAP groupings, preaching a rhetoric of treachery and betrayal, with 
the result that there were no significant sectional defections and the party did not split. Strasser 
was isolated.  Following a meeting between Hitler and Strasser about which there is no further 
detail, Strasser withdrew from his political activities entirely, initially going abroad for a break, but 
playing no further active role, until he was executed in the “night of the long knives” purge648, after 
Hitler had taken power.  
 
Meanwhile, von Papen had again gained the ear of Hindenburg, with whom he had always been 
close. Following the failure of Schleicher’s attempt to split the NSDAP, which had the effect of 
amplifying Hitler’s targeting of his administration, von Papen began to articulate a strategy of 
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offering Hitler the Chancellorship, on the grounds that he (Hitler) would be a ‘chancellor in chains”, 
given his being uneducated, having no experience in government, and having von Papen, 
Hugenberg and other political figures in the cabinet to manage him. Hindenburg agreed, and Hitler 
became chancellor on 30.January 1933. 
 
 
9.8 Consolidation of power 
Hitler’s consolidation of power 1933-36 following his confirmation as Chancellor, was fast, and 
focussed. In summary, it was achieved by the simultaneous activity in several different domains.  
 
Purges 
 Immediate, with the pretext of the Reichchancellery fire a month after taking office 
 The “night of the long knives”, in June 1934, against the SA and other important 
individuals.  
 
Constitutional extension of dictatorial powers 
 The Enabling act649 
 Assumption of Head of State role following the death of Hindenburg650 
 
Dissolution of opposition groups 
 The trade unions 
 Other political parties 
 Cultural reorientation along nationalist/NSDAP lines 
 
Extending his democratic mandate  
 With the immediate declaration of an election  
 Through achieving foreign policy triumphs 
 Goebbels’ propaganda amplified by the infrastructure of the state  
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Hindenburg and Von Papen’s strategy for Hitler’s new cabinet was that Hitler would be completely 
outnumbered by non NSDAP conservative ministers particularly von Papen and Hugenberg. 
However, Hitler had two allies in strategically central positions as Ministers of the interior of Prussia 
and the rest of the country. Given the NSDAP’s use of violence and intimidation; these posts were 
pivotal, controlling the police and thereby state sanctioned force and violence. Undermining efforts 
to create a working coalition, in his cabinet, Hitler called for new elections, arranged for March 
1933, before which there was a devastating fire in the Reichstag on 27th February.  
 
Hitler’s first purge of political opponents was enabled by the panic created by the Reichstag fire; 
Hitler blamed the communists, and pushed through an emergency decree suspending the Weimar 
Republic rights and freedoms the following day. With public support he was able to imprison many 
trade unionists and opposition activists; by April 1933, 2500 communists, trade unionists and 
political activist opponents had been detained651; many beaten and some killed in newly built 
concentration camps.  
 
Hitler’s enabling act had been anticipated and planned in advance as an “antidote” to democracy, 
having considerable support. In Shirer’s words, “the German Parliament would be requested to turn 
over its constitutional functions to Hitler and take a long vacation”. Practically, it enabled Hitler to 
rule by decree without reference to either the Reichstag or the President.  
 
As a constitutional amendment (part of the strategy of legal legitimacy) passage of the enabling act 
required a two-thirds majority652, and the amendment required to be renewed every four years. 
Hitler had increased his Reichstag representation in the 5th March elections, but did not have an 
outright majority. However, on the day of the vote, many of the deputies who would have voted 
against had been imprisoned in the purge and some were simply not allowed in the chamber. The 
chamber itself was swarming with and surrounded by an intimidating band of SA troops, and in his 
role as Chair of the House, Goring changed procedure in that the votes of absent members were 
not to be counted. The large Centre Party was given concessions, and a reassurance that these 
would arrive in writing (which they never did), on the basis of which the Centre Party voted for the 
measure. Although the Social Democrats voted against, the motion was passed.   
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Hitler’s seizure of power had let loose much of the violence within the paramilitary organisations 
that had to be suppressed during the democratic phase of the Nazi rise. The street fighting with the 
communists and persecution of Jewish people grew such that it offended the middle classes. In 
addition, a constitutional dimension was growing to the problem, with Rohm (leading the SA, which 
now numbered something like three million) nurturing his plan to replace the Wehrmacht. During 
1934, the political split was such that with Hindenburg’s support, von Papen made a speech in 
Marburg decrying the lawlessness, and let it be known that Hindenburg was considering imposing 
martial law.  
 
For a long period, Hitler dithered, but on 30.6.1934 executed his second purge, operation 
Hummingbird, the “night of the long knives.”  A predetermined large group of 70 or 80 SA 
commanders were rounded up and executed by the SS and Gestapo, with the opportunity being 
taken to kill a number of other political figures, such as von Kahr, suppressor of the 1923 Putsch; 
Strasser, Hitler’s more left wing former colleague, and Schleicher, who he accused (falsely) of 
being involved in a treasonous plot. Von Papen was also on the list, but was not at home.  
 
Hitler publicly owned the decision to enact the purge on the grounds of national security, and the 
SA was formally disbanded. Simultaneously, Hitler had allied himself with the Wehrmacht (who had 
wanted the SA disbanded); acted in accordance with the popular mood, which had been disturbed 
by the violent excess of the SA troops; and resolved a divergent split within the party.  
 
Hitler’s last vulnerability was Hindenburg, who as president could formally dismiss him as 
chancellor.  Hindenburg was ailing, and appeared in public little, Hitler had always been outwardly 
respectful on these occasions, but privately contemptuous. As Hindenburg took to his death-bed, 
Hitler legislated for the roles of President and Chancellor to be combined, thus making himself 
head of state. This meant (highly significantly) that members of the Wehrmacht (initially the 
Generals) were to declare an oath of allegiance to Hitler personally in his role of president.  
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In understanding the way that Hitler articulated and disseminated his authority, Kershaw uses the 
phrase “working towards the Fuhrer”653, meaning that decisions were taken by followers on the 
basis of what Hitler would want or approve of. This analysis can be extended further to partly 
explain the cultural revolution that took place across all areas of German society in the mid 1930s 
as existing groups and social and political structures were redefined within a National Socialist 
guise. 
 
A particular example, requiring more active effort was the reorientation of the trade unions. The day 
after a delirious celebratory national holiday declared for Mayday 1933, the union buildings across 
Germany were all occupied and the independent unions dissolved. With the trade union leaders 
imprisoned, a German Labour Front was created in its place, whose role initially was to negotiate 
with industry leaders, this later giving way to a view that the factory leaders should be the authority 
within the factories, backed up by the state, and that there was to be no bargaining. In a similar 
manner, through a combination of intimidation and a demand for loyalty to Germany, the political 
parties themselves aligned or dissolved themselves before a law in July 1933 outlawed any party 
other than the NSDAP.  
 
Kershaw writes 
 
Hardly any spheres of organized activity, political or social, were left untouched by 
the process of Gleichschaltung – the ‘coordination’ of institutions and organizations 
now brought under Nazi control. Pressure from below, from Nazi activists, played a 
major role in forcing the pace of the ‘coordination’. But many organizations showed 
themselves only too willing to anticipate the process and to ‘coordinate’ themselves 
in accordance with the expectations of the new era654 
 
Hitler increased his democratic franchise in two ways. Firstly, he conducted elections and 
plebiscites, and secondly, he increased his support through his foreign policy successes. Childers 
argues that the November 1932 elections halted the inexorable rise and the sense of inevitability of 
achieving power655; Goebbels had said that they should not campaign again while not actually in 
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Government. Now Hitler was, there was a further opportunity, and in the aftermath of the Reischtag 
fire, the internment of thousands of political opponents, and allegations of electoral irregularities, 
the NSDAP increased their vote in March 1933 to 44%. By the following year, the NSDAP was the 
only legitimate political party, but the electoral support was continued and extended with a 
sequence of plebiscites.  
 
The first of these was in October 1933 in the context a foreign policy success. The disarmament 
talks in 1932 and 1933 were struggling with Britain and France unwilling that Germany should have 
parity. Hitler withdrew from the conference, and from the League of Nations, blaming the 
unreasonable terms of the Versailles treaty and the hypocrisy of the allies to whom he had offered 
a total disarmament as an option. The ubiquity of resentment at the terms of the Versailles treaty in 
Germany, and sense of unfair treatment at the hands of the Allies made these moves very popular.  
 
Secondly, in 1934, a plebiscite in the Saarland took place that had been agreed at the point of 
French occupation at the end of the first war. NSDAP propaganda includied flooding the country 
with “Goebbelsschnauzen” (Goebbels’ Snouts) a relatively low priced radio enabling the NSDAP 
and German message to be delivered. Threats and intimidation also contributed to delivering the 
majority preferring to return to Germany, and this was enacted in July 1935 to national jubilation.   
 
In the following years, to these successes was added the reoccupation of the Ruhr – risking a 
French military response in March 1936; the Anschluss with Austria in 1938 and so on to the 
triumphant defeat of France in 1939.  
 
9.9 Hitler as a leadership case history: Conclusion  
 
Hitler’s leadership managed to combine power centralisation with rigid autocracy; extreme 
pragmatism with an iron consistency and strategy based on delicate intuition on one hand and 
instrumental violence on the other. The following chapter pulls together some of these overarching 
themes of Hitler’s leadership and the NSDAP as the organisation he led.  
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10 Case history comments and conclusions 
 
 
For two decades Hitler was a successful leader, growing a small political party to local then 
national success, he then had considerable success geopolitically as chancellor. Within popular 
judgement, his organisation and vision was psychopathic, in the sense of being violent and callous, 
and thirdly, he personally is acknowledged to be significantly personally charismatic. So in the 
exploration of how managers are effective within organisations, and to what extent the personality 
or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable, Hitler was argued to be a “crucial case” justifying 
a single case study methodology 
 
Having set out the facts of his biography, the historical setting (structural context) and his 
leadership case history, this chapter looks at aspects of the culture of Hitler’s leadership and within 
his movement, the NSDAP, then articulates some conclusions including that the NSDAP is best 
characterised as a criminal organisation. Hitler’s own relation to violence is more complicated given 
he was probably Aspergic rather than psychopathic.  
 
 
10.1. NSDAP cultural themes   
 
This section examines prominent aspects of organisational culture within the NSDAP; the 
espoused culture of leadership, the use of mendacity and violence and so on. The selection of 
these themes is partly heuristic, for example the centrality of violence as ideology and strategy, or 
the ubiquity of mendacity; partly  linked to the theme of the research, such as the phenomenon of 
the Fuhrerprinzip, and partly the themes echo emphases made by other writers, for example  the 
cult pf personality656.  
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10.1.1 The Fuhrerprinzip 
In this discussion, there is some laxity between referring to the leadership themes and cultures of 
“Hitler” and “the NSDAP”. This is partially justified on the grounds of the culture of personal 
allegiance to Hitler demanded and the structure of the Furherprinzip, the absolute authority of the 
leader.  
 
Through its ranks, the NSDAP developed a particular culture of leadership, where the leader was 
the total autocratic authority. This reflected Hitler’s own attitude to his leadership of the party, the 
so-called Fuhrer principle. In MK, Hitler articulates his contempt for democratic politics, suggesting 
that  
 
There is a better chance of seeing a camel pass through the eye of a needle than of 
seeing a really great man 'discovered' through an election. Whatever has happened 
in history above the level of the average of the broad public has mostly been due to 
the driving force of an individual personality.657 
 
His position (somewhat after Nietzsche) is that there are great people who change history, rather 
that the structuralist account of tectonic societal tropes driving change. The authority of these 
Ubermensch within their organisations should be complete. The person bestowed with leadership 
authority   
 
… is the sole leader of the movement. All the committees are responsible to him, but 
he is not responsible to the committees. His decision is final, but he bears the whole 
responsibility of it. The members of the movement are entitled to call him to account 
by means of a new election ... He is then replaced by a more capable man who is 
invested with the same authority and obliged to bear the same responsibility. One of 
the highest duties of the movement is to make this principle imperative not only 
within its own ranks but also for the whole State. The man who becomes leader is 
invested with the highest and unlimited authority, but he also has to bear the last 
and gravest responsibility. 658 
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This bestowal of absolute authority is the Fuhrerprinzip, this cascading to local leaders of the 
groups of paramilitaries, which autocracy lead to public criticism and unrest,after their roles were 
enfranchised by the state after 1933. At the level of the NSDAP party, the organisational culture 
was of complete obedience to the Fuhrer. At the level of the state this was echoed by the 
presidency, which Hitler aligned integrated with the Chancellorship.  
 
 
10.1.2 The Cult of Personality.  
Following Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933, the effects of the personality cult could be seen; as 
Kershaw summarises 
 
‘Poems’ – usually unctuous doggerel verse, sometimes with a pseudo-religious tone 
– were composed in his honour. ‘Hitler-Oaks’ and ‘Hitler-Lindens’, trees whose 
ancient pagan symbolism gave them special significance to völkisch nationalists 
and Nordic cultists, were planted in towns and villages all over Germany. 252 Towns 
and cities rushed to confer honorary citizenship on the new Chancellor. Streets and 
squares were named after him… the Führer cult created an entire industry of kitsch 
– pictures, busts, reliefs, postcards, figurines, penknives, badges, illuminated 
buttons, zinc plates…659 
 
Its creation had its roots from about 1922; up until that time Hitler had only foretold of a leader that 
would come after him; criticising the confusion and indecision of the Weimar democracy around 
him, and arguing that there was a need for a German saviour, a leader to cut through the tangle of 
pluralism  
 
It is not possible to clearly identify the point at which Hitler embraced the idea of his own saviour-
hood, perhaps it grew in the context of recognising his rhetorical power in speeches, and utilising 
this to be organisationally effective, or his success in the 1924 trial after the 1923 putsch. Another 
contributor cited by Kershaw is Mussolini’s success in Italy with the March on Rome in October 
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1922660. Alternatively, his avowal of being the “drummer” for the leader to be was the same 
dynamic described below, of Hitler playing the ingénue while planning the more omnipotent path.  
 
From the days of his well pressed evening wear as a teenager when in the Vienna Opera as 
described by Kubizeck, Hitler was fastidious about his appearance, and this extended to his public 
persona in the form of his images. Throughout, he operated through one photographer Hoffmann 
with whom he was close friends, and through whom he kept very tight control of images of himself 
allowed into public, hence the popular images of his stern half profile, a favoured shot. His self-
conscious control and manipulation of his appearance is illustrated by a series of photographs 
Hoffmann was commissioned to take by Hitler articulating passionate poses he might assume 
during speeches661 in order to understand the impact of his oratory. 
 
The content of the personality cult can be argued to be fairly generic psychoanalytically understood 
as a projection of the followers “ego-ideal”662 (an internal representation of the self as one would 
like to become) onto the subject of the cult. The image management task is simply to maintain the 
public persona in such a way as not to jar with that benign public perception. Hitler was being 
portrayed as being an expert on everything from theatre to architecture663; loving children and 
animals, ascetic and hardworking.  
 
Kershaw argues that the bestowed charisma deriving from the large car and the airborne leader 
both were explicitly to contribute to this cult. Hitler used a large Mercedes Limousine from the point 
of his release from prison in 1923, along with the “Hitler over Germany” accounts664 of his using 
aircraft in the 1932 elections to speak in up to five different cities in one day to massed rallies of 30-
100 thousand. 
 
However, Kershaw also suggests that active propaganda, even with Goebbels’ virtuoso could not 
have created the adulation that surrounded Hitler, for example “Hitler Day” for his 42nd Birthday 
where almost all towns and cities were festooned in his honour. There seemed to be a dependency 
need within the population to latch onto a saviour figure Hitler utilised665. In explaining the 
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phenomenon of Hitler’s success in capturing popular attention, Laswell’s work, “psychopathology 
and politics” cited by kets de Vries, would suggest that 
 
What gives truly effective leaders such conviction and power is their ability to 
articulate the underlying issues of a society …trying to solve for all what they 
originally could not solve for themselves666  
 
In addition, to the personality cult, Hitler the individual held together a movement with very diverse 
aspirations, more violent; more socialist than its publicly acceptable image; and he sustained this 
with something of a vacuum in relation to publicly acceptable policy, thus retaining public support. 
 
 
10.1.3 Instrumental use of violence 
Violence by Hitler and the NSDAP was in the main not spontaneous and catathymic, it was specific 
and targeted. Psychoanalysis formulates violence as the failure of symbolisation667 supporting 
Arendt’s version of its use politically as crossing a Rubicon; breaking a boundary that subsequently 
redefines the movement668.  In terms of power (previously discussed) violence is a powerful 
legitmiser, and for the NSDAP violence was at its core; tactically, strategically and ideologically.  
 
 Violence as tactics. From the start of the movement, violence was used informally to 
protect meetings of the party and become involved in fights with and intimidation of 
communists and opposing parties.  In the context of the inter-war restriction on the 
Wehrmacht and tolerance of such groups, the NSDAP paramilitary group, lead by Rohm, 
became the SA. 
 
Planning for and enacting the putsch in 1923 with the Kampfbund; the violence in the 
streets leading up to the seizure of power in 1933, and the violence and settling of scores 
after Hitler became chancellor, were tactics to support Hitler’s claim to the Chancellorship 
in the context of the NSDAP electoral success, and then to assert the authority of the new 
order from 1933.669 
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In both the 1923 putsch, and for the passing of the 1934 enabling act, peaceful political 
process was explicitly distorted by the threat from armed men. Kahr’s political meeting was 
surrounded by SA with guns in the chamber, as was the Reichstag in 1934.  
 
 Violence as strategy. In Bavaria between the years 1920-23 Hitler obtained concessions 
with the threat of civil war. At a national level a decade later, the rapid sequence of Reich 
elections between 1929 and 1933 was due in no small part to SA agitation and 
coordination of civil unrest, combined, Janus faced with avowed political legitimacy, and 
development of the political franchise. Schleicher’s strategy of including Hitler in 
Government was in part to pacify this destabilising influence670.  
 
Finally, and triumphantly, it was the credible threat of a further conflagration to a war weary 
Europe in 1938 that may have enabled Hitler to persuade Chamberlain that his territorial 
ambitions extended no further than Czechoslovakia. In all three of these situations; from 
the street brawls with the communists in Munich in 1920 – the key was that the threat was 
not idle; that there was a culture of actuated violence, and that Hitler and many of his ex-
army followers enjoyed, relished and glorified violence and the opportunity to articulate it.  
 
From early in the development of the NSDAP, the political growth of the party was 
paralleled with the development and growth of a paramilitary violent element. Once in 
government, this utilisation of violence was a natural and a central part of the party’s 
activity. Candlelight processions and large set piece rallies were intimidating because of 
the numbers involved, the uniforms and the militarism.  The power and effectiveness of 
Hitler and the NSDAP use of violence was that political “negotiation” was frequently 
concessions obtained under threat of violence. This process had two parts, the credible 
threat of violence (as evidenced by practice), and the phobia of violence in others in the 
decades after the Great War. Repeatedly, Hitler took a position of publicly condemning the 
violence, but quietly condoning and coordinating it to achieve maximum impact. 
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 Violence as ideology. Rees’ interpretation of Hitler’s “struggle” (Kampf) is that it was 
violent; that it was a ubiquitous and inevitable consequence of his social Darwinism. The 
competition for survival is between different races as evolutionary units, and war and 
violence is that struggle manifest.671  
 
Hitler’s achievement was to surf on the wave of violence without being consumed by it; the 
dilemma of how to balance and manage the violence, on the one hand fanning it sufficiently to 
drive the political process through the credible threat and concession, but on the other, not to 
actually unleash it, and thus undermine the party’s wider political legitimacy.  
 
There was some genuine difficulty in this; the Beer Hall Putsch and the unsuccessful march on the 
parliament the following day both may have been enacted prematurely because of the groundswell 
of pressure of pent up violence and the requirement to act. In the years 1931-32, with the Nazi 
party a significant force in national politics and Hitler refusing places in coalition governments, there 
was again the difficulty of keeping the violence of his followers at bay, leading to its outpouring in 
the days and weeks following his eventual accession to the Chancellorship in January 1933. 
 
 
10.1.4 National Socialism as a secular religion 
The religious nature of fervent political movements has been a traditional theme of analysis, for 
example Tocqueville’s analysis of the French Revolution672; that it “pursued the same course as a 
religious revival”. Hitler writes in MK that in the monastery that has on one icon the swastika later 
adopted by the NSDAP, he   
 
practised singing in the choir … and thus it happened that I was placed in a very 
favourable position to be emotionally impressed again and again by the magnificent 
splendour of ecclesiastical ceremonial.673 
 
The religious elements of the NSDAP might be broadly listed 
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 The emotional appeal of revivalism. Rees674 emphasises the collective sense of defeat 
and exhaustion in the German people in the aftermath of the war, and during the periods of 
economic crisis in the hyperinflation of 1923, and the economic crash of 1930; that Hitler 
was preaching a form of redemption and renewal on the grounds of a pan-German revival.  
 
 The cultivation of martyrs; Hitler begins MK with a solemn list of the “fallen” in the 1923 
putsch, whose names continued to be revered. For example Burleigh describes the explicit 
search for an appropriate death to sanctify by Goebbels675, alighting upon Horst Wessel, 
whose self penned song became a second national anthem, sung at each sitting of the 
Reichstag along with Deutschland Uber Alles.  
 
 The creation of pseudo religious icons and ritual. Rallies and assemblies of the NSDAP 
clearly mimic those of religious worship ritual and observance. A significant icon was the 
NSDAP colours flag carried on the 1923 Putsch, spattered with the “Blood of the martyrs”, 
which was solemnly placed on the dais alter, and each new party divisional flag was 
touched by it.  
 
 The observance of a calendar of festivals and holidays, marking anniversaries of the 
NSDAP movement, for example the 9th of November from the 1923 Putsch; the “seizure of 
power” on 30th January;  these being honoured by speeches, rallies; centrally organised 
celebratory activities; and the crowning Autumn Nuremberg rally. 
 
Rees links the three elements of the Fuhrerprinzip; the personality cult and Hitler’s rhetorical skills 
as components of his charisma in the religious sense. He argues that these specific factors 
combined with other general and situational ones, such as the public need for a saviour; the sense 
of anomie, and hunger for certainty in the face of bewildering change. These synergistically 
combined to heighten the emotional impact of the movement, and the salvationist illusion. In 
addition, Rees notes, Hitler amplified the religious symbolism in each speech, by emphasising his 
humble beginnings; his ascetic simplicity and his path of suffering as a junior soldier, evoking the 
stable, the teachings and the crucifixion testing of the Nazarene. Rees cites Orwell 
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The fact is that there is something deeply appealing about him… the face of a man 
suffering under intolerable wrongs… it reproduces the expression of innumerable 
pictures of Christ crucified, and there is little doubt that that is how Hitler sees 
himself.676 
 
The effect of this revivalist religious fervour was to facilitate the denial of reality; the reorientation of 
the moral compass. For Rees, the NSDAP, like an economic market bubble, had faith as its central 
scaffold. He cites Mussolini 
 
Faith moves mountains, because it gives us the illusion that mountains do move677 
 
Hitler was a chorister age 8; the embedded ritual that formed part of the candlelight processions, 
the icons and festival days of the Nazis clearly have the character of "ecclesiastical ceremony" as 
practiced in that setting. This aspect of the Nazi regime has been articulated in terms of the extent 
to which it might be termed a political religion itself. Adding to Toquevilles analysis678, it is 
unsurprising that, Voegelin’s “The Political Religions”679 published in 1938 and pointing out the 
false dichotomy between Church and state in a historical context, was suppressed by the NSDAP.  
 
Within the Nazi movement, there were later moves towards a reinstatement of the more traditional 
German pagan traditions, although Hitler himself seemed unimpressed by these. Rather, he 
seemed to maintain a statesmanlike support of the established Christian religions, although those 
closer to him, and comments from the “Table Talk” write ups of discussions among his confidants 
suggest a more cynical politically expedient attitude. 
 
In the long run, National Socialism and religion will no longer be able to exist 
together680 
 
He argues that he would anticipate religion would eventually wither or consume itself, but also later 
arguing that Christianity is preferable to superstition.  
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10.1.5 The message and the lie.  
Managing the message for Hitler had a number of elements. Firstly, in its form; his speeches and 
the party propaganda. Second the content, with alternation between clarity and vagueness of 
policy, the “big lie” and sprachregelung.   
 
Message delivery. Hitler argued that the most powerful form of engagement was real engagement 
with real people, delivering speeches and persuading people 
 
An orator receives continuous guidance from the people before whom he speaks. 
This helps him to correct the direction of his speech; for he can always gauge, by 
the faces of his hearers, how far they follow and understand him, and whether his 
words are producing the desired effect … He will always follow the lead of the great 
mass in such a way that from the living emotion of his hearers the apt word which 
he needs will be suggested to him and in its turn this will go straight to the hearts of 
his hearers … In this struggle between the orator and the opponent whom he must 
convert to his cause this marvellous sensibility towards the psychological 
influences of propaganda can hardly ever be availed of by an author.681 
 
Message clarity. In the 1930s, a German conservative Herman Rauschning who had initially 
supported the NSDAP, fell out with them, and exiled himself. He became a critic and Nazi 
detractor, and having settled in the US, published a supposed exposé of the invidiousness of the 
regime, “Hitler Speaks”682. This was based upon personal conversations, the authenticity of which 
was challenged. The debate was unnecessary; the NSDAP programme had been clearly set out in 
Mein Kampf, published in 1925. Indeed, the notorious Nuremberg Laws of 1935 depriving the 
Jewish people of citizenship were the enactment of points 4, 5 and 6 from the 1920 NSDAP 
manifesto’s “25 points”.  
 
Hitler and the NSDAP were extremely consistent in their aims – and clear about them.  
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Propaganda. Characteristic of the NSDAP throughout its history, and of the national regime it 
articulated when in power, was a tight control of the message (with the 1934 sedition laws making 
comments against the Fuhrer a capital offence for example) and the promulgation of propaganda. 
The centrality of propaganda to Hitler’s thinking and political strategy is illustrated by the fact that 
his first role within the NSDAP was as being in charge of propaganda. In MK several years later, he 
commended Leuger (Mayor of Vienna) for his intuitive skill in managing the public perception, and 
he expounded this theoretical underpinning 
 
… All effective propaganda must be confined to a few bare essentials and those 
must be expressed as far as possible in stereotyped formulas… it must appeal to 
the feelings of the public rather than to their reasoning powers… finding the 
appropriate psychological form that will arrest the attention and appeal to the hearts 
of the national masses… it must present only that aspect of the truth which is 
favourable to its own side [and with]… constant repetition will finally succeed in 
imprinting an idea on the memory [and]… be rewarded by the surprising and almost 
incredible results683 
 
Goebbels, an academic, was Strasser’s more socialist wing of the NSDAP684. Hitler recognised his 
talents at the confrontational meeting in Bamberg in 1926 when he wrested back complete 
leadership, inviting him to Munich so he shifted camps. The centrality and importance of Goebbels’ 
role in shaping and organising the propaganda effort cannot be overemphasised, illustrated by the 
fact that Goebbels’ family was in the Berlin Bunker on April 1945 at the end, shooting their children 
before committing suicide themselves.   
 
The “Big Lie” describes the technique of developing explicit and conscious fabrications and 
untruths. Hitler describes the “big lie” in MK 
 
In the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad masses 
of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional 
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nature than consciously or voluntarily;… they would not believe that others could 
have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. Even though the facts which 
prove this to be so may be brought clearly to their minds, they will still doubt and 
waver and will continue to think that there may be some other explanation. For the 
grossly impudent lie always leaves traces behind it, even after it has been nailed 
down, 685 
 
It is entirely consistent with Hitler’s leadership style that the “big lie” in MK is attributed to others in 
the context of a moral disapprobation. Throughout the war he subsequently created, he 
unwaveringly attributes the aggression to the allies, in particular to an international Jewish 
conspiracy while his regime is enacting genocide in the east against that same people.  
 
Sprachregelung The word “sprachregelung” refers to the use of euphemistic terms. For the 
NSDAP, the notorious ones included the “Aktion T4” “euthanasia” program where those with 
physical deformities and psychiatric illness were killed. In the case of children, they were sent to 
the “children’s speciality department”. “Wet work” referred to engaging in actual violence and 
torture rather than the more office surveillance and detective work of the SS. In the same vein, the 
1944 preparations for the Red Cross visit to the Terezin (Theresienstat) concentration camp in 
June 1944, where shops, cultural centres and good accommodation were faked as part of a dupe 
away from the reality of the “final solution”, itself a “spraregelung”. The notorious “Einsatzgruppen”, 
or “task force”, were formed with the explicit role of killing the Jewish people, socialist and 
intelligentsia in the Eastern occupied countries, known as “Housecleaning”.  
 
While the NSDAP euphemisms were particularly grotesque and a potential illustration of Arendt’s 
“Banality of Evil”, the practice of euphemising is ubiquitous. For Hitler and the NSDAP as the 
regime progressed, the extent, the extremity and the centrality of the violence meant that the 
normal euphemisms had to cover much more disturbing reality than they normally do. Indeed, the 
need to use them argues against the evil being banal, but rather that it retained some of its 
emotional valence that people prefer not to directly mention.  
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Hitler duplicitously convinced Chamberlain that he was both a man of his word, and wanted peace, 
in the context of a German rearmament programme and clearly declared war aims. Hitler himself 
was unprepared for Chamberlain’s concessions such that he had to put the planned invasion of on 
hold686.  
 
10.1.6 Centralisation by distribution.  
Kershaw’s account of “working towards the Fuhrer687”, where preference and career progression 
was based on anticipating what Hitler would want and making it happen, was in part a reaction to 
the lack of clear bureaucratic structures688. Hitler’s “administration” would include poorly set out job 
roles so that there was a form of managerial and policy Darwinism, where the different people with 
overlapping responsibility would fight it out among themselves; or work to best each other in 
anticipating Hitler’s wishes in their “working towards” him, with Hitler siding with the winner of the 
competition.  
 
This distancing himself from the operational activities of the state had the effect of enhancing his 
perceived power through his inaccessibility, but also, as the violence of the regime unfolded, a gap 
was perceived between Hitler himself, and the actions of his subordinates. Thus the actions of the 
SA were perceived as local excesses about which Hitler must be ignorant.  
 
 
10.2 Organisational culture more clearly attributable to Hitler personally.  
 
While the case history of Hitler and the NSDAP illustrates well the way that effective leaders mould 
the culture and then the structure of the organisation to a template articulated by their own 
personality, there are several further significant aspects of Hitler’s character itself that seem more 
clearly attributable to the man, as illustrated by his more personal and social behaviour and his 
activity at those points where he had to make decisions himself in the loneliness of power689.  
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10.2.1 Passivity and action.  
Hitler’s executive activity can be seen as an oscillation between action, decisive and at times 
brutal; and passivity.  
 
Prevarication and delay, The management of the SA in the months after the “seizure of 
power” is an example of his extended prevarication prior to an incisive and brutal action. 
Their violent anti-Semitism was not tolerated by moderate opinion, neither was Rohm’s 
pushing to subordinate the Reichweir to the SA. Hitler eventually acted on the night of the 
long knives of the 1934 purge.  Similar to this was his apparent passivity, holding out for 
the chancellorship, and refusing the vice-chancellorship.  Kershaw cites Weidemann;  
 
‘He took the view that many things sorted themselves out if they were 
left alone.’690 
  
High stakes gambling. Alternatively, Hitler could be decisive and audacious, time and 
again taking a significant risk. 
 
 Within 6 months of joining the DAP, and in the context of their previous political 
gatherings attracting a hundred people or so, Hitler hired the Staatliches 
Hofbrauhause which could hold two thousand; a massive step up from the usual 
audiences gathered, and a gamble, albeit successful.  
 
 When confronted in July1921 about being overbearing, he resigned from the party. 
His comrades, realising that Hitler was this small parties main asset, allowed him 
to return on his own terms which included his being undisputed leader.  
 
 The 1923 Putsch and his strategy in the subsequent court case, namely to entirely 
own responsibility for the action. Given that this was high treason, this was again a 
significant personal risk.  
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 Holding out for the chancellorship in the context of declining electoral votes, and 
refusing the vice-chancellorship was a significantly risky strategy 
 
 Subsequent foreign policy triumphs 
o Occupation of the Ruhr valley 
o Anschluss with Austria 
o Occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland and then the bold conquest of 
France in 4 days.  
 
Characteristic of Hitler’s resolution was a clarity and certainty once he had decided how to proceed. 
 
 
10.2.2 Playing the Ingénue.  
Time and again from Hitler’s commencement of professional potency, Hitler was repeatedly 
underestimated and dismissed by his peers. This is first seen at the point at which he joined and 
then took over the NSDAP because Drexler thought he could “use” him. The quintessential iteration 
of this process was his duping of Chamberlain in 1938 over Czechoslovakia, persuading this 
cultured and experienced statesman that he was a “man of his word”; a man that that he, 
Chamberlain, and the British people could “do business with”.  
 
In the granting of Hitler the Chancellorship in January 1933, von Papen sought to “play” Hitler, 
proposing to Hindenburg the cabinet with him (von Papen) and Hitler in Chancellor and vice-
chancellor roles, reassuring Hindenburg (throughout extremely sceptical and disapproving of a 
Hitler chancellery) that with himself, the authoritative Hugenberg and all but two of the cabinet as 
von Papen’s men, that Hitler would be “boxed in” and easily manageable.  
 
Stalin was said not to have believed that Barbarossa had begun, and while the Blitzkrieg had 
commenced in one area of the Germano-Soviet border, raw materials were still being shipped to 
Germany by Stalin as part of the Nazi-Soviet pact.  
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It is not clear the extent to which it was an avowed strategy of Hitler’s to maintain a role of being 
faintly absurd (the Charlie Chaplain moustache); his predilection until quite late for odd looking 
Volkish Bavarian clothing and lederhosen, possibly so as to be easily dismissed and 
underestimated. 
 
 
10.3 NSDAP Germany was a criminal organisation 
 
The proposal  that the NSDAP was a criminal organisation (and that the whole state of Germany 
became thus) derives from two arguments, echoing the discussions above in Ch 4.  The table 
below is an extension of table 11 (above); and evidences the significant leaning of the NSDAP 
towards a more criminal organised culture.  
 Pro-social legitimate 
business organisation 
NSDAP 
Violence Nonviolence Violence as central strategy and tactics; e.g. SA in 
Karr’s meeting prior to 1923 putsch; SA in Reichstag 
during the vote for Enabling Law  
Openness Transparency  “The big lie” explicitly articulated in Mein Kampf 
State 
structures 
Work with legitimate 
(state) authority 
Revolution through the democratic process; assumption 
of control of state followed by dissolution of democratic 
process; enactment of “protocol of the Elders of Zion” 
Democratic 
process 
Work within democratic 
process 
Explicit perversion of process; e.g. Exclusion and 
internment of various deputies and SA threat for the 
vote on the “Enabling Law”; Reichstag votes of no 
confidence to bring down government coalition;  
Judicial 
process 
Work within judicial 
process 
Maintenance of some judicial independence within 
Germany; extermination of judiciary and other prominent 
cultural figures in occupied territory, e.g. Poland.  
Group task Legitimate business 
providing financial gain 
Enacting supremacy of the German race through theft 
and violence to peer nation states and non German 
races 
Personnel Free entry/exit Executions of anti-Hitler commentators 
Equal rights Espousal of equal rights; 
recognition of wide group 
of stakeholders 
Structural (state enabled) abnegation of rights of groups 
through tight definition of citizenship  
 
Table 12. Legitimate pro-social and NSDAP organisational culture (c.f. table 11 above) 
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This contention is supported further by considering the NSDAP in terms of the moral matrices 
described above (4.4). In the Machiavellian matrix of ends vs. means, both were bad/antisocial, 
thus defining it through this analysis as a criminal organisation.  
 
Kershaw, commenting on the characters of the people Hitler had around about him, writes that his 
inner court had the “whiff of the gangsters den691” The researcher submits that descriptively and in 
terms of the moral matrix analysis above that the NSDAP and Germany following the enabling law 
could be characterised as organised crime.  
 
A second argument in favour of defining the NSDAP and so the German state after 1930 a criminal 
organisation is to be found in the ethical typology of organisational morality described in 4.4 above. 
“Criminal organisations” are redefined in terms of their being distinguishable from Machiavellian 
organisations and Balkan’s “psychopathic organisations” by virtue of their different aims.  
 
Critics of this conclusion would cite Kellerman’s work on “Bad Leadership” (4.1 above), in that the 
descriptions are partial and can be described in positive and negative terms. For example, NSDAP 
Germany was successful as a government using many economic and political indices in the 1930s.  
 
A criminal organisation might be characterised as one which has the triad of an adverse aim (racial 
supremacy for the NSDAP); centrally uses violence (politically and internationally for the NSDAP), 
and mendacity (Chamberlain dupe of “Peace in our time”). Some of the issues set out above in the 
case history “Leadership Themes” section, can be seen to echo the comments of “V” in his mafia 
manager book (4.2.4), for example the parallel between the Fuhrerprinzip and V’s Mafia “Patron”, 
or the NSDAP using the threat of violence and actual violence at a micro- and geopolitical level as 
an application of V’s comment that “a kind word and a gun are much more effective than a kind 
word alone”692.  
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An area for further research might be whether the extensively explored and documented history of 
the NSDAP itself can illuminate some of the organisational, leadership and management 
characteristics of self declared criminal organisations.  
 
 
10.4 Case history conclusions.  
 
Hitler as a case study related to the research question has been relevant relating to several of the 
parameters. He was clearly an effective manager and leader, and his personality was a critical 
variable both in terms of the delivery of a consistent overarching strategy and personal world view, 
and his personal charisma and cult of personality. 
 
A significant factor to have emerged unexpectedly from the case history was the extent to which 
Hitler and the NSDAP utilised the “transactional” elements of leadership (involving position power, 
coercion and reward) in the enactment and building of their power, particularly with the “enabling 
law”. Hitler and the NSDAP may have “seized power” through charisma, rhetoric and persuasion, 
but having seized it, they utilised the machinery of the state to maximal advantage.  
 
One concluding proposal is that Hitler and the NSDAP were the embodiment of a post modern 
political movement and then State. The centrality of power is both a critique and a tenet of post 
modernism. A critique in that Lyotard’s “incredulity toward metanarratives”693 delegitimises 
overarching understandings of human and societal development and progress, religious, national, 
progressive (in the Hegelian sense), leaving a vacuum that is filled only by the pursuit of power. 
Foucault’s analysis of various phenomena are reducible in essence to the exchanges and 
dynamics of power694, foreshadowed by Nitzsche’s “will to power”695  Hitler and the NSDAP  
redefined traditional morality, usurped the authority of religious ritual and manipulated the 
democratic process explicitly in the interests of the “seizure of power”, then having achieved this 
nationally, extended it out wards internationally by dupe, brinkmanship, threat and violence until it 
was thwarted.  
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A second concluding proposal is that the NSDAP was a criminal organisation. This proposal 
distinguishes the two elements of the Hitler/NSDAP phenomenon, the psychopathy/violence 
element and the charismatic/religious one described in 10.1.4, where the NSDAP’s function as a 
secular religion is proposed.  
 
It is submitted that Hitler’s charisma was the critical factor of success  rather than the violent 
character of Hitler’s vision and culture of the NSDAP, on the grounds of firstly he universally being 
described as being a charismatic speaker and leader, supported by the development of a 
personality cult and the explicit religiosity of NSDAP ritual. Secondly, this is proposed on the 
grounds of the evidence of this charismatic leadership being a crucial element in the development 
of his base of support, through his speaking engagements, then Hitler explicitly developing 
elements of charisma, (for example the 4 Is model696), of having exceptional ability, being inspiring, 
intellectually stimulating and giving the impression of caring and interest in followers. Hitler’s 
charisma enabled him in sequence to take over the small DAP, making it his own organisational 
vehicle, to grow it as a party then as a national movement.  
 
The classification of the NSDAP as a criminal organisation, however, potentially limits the 
applicability of findings from this case history to normal and non criminal ones. In addition, it has 
been argued that Hitler personally was not psychopathic (7.4).  Yet he was an effective leader. The 
amount of violence enacted by the regime suggests it was likely that there were a number of 
psychopathic people in positions of power, but Hitler’s own “psychopathic” vision seems to have 
derived from an Asperger/autistic  personal pathology, such that his use of the violent activities of 
the regime derived from an absence or lack of emotional resonance with the regime’s victims rather 
than a more psychopathic callousness or enjoyment of violence . Hitler can be said not to have 
been a case study that fully explored the question of psychopathy in leadership.   
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11. Conclusions: Research contributions and the managerial agency concept 
 
 
The research question for the project was to enquire how managers are effective within 
organisations, and specifically to what extent the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a 
critical variable in explaining that effectiveness. As described below, the outcomes of the research 
have been limited by a number of constraints and errors, although some tentative conclusions can 
be drawn that comprise the contributions of the research.   
 
This final chapter will centrally set out the response to the research question of “how managers are 
effective within organisations” through annotating the managerial agency concept. However, first 
other conclusions will be briefly rehearsed that are believed to be contributions.  
 
 
11.1 Conclusions/contributions within earlier chapters.  
 
These conclusions split into three broad groups, first conclusions about the case study, second, 
conclusions and contributions drawn during the process of the theoretical exposition, and third 
general conclusions about the second limb of the research question, to what extent the personality 
or psychopathy of the leader is a critical variable determining their effectiveness.  
 
 Regarding the case study, it has been argued that Hitler’s personal psychological 
pathology probably best fits an Asperger’s diagnosis (7.5.3). This has been previously 
tangentially suggested in the literature, but the depth of clinical review in the present study 
and evidence to support the diagnosis is novel. Further, and more controversially, it raises 
the question of the personal moral valence of his genocidal policies, in that they possibly 
have an ablative unemotional “autistic” quality. This finding directly impacts upon the 
second half of the research question, namely to what extent is the psychopathy of a 
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manager is a critical variable in explaining their effectiveness. It has been argued that Hitler 
was a crucial case to test the hypothesis. The finding of his not having been psychopathic 
suggests that this is not a critical variable.   
 
 It was also proposed that the NSDAP is best described as a “criminal organisation” (10.3), 
supported by an analysis utilising a Machiavellian ends/means matrix and an ethical 
acceptability vs. efficacy matrix; itself a novel technique (4.4). Comparison of Machiavellian 
vs. Mafia organisations on these matrices distinguishes the “goodness of aims” as a critical 
variable, such that Machiavelli’s Prince, or Hobbes’ ruthless monarch may not be criminal if 
their objective is peace or an ordered society. This proposal may raise more questions 
than it answers, but it provides explanatory value in understanding the culture and actions 
of the regime more clearly, pointing towards criminal and mafia as comparison 
organisations rather than other legitimate political parties or governments, however 
ruthless and Machiavellian in the pursuit of their goals.  
 
 It was proposed that the Hitler/NSDAP phenomenon articulates a post modern polity, with 
power as the only meaningful object and currency. This proposal illumines the ability of the 
regime to utilise and manipulate cultural metanarratives such as religion, nationalism, race 
and the Hegelian “Phenomenology of Spirit” belief in progress, instrumentally to obtain 
power. 
 
The second group of conclusions relates more to the specific question in the research. Firstly the 
question of how managers are effective within organisations, it is concluded that the leadership 
model of charisma or transformational leadership contribute in combination with sociological 
models of power.  
 
 In chapter 4, an alternative evolutionary model of “bad charisma” to the typologies in the 
literature was proposed (4.2.2). This contributes to the charisma literature by challenging 
the complacency of traditional typologies that try to explain and bracket the “bad charisma” 
of malignant charismatic leaders such as David Koresh or James Jones. It argues instead 
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that all “good charisma” can turn “bad” as it is challenged, by virtue of the power of the 
charismatic influence on followers. This finding illumined both the paradox that the NSDAP 
was approved of in the early 1930s by many, and how it managed to gain broad popular 
appeal in Germany.  
 
 In chapter 3, an, “object relations” model of structure and agency is proposed (3.3.3), 
borrowing from psychoanalytic theory, and based on the argument that structure and 
agency are ontologically identical, determined by which person (or “object”) has power. It 
argues that structure and agency is a description of power in personal relationships, that 
the superordinate person’s agency defines the structure for the subordinate. This argument 
is critical in the development below of the managerial agency concept. It proposes that 
power relations and structure/agency struggles are essentially interpersonal phenomena, 
and thus can be influenced by charismatic emotional manipulation.  
 
Turning to conclusions about the second limb of the research question, the following conclusions 
are proposed.  
 
 Regarding the question of psychopathy as a critical variable for effective leadership, the 
research proposes that the critical personality and behavioural variable for effective 
leadership is charisma rather than psychopathy. The “answer” to the clinical riddle 
proposed in chapter 1 about similarities between psychopathic patients and organisational 
CEOs is that some psychopathic patients have charismatic personalities and so can enact 
some organisational agency consequent on this. Their effectiveness is predicated upon 
their charisma rather than their psychopathy. 
 
 Regarding the question of whether the personality of the leader is a critical variable, the 
evidence from the case history is that it is. Firstly the leader's personality is important in 
that charisma is a “neo trait” theory based upon a personality trait of the leader. Secondly, 
the case history illustrates the centrality of Hitler’s personality in shaping the organisation 
then the country, illustrated by the development of a cult of personality.   
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11.2 Organisational effectiveness: Managerial agency 
 
The proposal of a concept of “managerial agency” provides a response to the research question of 
how managers are effective within organisations. The model combines four theoretical strands that 
have emerged;  
 
 The object relations theory of structure and agency (3.3.) with its central argument that 
structure and agency are ontologically identical, namely ideas held collectively and 
individually, respectively 
 Archer’s Critical Realist Morphogenic model linking agency, culture and structure, (3.1.4);  
 Accounts of charisma (2.1.2)  
 The accounts of discipline and power as an internalised structure of Foucault and others 
(3.2.4).  
 
The model is predicated on the assumption that organisational effectiveness is based upon the 
manager galvanising subordinates to enact their vision, and the argument can be summarised as 
follows.  
 
1. Subordinates’ behaviour is determined by internalised “structurated” habitus (Giddens’ 
praxis of structurations (3.1)697; Bordieu’s “habitus” (3.2.4)698; Foucault’s internal 
“discipline” (3.2.4)699. 
2. The managerial agent, through the mechanism of charisma has the ability to mould and 
change the internalised structures of their subordinates.  
3. The manager enacts agency within their group through the  
a. Active charismatic emotional manipulation of followers internal structures and 
attitudes,  
b. Establishing an investment in their (the manager’s) vision  
c. The manager’s vision becomes the new culture, and so is structurated to become 
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the new structure.  
 
More descriptively, this model involves the construction of a vision that can be communicated to 
and is intelligible to followers (what we are going to do); and secondly, the charismatic or 
transformational function, that is why followers should do it; why it is in their own interests to do it; 
why they will be transformed by doing it. This transformational/charismatic element enhances 
performance by galvanising followers’ enthusiasm about the task. This will enhance their 
performance and provide organisational “stretch”. The model can be divided into three stages, 
characterised below as seduction, enrolment and consolidation, loosely parallel to the different 
types of management/leadership referred to above (2.1.2), transactional, transformational and 
charismatic.  
 
 
11.2.1 Seduction.  
The first stage is the process whereby the manager in the new setting is commencing their 
engagement. The end point is that the followers are listening, that they are paying active attention 
to their manager/leader, and that they are receptive to and interested in hearing what he or she has 
to say.  
 
Aside from having some structural authority that confers an initial legitimacy; the main processes 
active at this point are the manager, tuning into, or divining, the collective psychology of the group, 
and then addressing it; engaging with the issues as they are perceived by the group members. The 
group’s ”collective psychology” can be an issue relating to history (the departure of the previous 
manager, for example) or it may be a specific dynamic of one or two powerful members of the 
group. For Hitler, it was the collective sense of grievance at the wounded narcissism of a proud 
race that felt undefeated following its 1918 retreat at the armistice from occupied land, and unfairly 
treated by Versailles.  
 
The second task of the manager is that they have to begin to address the issues, to demonstrate 
that they have “read” the psychology; they have “heard” the issues; that they have something 
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sensible and legitimate to say about it. Within this model, the effectiveness of the action is 
immaterial; what is important is that it evidences that the manager is listening to the group, and that 
the manager believes and feels that what the group is saying and feeling is important and 
legitimate. In a parallel process, as the manager demonstrates he or she is listening, so the 
followers start to “listen” to the manager; they become receptive to the manager’s position and 
comment.  
 
11.2.2 Enrolment.  
The second stage is enrolment. Once the manager has got their team listening and indeed hungry 
to hear what they have to say, through the development of elements of dependency, the manager 
delivers his or her vision. The successful end point of the enrolment phase is a workforce with a 
broad consensus on the nature of the task, and motivated to engage with it. 
 
Within this model, the vision consists of more than just how to achieve the task; it contains within it 
value elements (striving to be better for example); transformational elements (achieving the goal 
will make people feel actualised and confirmed), and will be translated into a form that specifically 
responds to, and appears to be a solution for, the group psychology problems noted above.  
 
The manager will communicate both the task related vision and how to achieve it, and also the set 
of values, priorities and world view on which it is based. If enrolment is successful, all of these will 
be accepted by followers, and at the end stage, they will have identified with it. If asked, they would 
not refer to the “manager's vision”, they would articulate “the” vision, complete with values, priorities 
and world view as if it was their own. Accepting the vision is not sufficient, it has to be assimilated, 
to become part of the follower and owned as if it were the followers own.  
 
More concretely, the manager will have a pre-existing vision and task that they will communicate, 
and during the enrolment phase, they use their persuasive skills along with further seduction, 
manipulation, charm and so on, to “bring on board” the group. Whereas in stage one, charm and 
EQ skills are being used to gain the trust and engagement of the group, in the second, they are 
being used to enrol the group in the way of seeing the problem held by the manager. Secondly, 
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they are gaining “buy in” to the manager’s solution. The manager is enrolling the group into 
agreeing with his vision of the task.  
  
By the end of this stage, the manager’s vision is becoming the culture of the organisation. This 
model of effectiveness brings together the sociological and managerial literatures. In the leadership 
model of Schon700, the “glue” between vision and delivery is proposed to be culture, as an 
organisational factor that an effective leader can shape and change. Archer’s morphogenetic 
theory of structure and agency proposes that half way between an agent’s vision and the creation 
of a social structure is culture. Managerial agents create an organisational culture around them 
based upon their own vision and psychological prejudices and preferences, which becomes the 
mindset of the subordinate group.   
 
11.2.3 Consolidation  
The third stage of the managerial agency model covers the process from the point at which 
followers have adopted the leader’s perspective and vision to the point where, through familiarity 
and praxis, it becomes the structure. It becomes the default way of thinking and operating. While 
superficially, the two stages of enrolment and development may seem similar, the difference lies in 
the embedding of an idea vs. the repeated enactment of praxis, doing things shaped by the 
managerial agent’s ideas over and over so that it becomes second nature, becomes habituated. 
This would be structure in the sociological sense of deeply engrained attitudes and processes that 
are seemingly insurmountable; that go unchallenged as they are unnoticed.  
 
In the development of this hegemony, having “won over” followers, the managerial agent 
can bring the more instrumental and transactional dimensions of their position to bear, by 
rewarding and coercing stragglers or non believers to conform. In this way, they are able to 
increase the homogeneity of their culture which has adopted the manager’s values and 
vision, and adapted to it. The use of more transactional reward and coercion provide a  
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Figure 9 The three stage model of managerial agency. 
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second line of defence for the manager in the face of challenge of or threat to the culture/structure. 
The first line is the conformity of the majority, and the natural social forces promoting this 
conformity in social settings. 
 
 
11.2.4 Contextualising the Managerial agency concept 
For the purposes of this research, the terms leadership and management have been elided and 
used synonymously. To develop the concept of managerial agency, there needs to be a return to 
the more traditional division of management and leadership as being distinct.701  
 
Within the “managerial agency” concept, the traditional dichotomy between management and 
leadership is developmental and complementary rather than typological, arguing that transactional 
(managerial) styles develop into  transformational. In the initial stages, the managerial agent with 
some legitimate transactional authority and power is in a position of influence, but this advantage is 
built upon and amplified with the softer more psychological interpersonal skills.  
 
The managerial agent’s “management” role defines two things, firstly their job, meaning the fact 
and dimensions of the individual’s responsibility vis-à-vis the task. Secondly, the “management” 
role defines and denotes the more transactional elements and levers of the role, the identification 
of strategy and tactics in achieving the task; allocation of resources for the task and the 
management of subordinates in terms of performance and reward. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Leadership, management and managerial agency.  
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In its preoccupation with the more inspirational tasks of leadership, the literature rather underplays 
the importance and centrality of management as clunky and process driven. In fact the managerial 
frame is core and central in that it defines the task and the area of responsibility that the leader is 
required to enact. 
 
 
11.2.5 Critique 
The critique of this model derives principally from the criticisms that can be levelled at the research 
methodology, particularly its non positivist approach, although a rationale for the single case study 
design and hermeneutic phenomenology research paradigm has been made above (Chapters 5 
and 6).  
 
Within its own epistemological terms a legitimate criticism of such a model of management might 
derive more generally from its potential irrefutability, following Popper’s criticism of the “pseudo-
sciences”702, where a counter example is re-interpreted within the frame of the model so as not to 
contradict it, for example a non charismatic leader’s behaviour might be reinterpreted as having 
elements of the charismatic process, although they not being obvious. 
 
A second critique might be made building on the assumption that managerial effectiveness within 
an organisation in predicates on their ability to lead, mobilise and direct subordinates. As a result, it 
might be argued that the model covers a very small element of the overall leadership and 
management process, focussing exclusively on the manager’s activity and leadership with their 
own subordinate team, and missing the larger organisational function of the leader, their 
entrepreneurial activity, and engagement with superordinate managers. This is an acknowledged 
failing, based upon Parson’s collectivist notion of power (3.2.2), and there are some speculations 
and proposals for further research noted below.  
 
 
11.3 Research constraints, speculation and recommendation for further research 
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It is a constraint of the research that Hitler was chosen as a “crucial case” because of the 
probability of his being a psychopathic leader. It has been argued that Hitler led an organisation 
that is best characterised as criminal; it is proposed that he himself was on the autistic spectrum 
rather than being psychopathic. Within the crucial case method, this finding proves the null 
hypothesis; concluding that psychopathy is not a critical factor in leadership.  However, a criticism 
might be that this undermines the method, in that he was not a psychopathic leader, and should not 
have been the critical case, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn relating to the second limb 
of the research question. In future research it would be interesting to explore the leadership styles 
of genuinely psychopathic leaders of criminal activities and gangs.  
 
A second significant limitation for the principal conclusion is that it provides a model for leaders to 
influence their followers; that is, how they are effective subordinately. An area for further research 
might be to explore how personality influences superordinate functioning; that is to say, how they 
are effective with those organisational structures that contain the leader and their activity. The 
managerial agent may be effective superordinately by being able to relate to and engage with the 
structures in an organisation because they recognise that the “structures” are in fact people and 
that people can be played by seduction, manipulation, intimidation and so on.  Managerial agency 
may be achieved by the charismatic emotional manipulation of supra-ordinate managers as well.  
  
One might speculate that the role of the leader/manager at whatever level of a rational/legal 
bureaucracy is to both administer, and also be the expert in the rules for the specialist area for 
which they have responsibility, within a Weberian rational/legal authority based bureaucracy703.  
For the managerial agent, the “owner” of these rules would be the best person to know how to “get 
around” them, and would be the person who can make the decision to derogate them for a 
particular instance. In the ward setting, personality disordered patients know this. If the nurse on 
the ward says that something is against the rules, they will mention it to the hospital manager next 
time they are down, or complain to them in order to gain direct access. If they can effectively “play” 
the manager (which comes down to a very personal face to face contest), the rule is reversed, 
dissolved or derogates. Rules in a rational/legal structure are only as robust as their keeper.  
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The managerial agent, therefore, may be upwardly effective; that is, they can change and modify 
the organisational structures that limit their activity. This may be an ability to beneficially “flex” the 
superordinate rules and their respective keepers; “managing up” to influence them to bend these if 
required. For the managerial agent, the organisational structures are people, people who can be 
persuaded, cajoled, manipulated, bullied. With a protégé to appoint during a recruitment freeze, 
there might be a need for “a conversation with A”, a budget holding superordinate manager; finding 
a way around rules about equal opportunities are “lunch with B” who leads HR. Because 
organisational “structures” are in fact simply internalised, structurated, habituated ideas, these 
ideas are owned and administered by individuals who have a personality, proclivities and 
vulnerabilities. The personality may be able to be influenced; can be changed using the same 
charismatic process that mutates the internal structures of subordinates. Following the self 
actualising effect of charisma, A and B in their relative roles may feel good for breaking the 
organisational structures, it having deepened the intimacy with the charismatic managerial agent.  
 
Future research, utilising a qualitative methodology with semi structured interviews might illuminate 
the extent to which bureaucratic organisational structure and function can be flexed by personal 
interaction with the people who hold the authority.  
 
 
10.4 Conclusion 
 
In Weber’s analysis of modernity, he argues that the success of capitalism is in part predicated 
upon the eclipse of magic704   
 
The fate of our times is characterised… above all, by the disenchantment of the 
world705 
 
Overly structured divisions of labour in the “iron cage” of modernity can lead to fatalism, Marx’s 
analysis of alienation within modernity; Durkheim’s description of Anomie.  
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Perhaps the role of the leader in the post religious disenchanted world is to recreate a sense of 
meaning, with an attendant pseudo-spiritual dimension. To create solidarity and community by 
facilitating and attending to the relationships; to dis-alienate the workers from their activity by giving 
the work meaning, and personal relevance; to re-enchant the world of work with spirit, albeit false 
and manufactured and exploitatively instrumental.  
 
It behoves us as followers, notwithstanding complacent reconstructed postmodern irony, to be 
aware of the risks of deserting the rational for the enchantments of the charismatic leader. 
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